Practice theory, ancestor worship, and ritual : an alternative approach to a cross-cultural understanding of Chinese culture by Lakos, W
1 
Practice Theory, Ancestor Worship, and Ritual: 
An Alternative Approach to a Cross-cultural Understanding of 
Chinese Culture 
by 
William Lakos BA, BA(Honours) 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 








Declaration of Originality 
I declare that the material is original, except where due acknowledgment 
is given, and has not been accepted for the award of any other degree or 
diploma. 
In other words, this thesis contains no material which has been accepted 
for a degree or diploma by the University or any other institution, except 
by way of background information and duly acknowledged in the thesis, 
and to the best of my knowledge and belief no material previously 
published or written by another person except where due 
acknowledgment is made in the text of the thesis. 
E 




A 7002 19583948 
3 
Statement of Authority of Access 
This thesis may-be made available for loan. Copying of any part of this 
thesis is prohibited for two years from the date this statement was signed; 
after that time limited copying is permitted in accordance with the 




The inspiration to inquire into Chinese culture came from Prof. Mobo 
Gao, my teacher and guide. The where-with-all to complete such a 
daunting task as this is with my teachers and colleagues in the School of 
Asian Languages and Studies. Special thanks must go to the Head of 
School, A/Prof. Pam Allen for her assistance over many years, and to Dr. 
Barbara Hartley for making the end possible. 
My family has been so important in supporting me. My daughter Rebecca 
has been especially significant with her ongoing encouragement. Lori, my 
wife, has been rock - steadfast under all conditions. The completion of 
this thesis is entirely for her. 
5 
Abstract 
An exposition and analysis of Chinese ancestor worship and its correlations, 
especially filial piety and ritual, will show its intrinsic importance to Chinese culture, 
both normatively and epistemologically. By using a practice theory - ritual approach 
the thesis highlights the relationship between the rituals of ancestor worship and their 
meaning within Chinese culture. In emphasizing the efficacy of ritual to cultural 
meaning the thesis offers an alternative approach to the dominant discourse which 
regards Confucianism as the prime cultural symbol and paradigm of Chinese culture. 
This thesis proposes that the practice of ancestor worship has underpinned Chinese 
culture in many influential and vital ways and provides a nuanced and more 
efficacious paradigm through which Chinese culture may be viewed. 
This is a new approach which finds its inception in a number of contemporary 
theories related to both practice theory and ritual communication theory, and suggests 
that this symbolic- practice oriented approach, with an associated focus on ritual and 
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Introduction 
A New Approach to Understanding Chinese Culture 
Today, as the different peoples of the world find themselves inextricably bound 
together in some form of globalization, it is imperative we have a better understanding 
of each other and each other's culture. The Western world's need to understand China, 
due to contemporary changes and challenges, makes the task even more urgent and 
important. Raymond Dawson (1967, 7) alerts us to this need when he writes, 'As the 
world shrinks and China swells, our ignorance becomes more dangerous'. The West's 
understanding of China and Chinese culture is problematical to a significant degree as 
a consequence of Western hegemony and ethno-centrism imposing its own values, 
meanings, and conceptual paradigms (Al-Azmeh 1991, 468), and the problematic has 
been further exacerbated by the Chinese themselves as they internalize the Western 
understanding. 
In order to ameliorate and overcome the epistemological problematic of a cross-
cultural understanding of China, a new approach to the understanding of China and 
Chinese culture is proposed. This thesis proposes that the practice of ancestor worship 
has underpinned Chinese culture in many influential and vital ways, and a focus on 
the practice of ancestor worship and its corollaries will lead to a better understanding. 
This is a new approach which finds its inception in a number of contemporary 
theories related to both practice theory and ritual communication theory, and suggests 
that a broad-ranging symbolic-anthropological study and an associated focus on ritual 
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and the practice of ancestor worship will provide a nuanced and more efficacious 
paradigm through which Chinese culture may be viewed. 
The Chinese cultural world view is both shaped by ancestor worship and the world of 
the ancestors, and is a source of the conditions which enabled and fostered ancestor 
worship. In this cultural realm, ancestors, self, and heirs are connected in a web of 
relationships bounded by harmony, hierarchy and mutual dependence. 'Reverence for 
ancestors has been part of life for virtually all Chinese, regardless of their 
involvement with other forms of religion or their beliefs in gods or ghosts' (Jochim 
1986, 14) and as 'a factor in moulding Chinese life, [Chinese ancestor worship] can 
hardly be exaggerated (Latourette 1964, 540).' This thesis will go further than Jochim 
and Latourette, and claim that that ancestor worship has been a vital part and a 
significant factor of Chinese culture. Ancestor worship, as the nexus in the web of 
cultural actions, is also the epistemological key to a better, less ideologically biased, 
and more nuanced understanding of Chinese culture, offering a more efficacious 
cultural discourse. 
However while the importance of ancestor worship to Chinese culture was well 
recognized in ancient and classical China, ancestor worship is generally seen by 
Western contemporary scholarship as being of less importance than it once was, of no 
importance, or even as a negative. And even if there is some kind of agreement or 
recognition concerning the importance of ancestor worship in 'traditional Chinese 
society, if we start asking more particular questions about this fundamental concern of 
the Chinese mind, we find that comparatively little is known' (Aijmer 1974, 232). As 
a marker or key to understanding Chinese culture, it is the contention of this thesis 
that this understanding of ancestor worship is flawed and skewed, and its cultural 
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significance most often ignored while at the same time the significance of 
Confucianism is over-promoted. 
This thesis will argue that the Confucianism-as Chinese-culture paradigm is a kind of 
orientalism, an Edward Said (1978) type of orientalism, where (negative) views of 
China (as part of the Orient) were 'manufactured' (Jensen 1997) by the attitudes and 
ideals of the era of European imperialism in the 1 Sth and 19th centuries, leading to a 
misunderstanding of the 'other' culture: Chinese culture. This orientalism is a 
manifestation of the Western-centric paradigm of understanding which includes, 
according to Said (1993, 90), 'a battery of desires, repressions, investments and 
projections.' Said's radical critique of Western cultural epistemology was not framed 
in anthropological terms; however it has challenged the most elemental aspects of 
anthropological authority and its requirement to translate cultural difference into 
Western terms. 
The Western constructed web of cultural reality framed by European centrism is 
difficult to change, as it has evolved into cultural myth, where contradictory or 
alternative positions are rarely glimpsed and its hegemonic power unchallenged. So-
called orientalism 1 is still a contemporary way of thinking and living, and not just an 
out-dated way of knowing from the colonial past; it is an integral part of modem 
Western thought and ideology. The West interprets and assesses Chinese culture with 
the inherent attitude that its own way of understanding is superior because it is 
invariably true. 
Edward Said explores the biases of the West as it tries to attain a coherent understanding of 
other cultures. His work is often seen as inceptive of post-colonialism and is also linked with the 
theories of Michel Foucault, especially in relation to the relationship of discourse and power. 
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The Chinese themselves have not been immune to this Western inspired way of 
thinking and, beginning with the intellectual attacks of the May Fourth and the New 
Cultural movements and culminating in an all-out assault on Confucianism during the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-76), many of China's leading intellectuals, such as Hu Shi 
(1891-1962), were convinced that China and its culture was inferior to that of the 
West. Hu Shi wrote: 
There are half-wits ... who wish you to believe that the old Chinese culture and moral 
values are superior to all others .... I want to say to you, don't be fooled. We must 
admit. .. that we are inferior to others not only in technology and political institutions 
but also in moral values, knowledge, literature, music, fine arts and body physique. 
(quoted in Wang 1966, 395) 
Western conceptions of China have undergone drastic changes throughout the modem 
period, and the 'interesting thing is that these changes have not reflected changes in 
Chinese society [or the view of culture we desire here], as much as changes in 
[Western] intellectual history' (Dawson 1967, 7). 
Thesis goal 
It is the goal of this thesis is to overcome to some degree this [Western] 
epistemological bias and achieve a better, more nuanced understanding of Chinese 
culture. It is proposed that this less ethno-biased, more culturally-nuanced 
understanding will be achieved by the investigation and exposition of the role of the 
practice of ancestor worship and its corollaries in Chinese culture. The proposition of 
this thesis is that ancestor worship has been a key, both normatively and 
epistemologically, in Chinese culture, and it has enabled the success of Chinese 
culture and society over a long period of time - ancestor worship has been its primary 
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survival strategy. As a strategy, as a deep and underlying current, and as the nexus for 
cultural significants2, it underpins Chinese culture. 
Despite the urge over the past half century or so by the West and the Western 
academy in particular to view China's culture through a paradigm loosely framed by 
Confucianism, some scholars argue that 'the dynamics of Chinese society are still 
poorly understood' (Parish and Whyte 1978, 248). Parish and Whyte (1978, 249) also 
note that the 
rituals and ceremonies [of ancestor worship] are not important simply because they 
are a link with the past, but because they celebrate and reinforce core social 
relationships and values in the present lives of the Chinese people [and] mirror the 
social world and the concerns of the living. 
And it is these core social values and their inherent and vital importance to Chinese 
culture which are engaged with throughout this thesis. Their 'vital importance' 
becomes increasingly evident in this thesis as the dominance of the social realm 
throughout Chinese history is examined. 
Thesis structure 
The thesis is structured according to the rationale of the argument. It is not a matter of 
discovering new facts, but about re-arranging what is already known, showing 
connections, and making a case for this new arrangement as an alternative means for 
understanding Chinese culture. The underlying theories for this methodology are 
explained in detail in the first chapter. At the hub of a constellation of theories utilized 
2 The word significants is used here in relation to Clifford Geertz's notion of 'culture' and is a 
noun which indicates those strands in Geertz's cultural 'webs of significance' - see the account of 
'culture' below. 
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here is practice theory. Practice theory is not a theory in the traditional sense, in that it 
does not make a set of general claims in order to comprehensively explain a particular 
phenomenon. 'It is an approach to understanding culture which avoids formal unity 
and eschews a single over-arching explanatory account' (Springs 2008, 934-969). It is 
as an argument that primarily concerns itself with what people do, and asks why these 
practices have been practised, and what were/are the conditions for their existence and 
what have been/are their implications. 
Related to practice theory are a number of antecedent theories and works ranging 
from Kant to Dilthey to Wittgenstein and Geertz, and in relation to ritual 
communication, from Dewey to Carey and Rothenbuhler. The practices relating to 
ancestor worship, that is the rituals of ancestor worship, will be 'thickly' described. 
'Thick description', a term used by Clifford Geertz, means to interpret and re-describe 
socially significant practices, and the norms, values and strategies implicit in these 
practices. Also important is Geertz's (1973, 5) explanation of culture as 'webs of 
significance man himself has spun'; and Wittgenstein's ideas concerning language, 
understanding, and 'form of life', which stress the intertwining of culture, worldview 
and language. A theory of Chinese ancestor worship is not proffered in this thesis. 
Instead the thesis points out the connections and correlates. It is a description of 
ancestor worship and not an explanation by way of theory. This should not be 
considered as an examination of different things, but only different views of the same 
thing - ancestor worship and its logical, phenomenal, and epistemic connections with 
Chinese culture. 
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Chapter two, "Challenging the dominant discourse: Confucianism-as-Chinese-
culture", questions the efficacy of Confucianism as the master narrative of Chinese 
culture. Whereas the remainder and core of the thesis is a positive statement and an 
extensive presentation of ancestor worship, showing its vital and important 
connections as the nexus of cultural practice, this chapter counters the orthodox claim 
of Confucianism as that nexus of action and understanding of Chinese culture. It is 
not claimed that Confucianism is not an important Chinese cultural heritage, nor is it 
disputed that Confucianism has a reinforcing role in ancestor worship. The clear aim 
of this chapter is to show the links between ancestor worship and Confucianism, and 
the correct place of Confucianism in the landscape of Chinese culture, dominated as it 
is conceptually by ancestor worship. 
For many, Confucianism is the key to understanding Chinese culture and the 'Chinese 
way of life for the last two thousand years' (De Bary 1960, 15). It has become the 
master narrative for understanding Chinese culture and is the master narrative that this 
thesis seeks to debunk. I believe, along with Overmeyer (1995, 1), that there has 'been 
an over-reliance in the past on [mainly Confucian] philosophical texts for 
understanding the mentality of early [and later]3 China'. The Confucian-as-Chinese-
culture discourse suffers from dual drawbacks of problems to do with interpretation, 
and problems associated with comparison to Western paradigms of understanding and 
hegemonic discourses, again a problem of interpretation, but one of a different nature. 
Confucianism imposes unrealistic limits and constraints on an understanding of 
Chinese culture on the one hand, and on the other it brings with it extraneous 
concepts and ideas that have no bearing Chinese culture. 
3 My brackets. I will argue later and throughout the continuing nature of Chinese culture and therefore 
Chinese 'mentality'. 
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Confucianism is a generic Western term that has no corresponding term in the 
Chinese languages. When we refer to Chinese society and other societies influenced 
by China as Confucian societies or as Confucian cultures, the meaning of these terms 
is so widely disputed that it is of little practical use in attributing cultural value and 
significance. Not only is the authority and meaning of the so-called Confucian texts 
disputed but also the meaning of Confucianism itself is disputed among scholars (and 
generally neglected among the Chinese people). This chapter exposes the ambiguities 
associated with the term Confucianism and asserts that this inadequacy inhibits it as 
an effective nexus of understanding of Chinese culture. 
Confucianism lends itself to a number of disciplinary approaches, such as 
philosophical, religious, historical, sociological, political and anthropological, 
providing a narrative of great complexity and also of uncertainty and ambiguity. The 
outcome is often seen as contradictory, confusing, multi-layered, but always inter-
related (Tu 1992, 18). Confucianism may be interpreted in a number of ways, and 
modern scholarship has provided a vast array of meanings and categories of 
understanding (Dirlik 1995, 251; Rozman 1991, 160; Tu 1994a, 40), but the question 
remains unanswered: which one do we choose in relation to understanding Chinese 
culture? 
Also, and of obvious interest (though most often glossed over), is that Confucianism 
postdates the central and inceptive ideas and themes that constitute Chinese culture, 
society and traditions. It is generally agreed that to understand Chinese culture and 
civilization, due to its continuous nature, the process of understanding must begin 
with China's embryonic beginnings. More than just problems with authenticity 
though, the Confucian texts also managed, as a source of high culture hegemony, to 
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remove other forms of textual evidence which offered alternative or different views to 
those of the literati or Ru. 
The major epistemological problem for the West in understanding China arises from 
the determined resolve of the West to impose its 'transcendental pretense' (Solomon 
1993, 3). Western Enlightenment thinking is dogmatic in that it is dismissive of any 
other different cultural views - this is its transcendental pretense. Hegel's universal 
and absolute idealism as 'transcendental pretense' was a form of ideological 
imperialism which reached absolute proportions (Solomon 1993, 358). Confucianism 
as a master narrative has within it a Western 'transcendental pretense', and it is not an 
understanding within Chinese culture. The Chinese understand their own culture, as 
the thesis argues throughout, through a variety of deep and inherent norms, rituals and 
practices related to ancestor worship. 
The following four chapters, the heart of the thesis, are an exposition of ancestor 
worship and its corollaries and show that ancestor worship is complex (when 
analyzed), and may be seen, described, and understood in many ways. The key 
function of the ancestors in Chinese culture is not at first apparent. However clarity of 
their vital function is gradually achieved as the description unfolds. Only through 
considering all the connections to ancestor worship can the goal of this thesis be 
achieved. The many views or various descriptions offered amount to an argument of 
cumulative evidence such as may be found in a court room. The four chapters equate 
to the total 'positive' argument in defense of the thesis. 
The chapter, "Watching the Ancestors", provides not only a description of what 
ancestor worship is, but also introduces ancestor worship as a practice that has been 
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ubiquitous throughout Chinese history. Its purpose is to establish a cognitive starting 
point by exploring the meaning of ancestor worship in all its semantic scope. It 
provides an introduction to the subject and a provisional work-in-progress meaning 
both generally and in this thesis, by the term ancestor worship. The term is discussed 
and the general and stereotypical views of what is meant by this term, which includes 
its metonyms, synonyms, links and correlations, are examined. The general approach 
of the chapter is to take a phenomenological look at the Chinese doing ancestor 
worship: a description of practice. Meaning has been provided by a number of 
evidential agencies and in the main is an anthropological and historical conception of 
ancestor worship. However these are not the only academic agencies or disciplines 
employed; archaeology, philology, philosophy, and religion are also important 
disciplines in this multi-disciplined work. 
Ancestor worship and the traditional Chinese kinship system are presented, initially, 
in an ahistorical form, as though they are unchanging and permanent. This snapshot 
rather than the moving picture approach is required at this stage as an aid for 
conceptual clarity. Of course such a presentation is a distortion in that ancestor 
worship, like all other traditional and cultural events, was not static but changed as 
circumstances unfolded. This evolving and changing nature is then addressed 
throughout the remaining thesis. The archaeological and historical evidence provided 
will support the proposition that ancestor worship has been practised by the Chinese 
since the earliest recorded times. It will show that the ancient Chinese of the Shang 
dynasty, and even earlier, were worshipping and sacrificing to their ancestors, and 
that this has been important and significant to their society and their culture ever 
since. 
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Ancestor worship was not just a practice of the ancient elite or nobility, and 'it is 
likely that the ancestors of the majority of the common people of China since those 
times have needed a considerable amount of attention from their descendants' (Baker 
1979, 72). The exposition shows that there are a number of kinds or types of ancestor 
worship and various ways in which it may be categorized and understood. There are 
also many types of ancestors and a variety of ways that the realms that these ancestors 
inhabited could be understood. 
Ancestor worship, though, involves much more than the practice outlined in these 
phenomenological observations. These symbols, as rites and rituals, contain a socio-
political program based upon the values and worldviews inculcated by these practices. 
The depiction of Chinese ancestor worship in this thesis elucidates the meaning of 
ancestor worship, especially in its broader context, as well as, most importantly, 
highlighting the comprehensive and even cosmic nature of ancestor worship as an 
important cultural symbol over the entire course of Chinese history and culture. 
The next chapter shows the significance of ancestor worship as it is expressed in 
Chinese thought through their philosophy and religion. It deals with the importance of 
the ancestors in the in the context of social groups in China and their cultures. Here 
we begin to see the unique aspects of Chinese culture that are necessarily connected to 
the worship of ancestors. It is important to note here, as Ann Swidler (2001, 75) does, 
that while a practice theory approach shifts the sociological focus from conscious, 
rational ideas and values to the empirical realm of the physical and habitual, the 
interpretation and meaning of those practices moves to 'the realm of the subjective.' It 
becomes necessary to make 'implicit claims about what symbol means' for the 
culture, 'but such claims are at least focused on description of a clearly observable 
empirical object: the ritual treated as text.' The publicly observable symbols and 
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rituals of ancestor worship become an empirical object, rather than something hidden 
away in individual consciousness. 
The subject of Chinese thought is overwhelmingly human and social, with 
filial/ancestral piety leading to an emphasis on family extending to the larger social 
realm and even to the cosmos. The initial focus here is on the ways of thinking of the 
Neolithic and early Bronze Age Chinese from which the later influential (so-called) 
Confucian texts and writers drew their own views, values, and teleology. Having 
provided a phenomenological, snapshot account of ancestor worship in the previous 
chapter, the focus here is to give an historical perspective on the inception of Chinese 
thought and culture and its relationship with ancestors worship. It engages with the 
discourse of Chinese worldview as the primal paradigm and provides not only a 
historical starting point for the exposition of ancestor worship, but also a logical one. 
Found in the rituals surrounding ancestor worship, the evolution of Chinese culture 
saw the development of certain worldviews which promoted and accepted a number 
of social ideas and strategies linked to ideas of family, hierarchy, and strength in 
harmony. Ancestor worship and its correlates together make up a paradigm model for 
the origination and inspiration of Chinese culture. Ancestor worship highlighted the 
family and kin relationships, as a model for society. Ancestor worship and ritual also 
provided the individual and society with a set of values, especially in relation to social 
unity, such as order, benevolence, harmony and reciprocity. It provided links with the 
dead and gave rise and force to an ontological reality which supported both the now 
and the then. Ancestor worship and its corollaries not only ordered the socio-political 
realm, but also the cosmic. 
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Ancestor worship eventually provided the grounds for the most enduring social 
system in world history. It provided the conditions, values, and rationale for the 
benefits of care and protection provided by families extending to the wider polity, and 
the sense of durability, order, hierarchy, and harmony within this society. This 
cultural optimism which understood and reacted to the world, reflected the importance 
the early Chinese placed on humanity as the centre of all things, on social harmony, 
and on an aesthetic approach to this human centered world which avoided abstract 
principles. Within this deep faith, which is perhaps better understood as a deep, 
inherent, and intrinsic view of the world, we can generally identify this core in terms 
of the ideals of life which are thought worthy of pursuit and which can be used as 
standards of value judgments for the larger portion of society. Chinese philosophy 
eventually developed to conceptualize the ideal aspirations of the people and their 
means of achieving these aspirations. This philosophy evolved and emerged from the 
practical activity of life - that is from its culture - and it generated an originative 
system of thinking which both consciously reflects and normatively guides Chinese 
culture. 
Expressed rather inadequately, but necessarily, in philosophical and religious terms, 
the cultural strategies of the Chinese, their world view, ethos, or way of thinking, are 
shown to be unique. Chinese distinctiveness, its cultural uniqueness, emerges from 
the complex interaction of way of life and the environment, to produce a Chinese 
form of life (Lebensform). Using the categories of change, positive and negative 
(pessimism and optimism), harmony, and vagueness, the difference between the 
development of Chinese thought and Western thought becomes more apparent. Also 
made clear is the association of ancestor worship to the Chinese cultural distinctions. 
A central goal of this chapter is to show the importance of the social role of ancestor 
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worship and its strategic function in Chinese culture. The connections between the 
religious, the philosophical, and the biological with the social are introduced as 
important aspects of this strategy - aspects that will be dealt with at length in the 
following chapter. 
In chapter five, "Living with the Ancestors", the insights gleaned from the previous 
chapter are further developed as they help us understand the importance the ancestors 
in the social realm. This chapter engages with the discourse of the family and filial 
piety (and veneration as piety). The dominant social strategies and their incumbent 
social mores which originated in ancestor worship profoundly influenced not only the 
religious and philosophical views of the Chinese, but also the socio-political orders. 
The purpose of this chapter is to reinforce and re-emphasize connections. Filial piety 
confirms the individual, as a member of a larger family-kin-ancestor web, and that 
web as the conceptual and actual nexus in the web of significants that is Chinese 
culture. It suggests a unified and dynamic world (view)- a world (view) not requiring 
a creator God. Its biological connections allow communication across space and time. 
Analogically, as a cultural connection, it connects the biological with the social and 
the political. 
In a world underpinned by the reverence towards ancestors the individual exists by 
virtue of his descendents, and his ancestors exist only through him. The importance of 
the reciprocity of kinship values may be seen very clearly in Chinese family 
relationships, and in the phenomena of these relationships writ-large in the politico-
social realm. The sense of mutual responsibility between parents and son was central 
to the operation of the family as a continuing and strong unit, and conversely 
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important for the operation of the state. One of the more particularly significant 
aspects of Chinese civilization has been its ability to maintain a highly organized, 
complex society over vast stretches of time and space. 
The political hegemony (and here we include also the social) in Chinese society and 
its dominance over the military, religious, and economic institutions is one of China's 
most remarkable characteristics. This political hegemony, sanctioned by the 
importance of the family values extended to the political, left no room for growth of 
those other institutions which have historically had various roles as the hegemonic 
force par excellence, in other civilizations, whether military, religious or economic 
forces. This is notably an exemplar instance of cultural difference. The connecting 
line here between worldview and ancestor worship, values and strategies, family and 
xiao, and political dominance by the ruler, is most evident. The political realm 
depended on the social realm and the system of family and ancestor worship, 
subsuming the military, religious and economic realms and functions. Filial piety 
'involves what is markedly Chinese' (lsay 2005, 441) and is at the very heart of 
Chinese culture' (Holzman 1998, 199). Therefore, as filial piety is a cultural correlate 
of ancestor worship, each depending on the other for conceptual existence, ancestor 
worship may also be seen as what is 'markedly Chinese' and 'at the very heart of 
Chinese culture'. 
Having established the ubiquity and importance of the rituals of ancestor worship in 
Chinese culture, the question of why these rituals have been the chosen means for 
communicating cultural values and strategies is engaged here in the next chapter, 
"Ritual and Ancestor Worship". This analysis of ritual in Chinese culture and history 
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discusses why ancestor worship, as a ritual, is more efficacious in understanding 
Chinese culture than the master narrative of Confucianism. It also shows the links 
between ancestor worship and Confucianism, and the place of Confucianism in the 
landscape of Chinese culture. It exposes the importance of ritual in Chinese culture 
and its co-relationship with a concern for the ancestors. It engages the topic in a 
number of ways. It analyses ritual as it is popularly portrayed as a general concern of 
the Chinese; ritual as communication; li as the Chinese word that is most often 
translated as ritual; and li in its (expanded) cultural, cosmic and metaphysical ~odes. 
An analysis of Chinese ritual shows that the Chinese tradition of rituals provides 
access to various layers and significant aspects of Chinese culture in ways that are 
inaccessible to a 'semiotic' analysis via language alone. Rituals and ritual have 
always been central to Chinese culture (Yang 1967, 44), and they are central to the 
creation and maintenance of a unified Chinese culture. 
Thus under Duke Chou 25th year we read: Ritual (Ii) is the constant principle of 
Heaven, the righteousness of Earth, and the proper action of mankind .... Ritual 
determines the relations of high and low; it is the warp and woof of Heaven and Earth 
and that by which the people live. (Tso Chuan in Watson 1971, 44) 
The underlying questions of this chapter ask why ritual is so important. Why has 
ritual been such an important aspect of Chinese culture from ancient times and why 
has ritual played such a vital role in Chinese culture? What is the significance of 
rituals concerning the relationships between the living and the dead - from worldview 
to human and social values - from these values to the means and ways of living those 
values? The rituals involved in ancestor worship, and indeed any ritual, may be 
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considered from many viewpoints. Ritual, as communication, is a powerful and a 
most effective form of cultural communication. From a sociological-religious point of 
view it is an element of the serious life. All cultures utilize ritual as a symbolic means 
of maintenance, and for adapting to outside influences. 
Finally, in the last chapter, the preceding chapters are summarized and the 
consequences of a changed paradigm are discussed. In order to rectify and overcome 
the epistemological problematic, I have proposed a new approach to the 
understanding of China and Chinese culture. It is an approach which embodies an 
argument that primarily concerns itself with what people do: their shared practices. 
This thesis argues that the important, ever-present, and continuous cultural symbols 
and rituals, those significants which have been spoken of and engaged throughout the 
thesis, cannot easily be removed and eradicated over a relatively short time of even a 
century. Chinese culture, as a continuous entity, has overcome many vicissitudes over 
its long (five millennia or more) history and the confrontation with what we call 
modernity is yet just another encounter along the way. While the importance of the 
ancestors may have been arrested, back-grounded, or seemingly negated during much 
of the past century of change, it is in fact only a temporary hiatus, and as 
circumstances change and become more favorable, it will become more energized, 
more openly practised and praised, and more acceptable. The practice of ancestor 
worship, in traditional and neo-traditional modes, is on the increase, and becoming 
more generally accepted, as a correlation of the increased social self esteem of the 
Chinese, and as a consequence of the debates concerning Chinese identity and 
direction. 
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Our contemporary understanding of Chinese culture is only interesting and 
worthwhile in light of future consequences, and so, while briefly summarizing the 
thesis argument and providing an account of current ancestral practices in China, the 
emphasis here is on the consequences of such an understanding. That is, what 
difference does it make if Chinese culture is understood differently, for after all the 
difference is one of nuance, given that there is much overlap between the two 
paradigms? In concrete terms, and in relation to this thesis, it means re-assessing 
some of the important significants (ideals, values, strategies) of our own Western 
culture, not for the sake of understanding ourselves better, (although this is a valid and 
worthwhile endeavor), but in order to adjust our own historical mind, in order to re-
look at and re-assess if required, our views of China. 
In this last section I am concerned with applying some of the insights gained from the 
preceding view of Chinese culture, and asking what are their consequences, if any, in 
today's world. Having interpreted the culture and history of the people from Neolithic 
times by a methodological focus on the actual cultural practices, and recognizing 
culture (once again) as that constructed web of significants man has spun for himself 
as a means of governing social behavior, we can now look at and compare some of 
those significants and consider their possible outcomes. By that I mean a range of 
behavior patterns that impact on the political, the economic, the social, or any other 
subjects of significance. 
The real significance of understanding China through ancestor worship lies in its 
avoidance of the problems encountered in the conventional Confucianism-as-Chinese 
culture master narrative, as it avoids many negative comparisons between 
Confucianism and Western philosophy, ethics, social ideals and so on. It overcomes 
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the absurd situation where 'all texts on Chinese history mention its long continuity, a 
remarkable case in world record, [but they do so] usually without elaboration' (Liu 
and Tu 1970, 10). 
A full understanding of the import of the connections between reverence for the 
ancestors and the socio-political realm in China and its total significance to Chinese 
culture sets in place a rationale that questions many of the standard Western 
conclusions about contemporary China. This rationale, free from the restrictions of 
the Confucianism-as-Chinese culture discourse and its ideological biased paradigm 
which prohibits an eyes-wide-opened view, allows an analysis of Chinese culture 
which appreciates its unique features, its longevity, and its strength. 
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Chapter 1 
Theoretical Underpinnings - Rationale and Method 
1:1: Thesis aim, method, rationale, and a new approach 
This thesis provides a new and alternative approach to the understanding of Chinese 
culture. The aim is to provide a comprehensive exposition of Chinese ancestor 
worship, and to show by dint of argument, the validity of the proposition that ancestor 
worship as a continuing cultural symbol and ritual activity provides an efficacious 
means for understanding Chinese culture. This aim will be achieved by reviewing 
scholarly texts and by selecting and collating appropriate evidence, both historical and 
contemporary, from the limited studies in this area, and also from general works on 
China. This textual evidence is not confined or limited to those disciplines which 
directly relate to the subject matter, such as Chinese history, philosophy, 
anthropology, philology, or sociology. It is a trans-disciplinary investigation into 
Chinese ancestor worship and its corollaries, which shows the importance of these 
connections between Chinese ancestor worship and Chinese culture. By trans-
disciplinary I refer to the term introduced by Piaget (1970) which concerns those 
studies which are simultaneously between disciplines, across disciplines yet beyond 
any discipline. That is not to say it rejects any rigor or reason, rather it seeks a unity of 
knowledge. K. C. Chang (1983, xx) tells us that 'the study of the ancient [and long 
lasting] Chinese civilization can be most rewarding if it de-emphasises traditional 
disciplinary barriers', and it is rewarding, I would suggest, because it achieves a better 
outcome. 
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The thesis will provide an overview of, and shed light upon, Chinese ancestor worship 
and its significance in Chinese culture, not by discovery, but 'by arranging what is 
already known in a way which clarifies the links or interconnections' (Glock 1996, 
279). The true task of philosophy, and by analogy, of cultural analysis, is not to 
explain or deduce anything, only to describe it. Such an investigation 'puts everything 
before us', and by doing so, 'leaves everything as it is' (Wittgenstein 2003, §126, 
124 ). 'The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their 
simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something - because it is always 
before one's eyes)' (§129). 
This clear view, (clearer than the view delivered by a Confucian paradigm), will show 
an ordered Chinese weltanschauung or worldview by presenting the connections to 
Chinese ancestor worship; connections such as the grammatical connections with 
ancestral veneration, ancestral piety and filial piety; filial piety's connections with 
family, society and the broader polity and the socio-political hegemony; and the 
connections with culture, ritual and li. Bourdieu (1990, 87-8) comes to a similar 
conclusion, although he does not refer to 'connections', but to 'different relationships' 
and to 'terms it links': 
Ritual practice performs an uncertain abstraction which brings the same symbol into 
different relationships by apprehending it through different aspects ... This mode of 
apprehension never explicitly limits itself to any one aspect of the terms it links, but 
takes each one, each time, as a whole. 
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The requirement to apprehend the cultural understanding of the rituals of ancestor 
worship 'through different aspects' is the motivation behind the plurality of 
methodology and discipline employed by this thesis. This multi-vocal, yet necessarily 
inconsistent approach may be compared analogously to the judicial situation where 
the 'defense' seeks evidence from a broad range of witnesses and employs various 
argumentative strategies in order to 'make a case' for its own view. 
However, before arriving at a perspicuous view of ancestor worship, which itself goes 
a long way to addressing the aims of this thesis, the thesis must challenge and 
deconstruct the concept of Confucianism-as-(the key to understanding)-Chinese-
culture and to displace the importance it is now endowed with in most scholarship 
concerning this subject generally. By gradually debunking the case for Confucianism 
as the key narrative of Chinese culture, this investigation of Confucianism will add to 
the argument in favour of ancestor worship as the cultural symbol around which the 
narrative is re-built. It will also challenge those mostly Western ideas that fail to see 
the import of what we can call at this early stage of our discourse a non-discursive, 
non-rational understanding in the form of symbol and action (ritual), e.g., ancestor 
worship. In doing so it is also concerned with the contiguity, significance, and 
relevance of ancestor worship to an understanding of Chinese culture today. 
Having cleared the cognitive space for a more considered understanding of Chinese 
culture vis-a-vis ancestor worship, the thesis will conclude by reinforcing this 
understanding through a discussion of the relevance of ancestor worship and a culture 
imbued and rooted in ancestor worship to today's world and to today's Western world 
view. Making use of much contemporary theory such as practice theory, 
hermeneutics, communication and ritual theory, learning and cultural theories, and 
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literary theory, the thesis adds weight, and makes interesting, the findings and 
outcomes made clear throughout by the perspicuous representation of ancestor 
worship and the negation of Confucianism as the master narrative. An important 
consequence of this part of the cross-cultural enterprise is the better understanding 
acquired, not only of China, but of self, and self as 'our Western culture'. 
In the process of achieving its goals, this thesis will aim to find complexity in the 
assumed-but-not-simple rituals surrounding ancestor worship, while at the same time 
seeing the complexity of connections between ancestor worship and its correlates as a 
unified cultural symbol and as a simplified and generalized concept useful for 
communication. It is a Wittgensteinian kind of understanding that comes from seeing 
the particular concrete case in the right light (2003, §133) and therefore is not a kind 
of theory or a set of positive claims that can logically show, like a mathematical 
equation, that the thesis is true, but the understanding which comes about by seeing 
connections to what we already know. If it is considered a theory at all, given the 
connotation between theory and thesis, theory here means simply a 'general and 
abstract account' (Schatzki 2001, 3) of ancestor worship as a key interpretive symbol 
of Chinese culture. 
As an investigation, the thesis attempts to throw light upon the question: what are the 
purposes or reasons that brought ancestor worship (and ritual) into its privileged 
being, and enabled its significant continuation? 'Hermeneutics is primary to this 
process of disclosure in that the reasons are not mere facts but rather the meaning of 
social events' (Ulin 2001, 118), and it is the meaning of ancestor worship and its 
relationship to Chinese culture that concerns this thesis. 
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The hermeneutic approach also has a corresponding relationship to the ancient 
Chinese understanding of the world. This correspondence is not considered necessary 
but as an additional benefit. Cross-cultural understanding is not about abstract 
notions, but about concrete examples in history. 'As the Qing scholar and historian 
Zhang Xuecheng (1738-1801) remarks, "The ancients never spoke of principles 
detached from particular things'" (Zhang 1998, 6-7). It is our pre-judged cultural 
anticipations which allow us to understand and interpret the products and practices of 
other cultures, and it is theses same prejudgments which draw us into the hermeneutic 
circle. Our prejudices (our prejudged positions vis-a-vis our worldview) are not 
postponed nor are they rigorously adhered to, but are instead gradually changed 
through the dialectical movement of understanding of the relationship of part to 
whole. The meaning of Chinese ancestor worship and its significance to an overall 
understanding of Chinese culture will disclose itself through this dialectical process. 
Chinese ancestor worship is a symbol, and it is the symbol, 'which is [for Ricouer]4 
the privileged object of hermeneutics' and which has 'unfathomable depth and 
opacity' as it is grounded in life and only 'partially reflected in language' (Ulin 2001, 
120). 
An essential characteristic of contemporary epistemology is the holistic character of 
knowledge: 'knowledge is not a single item existing by itself but a system of 
interrelated, interlocking concepts, theories and experiences' (Cheng 2003, 560). As a 
whole and a totality a text or text analogue is not just a simple succession of words 
and sentences. The relationship between the whole and the parts of a text requires an 
explicit type of 'judgment' (Ricoeur 1971, 548; Ulin 2001, 129) where the act of 
4 My brackets 
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judging or interpreting tries to apprehend a sense of the whole. It is hermeneutical in 
the sense that the whole (of culture) we seek informs the parts, and the parts the 
whole. 
This does not mean that the process of understanding or interpretation of a cultural 
narrative is uncertain and unpredictable. A cultural narrative is open to many views 
and readings; however a better interpretation does not involve measuring or 
verification of an interpretation against the facts. Interpretation of culture by others 
leads to a variety of other views where the correctness of these views is open to a 
process of rational argument like that which may be found in the judicial system. My 
aim in this thesis is to show than the proffered interpretation is more valid and 
probable in the light of what is known and shown, rather than to provide a true 
conclusion where a set of premises is set forth from which a verifiable conclusion 
may be necessarily drawn. It is more inductive than deductive and infers a general 
statement from a class of specific instances. Validation is not the same as the 
positivistic claims of verification. Following the work of Thomas Kuhn (1962), 
'scientific procedure suddenly seemed to lose its foundations that rested on systems of 
logical reasoning and the application of correct methodologies of empirical research' 
(Nencel and Pels 1991, 5). Combined with the insight of critical theory, the Khunian 
break provides the conditions under which the supposed neutrality of theory and 
method can be revealed as Western ideology. 
Not all interpretations are equal, and just as Paul Ricoeur (1971, 549) argues that 
'validation is an argumentative discipline', and compares it to the legal interpretation 
and argumentation of the legal system, it is my task here in this thesis, to convince the 
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'jury' that my interpretation is the more preferred one, and, just as one might expect 
in a court case, I will present throughout a case for consideration based upon the 
presentation of evidence and argument. 'The process of argumentation can and should 
strive towards achieving a preferred interpretation' (Ulin 2001, 129), preferred in this 
case of ancestor worship, for epistemologically sound reasons. 
The conventionally accepted dominant discourse and paradigmatic view of Chinese 
culture has claimed its authority via the Chinese classics, especially the Confucian 
canon. However, current scholarship and practice are now starting to question this 
view. The epistemological inquisitiveness of this thesis, is, in part, a post-modem 
suspicion 'which rejects totalities, universal values, grand historical narratives, solid 
foundations to human existence and the possibility of objective knowledge' inherent 
within 'modem' thought (Eagleton 2004, 13). This suspicion is underpinned by the 
doubts of the French philosophers Foucault and Lyotard who openly criticize any 
views that there could be a meta-narrative and underlying meta-theory 'through which 
all things can be connected or represented' and an 'incredulity towards meta-
narratives'(Harvey 1989, 45). 
When textual evidence lost its credibility and was seen merely as a recording device, 
it became clear that writing and text was only a form of interpretation and there were 
other forms of interpretation that needed to be considered. While texts (words and 
sentences) may help point to the truth, they should never be mistaken for the thing 
itself. The early Chinese thinker Chuang Tzu realized the shortcomings of words: 
The fish trap exists because of the fish; once you've gotten the fish, you can forget 
about the trap. The rabbit snare exists because of the rabbit; once you've gotten the 
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rabbit you can forget about the snare. Words exist because of meaning; once you've 
gotten the meaning, you can forget the words. Where can I find a man who has 
forgotten words so I can have a word with him? (Chuang Tzu in Watson, 1968, 320) 
Chuang Tzu was 'avoiding the trap of fixed doctrinal truths' (Jochim 1986, 183); 
fixed and supposedly verifiable truths where words and text are accurate 
representations of reality and truth. Throughout much of the early Daoist writings 
there is a sustained suspicion of language. 'A major theme of the Daodejing is that an 
uncritical use of language can lull us into a distorted understanding of the nature of 
the world in which we live' (Hall and Ames 2004, 112). Where the Logicians and so-
called logical thought 'sought to pin down the meaning of words, Chuang Tzu seeks 
to lift men's minds to a plane which is above such petty and fallacious concepts.' For 
him, the accepted divisions between 'good and bad, and [between] right and wrong, 
are based upon narrow and purely relative viewpoints' (Watson 1968, 161). 
It is also this requirement for a verifiable and truthful state of affairs which leads to a 
'distorted understanding of the nature of the world' that the hermeneutical approach 
and practice theory employed here also tries to avoid. There are two approaches to 
understanding culture/s (Nathan 1993, 324); hermeneutic and positivistic. This thesis 
takes a hermeneutic approach to culture, recognizing Chinese culture's historical 
framework, its inherently social characteristics, and its symbolic nature leading to 
necessarily conceptual understanding. The interpretation of these concepts is the 
attempt to make clear the meaning of historical and social symbols and actions such 
as in the Chinese case, ritual and especially the rituals pertaining to worship or 
reverence of the ancestors. This search for meaning is more than a phenomenological 
description, and requires the search for the deep, opaque, and unfathomable meaning 
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of and reason for ancestor worship. The understanding is to be found in culture's 
'pattern of meanings' (Geertz 1973), or by understandingly entering what Benjamin 
Schwartz (1985) calls its 'world of thought' to explore the 'problematique' of its 
thinkers and discover their 'shared cultural assumptions'. 
Hermeneutics has played an influential role in contemporary anthropological theory 
and its role within this thesis is just as important. The hermeneutic approach of this 
thesis has with it an attitude that any attempt at an objective reconstruction or re-
presentation is not useful. As subjects of thought and action, we all 'live in a world 
that science has so successfully managed to understand.' We 'have a very particular 
perspective on the world', a subjective perspective (A vramides 2005, 227). However 
we are also capable of transcending this subjective perspective and of thinking about 
the world in a detached manner. According to Thomas Nagel (1986, 3), both 
perspectives, subjective and objective, are real and the truth about our world can only 
be gained through an understanding of how these two perspectives coexist in all that 
we think and do. Furthermore, it is the relationship between these two perspectives 
which 'amount to a world view.' 
Understanding has become the cornerstone of hermeneutic theory (Mueller-Vollmer 
1985, 9). As a way of knowing, its roots may be found in the process of human life 
itself; it is a category or form of life, a Lebensf orm. This term, as employed by 
Wittgenstein, 'stresses the intertwining of culture, world view and language ... It is 
characteristic of our language that the foundation on which it grows consists in steady 
forms of life, regular activity [ritual]' (Glock 1996, 124). 
Dilthey maintains that in their daily lives human beings find themselves in situations 
in which they have to understand what is happening around them so that they may act 
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or react accordingly. Thus, their actual behaviour reflects their lived understanding 
and comprehension of their social and cultural environment. (Mueller- Vollmer 
1985, 25) 
The cultural understanding we seek starts with a presumption of deficiency in relation 
to how China is presently understood, and that a better understanding of China is 
possible using the approach outlined here. This thesis will show that the general and 
contemporary understanding of China ranges from a nuanced misunderstanding to an 
erroneous and biased view. The understanding that is sought is not the only, nor the 
correct understanding, but it is a better understanding than is conventionally available. 
The thesis approaches the subject with a non-positivistic attitude, eschewing the 
categories and discourse of reality and truth, realizing their culturally laden 
significances, and drawing attention to another more nuanced and less culturally 
biased positions for viewing Chinese culture. The position is informed by a cluster of 
theories, disciplines and an approach which is underpinned by a combination of 
various theories. In sufficiently simple and necessarily concise terms, it combines 
selected theories concerned with practice theory, symbolic anthropology, and ritual 
communication to achieve its aims. And the practice, the symbol, the ritual chosen is 
ancestor worship. This approach to an understanding of Chinese culture is new 
precisely because, as yet, no one has painted the whole canvas of Chinese culture by 
using the brush of ancestor worship. 
1:2: Theoretical underpinnings 
It may be pertinent to note here that the theories that underpin this thesis are not 
inceptive of the thesis. I did not attempt this thesis by following a particular theory or 
theories. In fact the words of Bourdieu below succinctly express the place of theory in 
my own work: 
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Let me say outright and very forcefully that I never 'theorize', if by that we 
mean engage in the kind of gobbledegook ... that is good for textbooks and 
which ... passes for Theory in much of Anglo-American social science ... There is no 
doubt a theory in my work, or, better, a set of thinking tools visible through the 
results they yield, but it is not built as such. (Wacquant 1989, 50) 
The impetus for this thesis was in fact no more than my own disenchantment with the 
Confucian-philosophical mode of understanding Chinese culture that was presented to 
me by Charles A. Moore in his book, The Chinese Mind: Essentials of Chinese 
Philosophy and Culture, a 1967 product of the 1967 'Philosophers East-West' 
conference in Hawaii which also produced the texts The Japanese Mind and The 
Indian Mind. However, one step removed from my own initial impetus concerning 
how Chinese culture is viewed, are a congeries of other views, and in the initial stages 
of developing the ideas and strategies for this thesis, the more important theoretical 
approaches which influenced me were those of practice theory within symbolic and 
cultural anthropology, the anthropological insights as enunciated in Wittgenstein's 
Philosophical Investigations, and also the (connected) works relating to ritual and 
communication, especially those of James Carey and Eric W. Rothenbuhler. My 
instinct was, similar to the postmodern urge of skepticism toward meta-narrative, to 
be skeptical, at least in the first instance, of approaches to cultural understanding 
which privileged a master narrative such as any religious or leading philosophical 
doctrine. This is not an unusual position and a suspicion or skepticism towards text, 
writing, and even words has been expressed by many authoritative thinkers over the 
ages. Donald Lopez Jnr., in Elaborations on Emptiness, a hermeneutical study of a 
major Buddhist text, the Heart Sutra, gives an account of many of these early thinkers 
and ways of thinking. Besides the early Chinese writers mentioned above, he refers to 
the skepticism of early Greek and Indian writers and philosophers. 
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1:2:1: Practice theory, symbolic anthropology, and ritual significance. 
Practice theory appeared at the end of the 20th century as an alternative approach 
towards cultural analysis and cultural comparison. Practice theory 'is a general theory 
of the production of social subjects through practice in the world, and the production 
of the world itself through practice' (Ortner 2006, 16). Practice theory does not 
propose a theory as such, in that it does not organize or systematize data or scientific 
generalizations that provide comprehensive explanations about the phenomena in 
question. Nor does it bow to the burden of a particular kind of argument or logic. 
Practice has a logic which is not that of the logician. This has to be acknowledged in 
order to avoid asking of it more logic than it can give, thereby condemning oneself 
either to writing incoherencies out of it or to thrust a forced coherence upon it. 
(Bourdieu 1990, 86) 
Anthropologists and sociologists have for a long time referred to 'shared practices'; 
however in more recent times, in the final decades of the 20th century, these 
references have become more important. In some cases a practice approach to 
understanding culture have become extreme and as far as some researches are 
concerned 'practice is all there is to study and describe' (Barnes 2001, 17). 
Cross-cultural study is often seen as equivalent to identifying what members of that 
culture have in common and compare this with members of other cultures. One way 
to understand what they have in common is to study their shared theories, ideas, 
beliefs or abstractly specified rules or norms that allegedly 'govern' their behaviour. 
In relation to understanding Chinese culture this has been the preferred way by the 
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West, and these 'shared theories, ideas, beliefs or abstractly specified rules or norms' 
have manifested as Confucianism. The difficulty with this rationalistic approach is 
that these ideas etc. are conceived as being internal to individuals leading to doubt 
about the verifiability of this kind of approach. A practice approach however, insists 
that it is within the shared and observable practices of cultural members where the 
foundation of commonality (and difference) may be found and confidently studied. It 
is now generally recognized that a practice approach is 'more satisfactory empirically 
... and in particular with [its] implied reaction against idealism' (Barnes 2001. 17, 18). 
Practice theory refers to an approach to cultural understanding that lacks a formal 
unity, and avoids a single over-arching explanatory account. It is an argument that 
gives priority to what people do. Within a practice theory approach there is an 
understanding that although human action is constrained by culture or the social 
structure, 'human action [also] makes "structure"-reproduces or transforms it, or 
both' (Ortner 1996, 2). This notion of cultural constraint was also important for the 
ancient Chinese thinker Xunzi and is also a pivotal idea within the ritual 
communication theories employed later in the thesis as explained below. 
The thesis faces the epistemic challenge of how to better understand China by 
studying not what may be said by some, but (initially) what is done by many, and in 
that sense it may be considered more a cultural approach. It is more an approach used 
to understanding culture than a theory of culture. It is mainly concerned with 
important cultural practices and the reasons behind their cultural importance. That is, 
it aims to understand the important things which have become symbolic and ritualized 
over time - to study what people do, or did, and therefore to study of the rituals of 
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China, those especially associated with the worship of the ancestors- thereby 
attempting to provide a better and more nuanced understanding of Chinese culture and 
China. 
Underpinning much of practice theory are the later works of Ludwig Wittgenstein 
These include his ideas and notions of family resemblance; meaning as a social 
practice; language games as a model for cultural practices; and an open understanding 
of forms of life (Springs 2008). His work provides important resources for cultural 
analysis. A Wittgensteinian understanding of practice theory comes together with, and 
sheds light on Clifford Geertz's account of significant cultural practices, meaning (of 
cultural practice), and thick description (of culture). For Wittgenstein, and for this 
thesis, the true task of philosophy and therefore of cultural analysis, is not to explain 
or deduce anything, but only to describe it. An inquiry such as this 'puts everything 
before us' yet 'leaves everything as it is' (Phillips 2001, 167; Wittgenstein 2003, 
§124,126). However it is in Wittgenstein's account of rule-following where the 
elemental problem cultural epistemological problem between the relation of theory 
and practice is confronted (Bloor 2001, 95-96). 
Conventional Western (Enlightenment) thinking, as rationalism, gives priority to 
theory over practice, and the paradigm example of rationalism is rule-following. 
Wittgenstein turned this paradigm case of rule-following from being a representation 
of the priority of theory over practice into an example of the priority of practice over 
theory. Rule-following looks like a case where theory has clear priority over practice, 
and when we think about the compulsion of rules, e.g., the rules of arithmetic, we may 
be inclined to say, 'The meaning of the rule fixes what we have to do' (Bloor 2001, 
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95-96). When we follow rules we act as we do because of our form-of-life and simply 
because we have been trained to act this way. Our form-of-life provides the bedrock 
for our understanding; our practice has priority over theory. 
Along with other 'practice theorists,' my approach here avoids the fixation towards 
scientific explanation, the Cartesian fixation with rational certainty and the positivist's 
desire for empirical verifiability as the final arbiter for understanding (although 
desirable it is not the final arbiter). This thesis does not recognize any single 
articulation of truth and reality, as all are only judgments which are able to be 
amended and improved as further information and experience is available to the 
knower of truth and reality. This approach to understanding is a sign of particular 
consideration to practice and practice theory as it privileges a belief that philosophical 
justification and explanation of what people believe and do is derived from their 
actions in daily life, and, of course, the action that most concerns this thesis is 
ancestor worship. 
Clifford Geertz has been a significant contributor towards the underlying (authority 
of) practice theory here. His own anthropological authority was grounded in 
interpreting cultural differences by describing indigenous symbolic systems - this he 
labeled 'thick description'. This is a hermeneutic process which describes and re-
describes cultural practice. The fundamental position of thick description is to 
'interpretively discern and conceptually re-describe [significant] socially instituted 
practices, and the norms implicit in those practices' (Springs 2008). Geertz's work 
comes within the sub-discipline of symbolic anthropology, where the symbols and 
rituals 'by which humans assign meanings to these symbols in order to address 
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fundamental questions about human social life' (Spencer 1996, 535) are studied and 
interpreted. Symbol here is a trope for a constituent part of cultural practice, the 
rituals of ancestor worship. These cultural (social) practices are seen as the shared 
interpretations of a particular group, the Chinese, and their world view as the base for 
their shared cultural system of meaning (Des Chene 1996, 1274). 
The approach by symbolic anthropology is interpretive and this approach is congruent 
to my own, as I am after all seeking what the Chinese themselves interpret from 
ancestor worship. Ancestor worship as a symbol brings about social action and is like 
other such symbols which, as Turner (1967, 36) writes, are 'determinable influences 
inclining persons and groups to action'. My own concept of culture, which resonates 
strongly with that of symbolic anthropology, is that it is an independent system of 
meaning that may be understood by interpreting key symbols and rituals. The 
motives, views, plans, strategies and beliefs which underpin these cultural symbols 
such as ancestor worship are initially hard to understand, and may seem impervious to 
logic. However, when studied as part of a meaningful cultural system, their logic 
becomes open to view. In his 1950-1954 study of Ndembu culture, Victor Turner 
(1995, 8-9) clarifies the point when he says that [what he was seeing]: 
became fully intelligible only in the light of values embodied and expressed in 
symbols at ritual performances ... and with my eyes wide opened to the importance 
of ritual. . .I began to perceive many aspects of Ndembu culture that had been 
previously invisible to us because of our theoretical blinkers. 
Later, Monica Wilson (1957, 6) was to write that 'any analysis not based on some 
translation of the symbols used by people of that culture is open to suspicion'. Social 
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actions are guided by symbolic interpretation, and symbolic anthropologists, besides 
studying obvious symbols and rituals, such as those used in significant religious 
actions, also study other forms of social organization that at first do not appear to be 
very symbolic, such as kinship and political organization, which make up a 
considerable part of this study. The study of these other aspects of society allows us to 
investigate the role of ancestor worship as a cultural symbol in the everyday life of the 
Chinese. This multi-aspect, trans-disciplinary approach allows us to examine symbols 
from different aspects of social life, rather than from one aspect at a time isolated 
from the rest, and to show that a central idea expressed as a symbol manifests itself in 
different aspects of culture (Des Chene 1996, 1274). 
The cultural symbols or practices that are of central concern to this thesis are the 
rituals of ancestor worship. The concern with ritual is more than just as a cultural 
symbol per se. 
In the last twenty years a number of diverse fields have found ritual to be an 
important focus for new forms of cultural analysis. Besides anthropologists, 
sociologists, and historians of religion, there are sociobiologists, philosophers, and 
intellectual historians who have turned to ritual as a "window" on the cultural 
dynamics by which people make and remake their world. The result has been a 
relatively broad and interdisciplinary conversation known as "ritual studies" (Bell 
1992, 3). 
Ritual is also communication, and as communication, it is a powerful and most 
effective form of cultural communication. From a sociological-religious point of view 
it is an element of the serious life. All cultures utilize ritual as a symbolic means of 
maintenance, and for adapting to outside influences. John Dewey (1966, 5-6) reminds 
us of the connections between community, commonality, and communication, and 
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James W. Carey (1990) shows us these connections in light ofritual communication. 
In order to be considered as a community and to have a culture, certain things must be 
shared in common, and these are: 'aims, beliefs, aspirations, and knowledge - a 
common understanding- likemindedness, as sociologists say .... Consensus demands 
communication'. Monica Wilson (1954, 241) appreciated the value of cultural 
understanding via ritual when she stated that: 
Rituals reveal values at their deepest level ... men express in ritual what moves them 
the most, and since the form of expression is conventionalized and obligatory, it is the 
values of the group that are revealed. I see in the study of rituals the key to an 
understanding of the essential constitution of human societies. 
The ritual view of communication focuses on original, socially significant meaning 
and the preservation of society in time. Transmission accentuates power and control, 
whereas ritual accentuates social participation and culture (Rothenbuhler 1998, 123). 
An understanding of communication as culture, and a ritual view of communication, 
implies that culture defines and maintains itself through ritual. Culture is not a top-
down process, a process dominated by the social and political elite, but a complex 
process of ritualization leading to collaboration and community. Any over-simplified 
control-command or progress model of society and cultural communication hides the 
complex normative way power works within a cultural milieu. The rationale of 
correlations is: ancestor worship - ritual - communication - culture. 
1 :2:2: Culture 
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The overriding task of this thesis is to better understand China; to establish a nexus of 
understanding. There is an explicit emphasis upon the defining importance of culture 
as the vehicle for this better understanding. Cross-cultural studies involve us in the 
invention of an idea of cultures, other peoples and our own (Blair 1993, 2). The 
underlying assumption of this thesis of 'better cultural understanding', which leads to 
the methodological approach employed, is that to understand other cultures is 
necessarily a difficult proposition, 'hardy work', in the words of Evans-Pritchard 
(1965, 109), where 'it is all too easy ... to transplant [the other] thought into our own, 
to transplant our thought into theirs.' To overcome much of this cross-cultural 
difficulty, a wide-ranging, practice and symbolic method, ('hardy work'), has been 
employed. 
As is evident, the notion of culture plays a pivotal role in this treatise, and so the 
problematic concerning its meaning and use here must be addressed. Anthropologist 
Roy Wagner (1981, 10) remarks that cross- cultural studies involve us in the invention 
of an idea of cultures. 'Anthropology is the study of man "as if' there were culture. It 
is brought into being by the invention of culture, both in the general sense, as a 
concept, and in the specific sense, through the invention of particular cultures.' We 
live in a world of cultural constructs and regardless of the ethnocentric and 
fundamentalist Western discourse concerning other cultures, attentiveness to the 
differences between Western and Chinese culture reinforces the constructed and re-
interpreted nature of culture as a phenomena created by humans. 
Symbolic anthropology focuses largely on culture as a whole rather than on specific 
aspects of culture that are isolated from one another. This culture as a whole meaning 
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of culture is not the common sense every-day meaning of culture. We cannot 
comprehensively, fundamentally, scientifically, and positively say what culture is as 
the language, thoughts and concepts used to define it are essentially cultural 
themselves. However we can say what meaning is employed here in this thesis. The 
'agreed original definition of culture within anthropology' (Jenks 2005, 32) was 
provided by Edward Burnett Tylor: 
Culture or Civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex 
whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any 
other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society. (Tylor 1958, 1) 
The understanding of culture, as it used and understood here, follows closely that of 
Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn (1963, 181). Culture is made up of patterns of 
behaviour which are transmitted by symbols. They reflect important and distinctive 
community outcomes and strategies, 'including their embodiments in artifact' and 
ritual. The heart of a culture consists of historically derived and selected ideas and 
their attached values coming together as a world view. Culture is both a product of 
action and practice and a condition of further action (Jenks 2005, 36). 
The pattern (of behaviour) theory of culture employed here argues that the continuous 
and more general elements of culture may be studied apart from social structure. It 
advocates an inquiry as to 'how patterns of art, religion, philosophy, as well as 
technology and science, waxed and waned, acquired their characteristic content and 
kept rolling majestically along, quite independently of particular individuals' (Harris 
1968, 328). The abstract concept of pattern enables me to attend to the col1)1Ilonality 
of all elements of culture, while also attending to their particularity in terms of their 
continuity and complexity. I believe, along with Max Weber and Clifford Geertz 
(1973, 5) 'that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has 
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spun,' and I also 'take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it therefore not an 
experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning'. 
For Clifford Geertz, anthropological authority was founded on the capacity to read 
and reproduce cultural differences by describing indigenous symbolic systems. The 
'webs of significance' are the object of this study - and it is convenient to generalize 
this as culture and it is also important to recognize culture in this expanded role. The 
implication of this understanding of the concept 'culture' is that world views become 
the ultimate cultural artifacts. But although they are in a sense, and in part, products of 
a culture, they are also, in another sense, producers, or at least the conditions which 
make possible that culture - there is a circular dynamic at work here. 
The cultural webs of significance, I call these significants, are the (categorized) 
means, whether they are seen as 'plans, recipes, rules, or instructions' (Geertz 1973, 
44), for the regulation and control of behavior and are not seen as the behavior itself. 
According to one ancient Chinese sage, Xunzi (c. 298-238 BC), man needs these 
controls ('plans, recipes, rules, or instructions'), for if allowed to go undirected, 
man's behaviour would be virtually ungovernable, a mere chaos of pointless acts and 
exploding emotions, his experience virtually shapeless. Spradley and McCurdy (1987, 
4) appear to confirm Xunzi's 2,300 year old insight when they write that: 'Human 
beings cope with their natural and social environment by means of their traditional 
knowledge' [their culture]. Culture concerns itself with the vital problems of resource 
distribution, how the 'collective' is organized, and how the individual engages with 
the collective. 
A cultural narrative, as I have indicated above, is open to many views and readings. 
This thesis is a 'cross-cultural' endeavour and is different in style, method and 
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intention from other expressions. It is not about abstract notions, but about concrete 
examples in history. Cross-cultural study is often seen as equivalent to identifying 
what members of that culture have in common and comparing this with members of 
other cultures. Underpinning cross-cultural inquiry, as it is used here, is the idea that 
there are two forms of culture: the culture that an outside observer may discern, and 
the culture that is understood by members of that culture; the emic/etic problematic. 
Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1-2) in his Outline of Theory and Practice explains how there 
is a need to transcend both the subjective categories of native experience as well as 
the objective categories of the outside observer. The practice approach utilized here is 
meant to overcome this problematic and to indicate 'a dialectic of the material and 
symbolic, the real and the perceived, the structure and the act (Bell 1992, 76).' 
The emic/etic problematic is exemplified when, for instance, some ritual activities, 
such as the rituals of ancestor worship, although an integral part of daily life in late 
imperial China, are rarely mentioned as important cultural signifiers by Chinese 
intellectuals, yet they have been of enormous interest to many Western interpreters of 
Chinese culture. On the other hand, the abstract notion of Chineseness has been a 
most important question for the Chinese intelligentsia over the past century and the 
discourse has been very strong over recent decades. This discourse is most often about 
ethnic and political questions and concerns the ongoing question of Chinese identity. 
It is the 'other' cultural discourse; the internal Chinese discourse about their own 
'culture', and while it shares many areas of similarity with the cross-cultural concerns 
of this work, it nonetheless has its own concerns and its own ideas about the construct 
'culture' as it overlaps between the two discourses. Nevertheless a brief mention the 
Chineseness discourse is valuable here as it will by comparison make clearer the 
specific construct of culture employed in this thesis. 
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There is an "ongoing crisis of 'identification' which has so deeply colouintellectual 
discourse in China during the twentieth century, and which, to this very day, is 
expressed with an intensity no less than that of the May Fourth era of seventy years 
ago.' (Cohen 1991, 133) 
Allen Chun (1996 111) reminds us of this discourse when he asks: "what is so 
unambiguous about China that makes it an unquestioned object of gazing? What is the 
nature of Chineseness, and who are the Chinese? Finally, who is really speaking here? 
Something called "China" unquestionably exists, but, more importantly, there is a 
multitude of expressions to denote different aspects of China and Chineseness." 
In the Chinese world, cultural discourse constitutes an appropriate "space of 
dispersion," in Michel Foucault's terms, for understanding how ethnicity (as 
nationality) is constructed. (Chun 1996, 11) 
Besides situating the discourse in ethnic and political space, Allen Chun (1996, 
116,130) sees a 'semantic arbitrariness of culture' and the 'possibility of different 
interpretations and political uses of Chineseness.' For Helen Siu (1993, 19) 'the term 
"China" has a similar arbitrariness and 'Chineseness is not an immutable set of beliefs 
and practices, but a process which captures a wide range of emotions and states of 
being.' 'Being Chinese' she says, 'involves diverse groups in continuous negotiation 
of their cultural identity and history in order to establish a legitimate position in a 
volatile but all encompassing state order' (Siu 1993, 22). 
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Tu Wei-ming (1991, 1-3) reinforces the fluidity of the discourse and its political and 
ethnic concerns when he writes that: 
Chinese culture, the generic term symbolizing the vicissitudes of the material and 
spiritual accomplishments of the Chinese people, has undergone major interpretive 
phases in recent decades and is now entering a new era of critical self-
reflection .... Although it is often noted that culture, rather than ethnicity, features 
prominently in defining Chineseness, the cultured and civilized Chinese, as the myth 
goes, claim a common ancestry. Indeed, the symbol of the "children of the Yellow 
Emperor" is constantly re-enacted in Chinese literature and evokes feelings of ethnic 
pride. 
This brief description of the Chineseness discourse as it relates to an understanding of 
Chinese culture highlights the differences between a cross-cultural inquiry and an 
internal inquiry into Chinese culture. This thesis, as an example of cross-cultural 
inquiry, makes implicit claims about what practice and the symbol of ancestor 
worship 'mean' for the culture, basing the claims on a description of a clearly 
observable empirical object: the ritual treated as text. The rituals become text in that 
they are 'analogous to culturally produced texts' that may be interpreted as bestowing 
'meaning upon experience' (Marcus and Michael 1986, 61). This way of 
understanding ritual has in recent years led to advances in the study of ritual, 
'particular I y in disciplines ... whose practitioners see them, or are beginning to see 
them, as primarily 'interpretative' endeavours' (Bell 1992, 15-16). 
The publicly observable symbols and rituals of ancestor worship become an empirical 
object, rather than something hidden away in individual consciousness. The 
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Chineseness discourse, as Helen Sui notes above, does not involve 'an immutable set 
of beliefs and practices.' Whereas the thesis' aim is to describe and find meaning, the 
Chineseness discourse is deontological in that it examines the culture from its own 
position and then tries to define where the culture should go. 
This work, besides being 'practice' oriented, also uses a symbolic anthropological 
approach, and therefore focuses largely on [Chinese] culture as a whole where rather 
than on specific aspects of culture that are isolated from one another. It sees culture in 
its wide ethnographic sense, as a complex whole (Tylor 1958, 1), just as Marcel 
Mauss (1967, 77-8) sees social systems as wholes where 'everything merges.' I am 
here, as Mauss is, concerned with wholes, which resist being divided into smaller 
elements because 'it is only by considering them as wholes that we have been able to 
see their essence, their operation and their living aspect.' This view of culture is 
therefore different from the discourse of Chineseness as Chinese culture whose focus 
is more specific, both in its subject matter - identity and ethnicity, and in a historical 
sense. Questions about identity and ethnicity, valid and important though they may 
be, are very specific concerns about a very general notion- culture (as it is employed 
in this thesis). Comparative cultural perspectives as illustrated here by concepts like 
China and the West, culture and ideology, seek to clarify issues which deserve to be 
tested against more differentiated versions of each entity (Blair 1993, 10). The 
Chineseness discourse however sees a different 'culture.' It is a culture where 
contemporary attitudes towards tradition and culture depend only on contemporary 
conditions. China's long historical culture counts for little from these perspectives. 
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When it becomes necessary to inspire the people, to revitalize their natural 
confidence, the traditional culture is more useful; when there is need to break 
away from the bondage of feudal autocracy, then the slogans for violent attack 
against the traditional culture are put up in readiness; and then when idealism 
turns into disillusionment, some of the would-be radical reformers who were 
once so anti-tradition and anti-authority now become dispirited and seek to 
reinstate the old tradition, to the point in advocating a new authoritarianism. (Li 
1991, 254) 
Whereas the Chineseness discourse emphasizes the variability of Chinese culture (Tu 
1991, 1-3) and that it has 'undergone major interpretive phases in recent decades and 
is now entering a new era of critical self-reflection', this thesis has emphasised its 
continuity and unity. 
Cohen (1991, 115) also notes China's cultural unity in spite of its pronounced 
linguistic diversity. 
I am able to confirm on the basis of my own field research in four widely separated 
Chinese villages [from the 1960s to the 1990s] that even where differences in spoken 
language were most obvious the Han Chinese shared traits so numerous as to readily 
place them in a culture area easily distinguished from those of nearby state 
civilizations in Asia. (Cohen 1991, 115) 
Allen Chun highlights another distinguishing feature of this discourse when he notices 
its origination in the ranks of the Chinese elite. This is also, interestingly, a drawback 
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of the Confucian discourse in regard to cultural epistemology, which I engage with in 
chapter two. Chun (1996 11) writes that: 
In the context of the state, such discourses [as Chineseness] rarely emanate directly 
from the people themselves but are articulated by the state, intellectuals, and other 
vested interests, all of whom claim naturally to speak on behalf of "society as a 
whole." 
Most Chinese do not see their traditional culture as being 'incompatible either with 
modem nationalism or with national modernization (Cohen 1991, 113), and the 
'resurgence of ritual practice in a time of relative prosperity' (Anagnost 1994 224) 
underscores this compatibility. However, 'China's traditional elites were cultural 
brokers, for their high status in society was based upon nationally accepted standards 
also validated by local culture. In contrast, the pronounced cultural antagonism 
separating the new elite from the masses represents a barrier between state and 
society ... .' (Cohen 1991, 113-114) 
1:2:3: Cultural continuity 
A critical assumption of this thesis, as opposed to the Chineseness discourse, is the 
continuity of Chinese culture. Although there appears to be a disjunction between 
Chinese tradition and Chinese modernity, and although 'much of what appears to be 
"traditional" China seems to be disappearing, paradoxical as it may seem, the 
traditional background still plays a significant part .. .in steering [today's] China' (Liu 
and Tu 1970, 1). Thomas Metzger (1977, ix) makes even stronger claims about 
China's traditional cultural continuity in the face of historical adversity when he 
writes that: 
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No culture in the world matches China's in durability. Moreover, it is a culture long 
under siege. For two hundred years it has staved off challenges from the West. Then 
for more than three decades Chinese culture has been brutally attacked and insulted, 
decried and denied from within by the extermination campaigns of the Chinese 
Communists. Yet China's cultural tradition persists and seems to be engulfing its 
Communist tormentors. 
Although we may question the degree to which ancestor worship has been treated by 
Confucian elite of imperial times, and whether or not modem educated Chinese 
engage with ancestor worship in a serious and religious way, for the vast majority of 
Chinese people, ancestor worship is an integral part of their religious world view. For 
them the ancestral altar at home ties the family to a religious system that transcends 
the family. 'This is the system of the lineage ancestral cult, which roots every family 
in past history and, at the same time, ties it to all other families of common 
ancestry'(Jochim 1986, 170). As a continuing cultural activity, ancestor worship has 
been important for the Chinese from earliest times to the present and as a symbol of 
cultural continuance it has no other rivals. 
It is not well known and appreciated in the West5, that during its long and traditional 
history China developed and maintained a highly complex and successful culture, 
enabling it to extend the empire 'so early to a world as vast as Europe and containing 
human beings of comparable diversity'(Gemet 1982, 27). No civilization in the world 
today has had a longer continuity than the Chinese (Ho 1976, 547). From its ancient 
beginnings until recent times China has withstood constant evolutionary changes. As 
5 See Raymond Dawson's (1967) The Chinese Chameleon for a full account of this claim and 'an 
analysis of European conceptions of Chinese civilization' throughout the modem ages and up until the 
mid-twentieth century. 
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a distinctive culture (Nathan 1993, 923) it has strongly underpinned a highly 
organized and continuous socio-political entity. Underscored by continuity, 'it is quite 
false to see the elimination of the Sino-Manchu dynasty in 1912 as the end of a two-
thousand-year-old political system' (Granet 1982, 21). Since the 1950s, the constant 
surveillance, crippling regulation, and persecution of religion that is attributed to CCP 
policies is not something new. Throughout China's last two thousand years, the state 
has held absolute right of control and intervention over religious and other activities 
(Thompson 1973, 231 )6, so it is not logical to infer a necessary irreparable disjunction 
due to the CCP religious policies alone. Joseph Levenson (1958, 156) was suggesting 
its continuous nature when he wrote that 'maybe China is forever China, as the saying 
is, absorbing everyone, and nothing has been new in a crowded century except 
ephemeral detail, spilling over a changeless paradigm of Chinese history.' China's 
civilizational continuity is an extraordinary example of longevity, yet this 
extraordinary success story is only just beginning to be appreciated, and only rarely 
explained. As a distinctive characteristic, this successful cultural continuity is most 
often ignored, an omission this thesis seeks to rectify. Weber went even further when 
he came to see this 'extraordinary example of longevity' as a cultural weakness of its 
'internal transformative capacities' (Eisenstadt 2003, 282), a view I will discuss in 
greater detail in the conclusion of the thesis. 
The cultural strategy of the Chinese, throughout their long and continuous history, has 
enabled China to be successful; successful as measured by cultural survival and 
continuity, combined with its size and power over such a long history. These cultural 
I 6 _ This discrimination was not directed against religion per se. 'It was directed against the 
category of religious believers which was unwilling or unable to reconcile devotion to one's faith with 
loyalty to the [current] regime' (Thompson 1973, 234). 
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strategies have occurred over a long period of time, and we need to look for the 
source of these strategies, as patterns or 'webs of significance' in China's distant past, 
and throughout its history and development. Culture, as a strategy for survival, 
subsumes other concepts such as ideology, philosophy, religion and should be seen, 
along with other related strategies, as significant cultural strategies - significants. It is 
a general way of thinking which for thousands of years has allowed and enabled the 
Chinese to maintain a continuous and enduringly successful society. The culture of a 
people subsumes not only their philosophy and/or their religion, but also that entire 
collection of views, beliefs and actions concerned with those important and significant 
aspects of a society. It concerns 'every aspect of life: know-how, technical 
knowledge, customs of food and dress, religion, mentality, values, language, symbols, 
socio-political and economic behavior, indigenous methods of taking decisions and 
exercising power, methods of production and economic relations, and so on' (Verhelst 
1990, 17). Culture emphasizes continuance, and the continuing importance of the 
family, for example, is revealing as an institutionalization of continuity in China. 
Even revolutionary political changes may have limited impact on cultural continuities 
(Blair 1993, 2). 
Since the Opium War the Chinese have gone through a number of violent periods. 
However, as Li points out, the extent to which change occurs is questionable. 
Historical changes and the unremitting efforts of generations of thinkers have 
provided many favourable turns in the modernization of the traditional Chinese way 
of thinking, and some reasonable elements of the Western civilization have more or 
less been assimilated. Yet, since the traditional way has been followed for 
generations, it will always be characterized by stability, solidity, and exclusivity, and 
the innermost core of its structure will be hard to change. (Li 1991, 256) 
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Marx (1951, 225) adds his own insights to the argument for cultural continuity when 
he writes that 'men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they 
please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past'. Therefore, 
in reference to culture, we can easily agree with Hall and Jefferson (1976, 11), that it 
'embodies the trajectory of group life through history', and it is this trajectory which 
we see as the continuing nature of culture. 'The cultural traditions established in 
[ancient] China were ancestraz7 to all that followed, continuing to exert their 
influence down to recent, if not contemporary times' (Keightly 1990, 54). 
1.3. Caveats 
1: 3: 1 Generalizations 
Here I want to clarify, qualify, and say something about my approach and method that 
may be considered unusual; a caveat against conformity and conventionality. I have 
already written at length about the hermeneutical process, and part of this process is to 
move from the general to the specific to the general. In trying to understand various 
things about China, I apply the very general concept of culture for this purpose; the 
aim to know more about culture (the more general concept), in order to know more 
about things (the specific and particular), and the more known about things will help 
better under understand the more general, and so on. China and Chinese culture fall 
into that category of a generalization, a stereotype, and the use of generalizations 
throughout this thesis is necessary and desirable. Part of the need for generalizations 
and stereotypes is the determination to synthesize the multivocality of cultural voices 
from different regions and various historical eras - a striving for the whole of culture. 
7 My emphasis 
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As Blair (1993, 10) reminds us, there is an inherent worth in 'improving on widely 
held stereotypes through comparative analysis. Such acts of conscious redefinition of 
other in relation to self remain an indispensable part of long-term process commonly 
referred to as education.' 
Questions about who the Chinese are, exactly, as they constitute the participants of 
their culture, are not a concern of a generalization. Nor does it matter overly much 
that at times I will refer to us as the Western 'other', sometimes meaning more the 
Western academy, sometimes the more general field of those influenced by the 
academy, sometimes a general field of 'intelligentsia' and leaders, and sometimes just 
the chattering classes. Most times I will situate the meaning within how I am using 
the generalization at the time. However, at all times I am treating the generalized term 
as just that: general, stereotypical, sometimes universal, but always non-specific - just 
as it should be treated. So my caveat here is that my emphasis many times throughout 
will be general, and a precise meaning should not be sought. Returning to Blair (1993, 
10) again, he reminds us that 'Despite the essentialist traditions dominant in the 
Western world, awareness of Chinese differences from ourselves reminds us that 
humans live in worlds of cultural constructs', and it is these general constructs which 
are of most interest here. Comparative cultural perspectives as illustrated here by 
concepts like China and the West, culture and ideology, seek to clarify issues which 
deserve to be tested against more differentiated versions of each entity (Blair 1993, 
10). 
1:3:2. Translation. 
All of the original Chinese texts quoted have been translated into English. There are 
many translations and interpretations of these texts; however, where possible, I have 
opted for the better known translations by James Legge, Arthur Waley, Wing-tsit 
59 
Chan and Burton Watson. Of the two major systems for transliterating Chinese 
characters, Wade-Giles and pinyin, I have chosen pinyin, the official and most widely 
used. However I will retain the use of some Wade-Giles transcription for some well 
known names and as they are used in the translations. 
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Chapter 2 
Challenging the Dominant Discourse: Confucianism-as-Chinese-
Culture 
An overriding sentiment of the thesis is to engage with and endeavour to overcome 
any 'prejudice against ritual' as a cultural epistemological key. It achieves this with 
'eyes wide opened to the importance of ritual' (Turner 1995, 7-9) as it exposes many 
aspects of Chinese culture that have been in the past glossed over due to theoretical 
constraints imposed by our own culture and our over-reliance on the paradigm and 
discourse of Confucianism-as-Chinese-culture as the key to its understanding. 
Cultural and historical phenomena are more 'fully intelligible only in the light of 
values embodied and expressed in symbols as ritual performances' (Turner 1995, 7-9) 
and it will be the role of the later chapters to bring to light the cultural values found in 
ancestor worship. 
The thesis rationale has, coincidentally, followed Neville's (2003, 531) argument that 
a reconstructed study of the signs and symbols [of Chinese ritual] 8 provides thick 
access to all layers of [culture9]. This practice method and way of approach allows us 
to more easily recognize configurations and patterns of action leading to the 
formulation of general relationships, a necessary condition for understanding other 
cultures, and 'the founding ambition of the social sciences at the beginning of this 
century [20th] (particularly in their sociological and Durkheimian versions)' (Chartier 




_Neville prefers the word 'civilization' here, and while semantic differences are important, I think the 
use of the term culture would not bother him too much. This chapter of his is in fact titled 'Philosophy 
of Culture.' 
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'official accounts' of what people do in their daily lives and what people actually do. 
'In other words, [practice theory asks the question], what is it that produces 
behaviour, if it is so clearly not the cultural knowledge which is revealed in "official" 
public discourse' (Jenkins 1992, 69)? Although the thesis will in general have to make 
a case for the importance of ancestor worship and its associated rituals in relation to 
understanding Chinese culture, and like Monica Wilson (1957, 6), take it for granted 
that 'any analysis not based on some translation of the symbols used by people of that 
culture is open to suspicion,' the question of Confucianism still looms large. And so 
the purpose of this chapter is to engage with the Confucianism-as-Chinese-culture 
discourse and to make clear where Confucianism sits in this analysis and decide 
whether it should be open to suspicion as the leading cultural narrative? 
2:1 Confucianism as a metonym for Chinese culture 
There are many ways to understand a culture, but the popular Western understanding 
of Chinese culture most often falls within the bounds of the dominant discourse: 
Confucianism. Western commentators have usually referred to Chinese society as 
Confucian (Milston 1978, 117). 'Confucius and his school are responsible for the 
pedagogic tradition which characterizes all of later China, [and] .. .if we were to 
characterize in one word the Chinese way of life for the last two thousand years', says 
W. M. Theodore de Bary (1963, 15, 19), 'the word would be Confucian'. Wing-tsit 
Chan (1963, 14) confirms this sentiment when he writes that 'Confucius can truly be 
said to have molded Chinese civilization in general.' 
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However, despite the master status of the Corifucianism-as-Chinese-culture discourse, 
Raymond Dawson (1967, 6) has a counter view and claims that Western Sinologists 
have excessively focused on the Confucian classics. He provides an example of this 
excess and cites the classical translations of James Legge, which were 'written a 
century ago, [and] are still considered so necessary and standard a tool that they were 
recently reprinted in their entirety by the University of Hong Kong.' 
More recently we have the popular culture rendition of Confucianism-as-Chinese-
culture in the Beijing Review, (29-11-2008, 41): 
One of the most poignant moments during the opening ceremony of the Beijing 
Olympic Games on August 8 was the scene where 3,000 performers in the guise of 
Confucius' disciples, each holding a roll of bamboo-strip book, recited the Confucian 
classics. This performance presented to the audience a very important period in the 
development of Chinese culture. 
Another recent example, from the China Daily (18-8-2005), is an article titled 
'Confucianism is the backbone of ancient Chinese culture.' Quoting Professor Zhang 
Liwen, from Renmin University it says: 'Confucianism is the root of the Chinese 
culture. Only when there are deep roots will there be thick foliage.' Therefore, while 
the task of the thesis proper is to provide an alternative and more nuanced means for 
understanding China, the task of this chapter is to engage and challenge the 
conventional Confucianism-as-Chinese-culture way of understanding China, and to 
clear a conceptual pathway for the exposition of evidence and links to an 
understanding of ancestor worship and ritual as an alternative and more efficacious 
means of understanding. 
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While Confucianism is the leading narrative and the key symbol for understanding 
China, its role in these positions is not unchallenged, and counter views, besides those 
of Dawson (above) persist. The anthropologist James Watson argues that 'the whole 
of Confucianism is a mirage' and he has 'difficulty identifying what it is and what it is 
not' (Tu 1992, 51). He noted that: 
Anthropologists who work on the ground in Chinese cultural areas tend to be 
very suspicious of the Confucian label. It tends to be a catchall phrase, a kind of box 
that will hold almost anything. (Tu 1992, 92) 
In an illuminating work concerning the conceptualization of Confucianism, Lionel 
Jensen (1993, 3) describes how 'China and the West have been bound in imagination 
by the concepts of Confucius and Confucianism since the late seventeenth century'. 
He sees Confucianism as being 'manufactured' into a 'definitive ethos of the Chinese 
- their civil religion, their official cult, their intellectual tradition' where it has 
become 'indistinguishable from what it signifies - China, especially the China of the 
ageless rhythms of family, field, and forebears' (Jensen 1993, 4). Deborah Sommer 
(1995, xx), agreeing with Jensen, but also including Taoism in the discourse, notes 
their artificiality as products of Western sinology. It becomes clear that Confucianism 
is a generic Western term that has no corresponding term in Chinese, although it is 
variously described as a worldview, a social ethic, a political ideology, a scholarly 
tradition, and a way of life. Although Confucianism may be understood in many 
important ways, or precisely because of that, 'it is [still] an exaggeration to 
characterize traditional Chinese life and culture as Confucian culture' (Tu 1992, 49). 
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Confucianism, as a Western invention, derived its authority from a Western 
hegemonic position which over the last 400 years or so, needed to describe the 
narrative of Chinese thought in Western terms - religious and philosophical terms. It 
had to fit into the West's paradigm of understanding, and this meant fitting into those 
categories within that paradigm. It is an uncertain term, but it is nevertheless clear that 
it is most often understood in the West within the religious and philosophical 
discourses. These Western discourses, expressed as the West's meta-narrative, are 
found within a self-fulfilling, ideological paradigm and a consequential prophecy that 
gives primacy to the hegemony- Westem-centrism. Al-Azmeh (1991, 468) declares 
that 'despite protests .. .it remains incontestable ... that modem history is characterized 
by the globalization of the Western order'. 'Furthermore', he adds, 'it is clear that 
Western economic and political conquest and hegemony' have caused 'correlative 
conditions of equally real ideological and cultural hegemony'. For users of the 
Corifucianism-as-Chinese-culture discourse and symbol, there are both hermeneutical 
and epistemological (cultural epistemological)10 problems. 
2:2 The Hermeneutical Problematic 
A comparative inquiry of civilizational/cultural 11 thought will show that the problem 
relating to founders and followers of that thought is universal. The hermeneutical 
problematic is 'how do the interpretation of the followers relate themselves to the 
original or primitive teachings of the founders? Or, conversely, can the original 
teachings of the founders be extricated from the interpretations of the followers' 
(Schwartz 1975, 3)? The translation of these canonical texts remains one of the most 
10 I use the term cultural epistemology to highlight the difference between the philosophical uses of the 
word as it relates to knowledge and its acquisition, and the cultural use as it relates to understanding. 
11 I use the juxtaposed term here to distinguish a particular kind of culture - the culture of a 
civilization. 
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difficult tasks involved in cross-cultural interpretation. It entails 'many different 
linguistic, aesthetic, axiomatic, logical, metaphysical and political "pretexts" and 
practices' (Pfister 2003, 734). The discourse of Confucianism must to some extent 
depend on the original teachings and texts of Confucius and the Confucian school for 
consistent thought and for its boundaries. However, as is shown by the exposition 
below, consistency, clarity, and agreement about meaning, and the authenticity and 
intent of the Confucian teachings and the (so-called) Confucian texts are far from 
achieved. 
2:2: 1 The Confucian Texts 
The Confucian texts, as the evidence and the womb from which Confucianism is born 
and nurtured, contain the same problem as most other works of such historical 
significance - uncertainty about source and meaning. The image of Confucianism in 
the West has always been closely related to how these classics have been evaluated. 
The Confucian texts have for over two thousand years been analyzed to the extreme 
and in minute detail 'by generations of scholars in an effort to discover some hidden 
message which Confucius was attempting to relay to posterity' (Watson 1962, 38). 
The Confucian corpus, though, remains a stubbornly difficult subject for analysis, as 
it is a convoluted and complex system of interpretations which are often contradictory 
and reconstructed. Debates and arguments concerning what are original texts and how 
much Confucius contributed towards them have been an ongoing concern. Some 
modem scholars have even argued that Confucius had nothing to do with the texts 
attributed to him (Watson 1962, 128). Herrlee Creel (1960, 106) insists that 'we have 
no convincing evidence that [Confucius] wrote or even edited anything at all. This is 
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not an original verdict; an increasing number of scholars have reached this conclusion 
in recent years.' 
The Confucian literati, as the name suggests, followed a tradition of books 12 where 
the sacred writings of the ancients were the source of values and ideals. The ancient 
classics, as the core of Confucian doctrines, are the font of all the Confucian wisdom. 
'Indeed without a proper knowledge of Confucian classics, it would be impossible for 
us to draw a full picture of Confucianism' (Yao 2000, 47). It is interesting to note 
however that many of the pre-Confucian texts such as the Book of Documents, the 
Book of Odes, and the Book of Changes, eventually came to be seen as Confucian 
texts (Watson 1962, 124), and along with other texts of the times, such as the Spring 
and Autumn Annals, the Li Ji or Book of Rites, the Analects, and the short Classic of 
Filial Piety, became the official texts of Confucianism and the Han state. 
However problems arise when it revealed that these official and culturally significant 
(for some) texts of ancient China are only known through later texts. 'The oldest 
extant texts of the works are in most cases printed editions dating a thousand years or 
more after the composition of the works themselves' ( Watson 1962, 5), and this 
brings with it enormous implications regarding the authority and legitimacy of the 
texts, especially as sources for the cultural paradigm, Confucianism-as-Chinese. 
Furthermore, even after overcoming many of these problems of legitimacy, there is 
also the problem of style. It was a practice of early Chinese writers to place their 
'words of wisdom', [I avoid the term 'philosophy' for obvious reasons given above], 
12J relate this 'tradition of books' below to the 'cult of the book' and its polar other in this thesis, the 
'cult of the ancestors'; text versus action; theory opposed to practice. 
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within real historical settings, and also a common practice of those giving historical 
accounts to embellish them with 'words of wisdom' and to attribute those words to 
the historical figures they were writing about. That is, 'many works of history are 
coloured by philosophical bias, and many philosophical works abound in historical 
anecdotes and allusions' (Watson 1962, 7-8). 
More than just problems with authenticity, though, the Confucians also managed, as a 
strategy of power and domination, to suppress other forms of literature which may 
have provided alternative or different views. Popular folk stories and ballads, which 
we know existed, are either rare or non-existent after the sixth century B.C. (Watson 
1962, 5). Therefore, the popular view of the culture which may have been found in 
these works is no longer available to us and so we are forced, (if we rely on texts), to 
rely on the formal texts of the Confucian literati, and through the selected and formal 
historical texts of writers who were most often also the guardians and regulators of 
these early works. The Confucian Analects themselves, the earliest work on 
Confucius' life and teachings, did not attain their current form until at least one 
hundred years after his death. The authorship is still uncertain, and they are only 'a 
compilation of incomplete and partial dialogues requiring guesswork from those who 
are interpreting (Watson 1962, 127).' Its reliability is further questioned as 
contemporary works of the period make no mention of the Analects. 
Burton Watson (1962, 21) makes it clear that the 'semi-fictitious speech' employed 
by ancient writers and used in much of the Confucian canon is a 'dangerous 
instrument in historians' hands.' And I would add not only historians, but those who 
use or adapt the historical evidence gleaned from the Confucian texts to promote or 
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explain their versions of Chinese culture or Chinese cultural traits. In relation to a 
hermeneutic approach to the historical development of renderings of classical Chinese 
philosophy texts, it is clear that these translations are of varied quality and they call 
attention to a range of different philosophical positions. And it is these translations of 
varied and questionable quality that 'have now become the bailiwick of Sinological 
experts responsive to, but rarely trained in, philosophical research' (Pfister 2003, 
738). Furthermore, any philosophical theories announced and found in the 
Ruist/Confucian texts 'served only secondary functions. We may have been reading 
the texts with irrelevant expectations' (Eno 1990, 10): reader expectations conditioned 
by culture and ideology. 
2:2:2 Confucianism: A disputed term 
The term Confucianism itself is a much disputed and often ambiguous term. There is 
no agreement about what it means. One commentator even goes as far to say that 'if 
[Confucianism] is the original teachings of Confucius in the Analects, then almost 
nothing said about Confucianism today speaks to that '(De Bary 1991, xi). It is clear 
that Confucianism is important, but how important and what role it plays is not so 
clear, although, ironically, most writers in the subject often 'treat Confucianism as if 
its content were self-evident, simple, and unchanging' (Nivison and Wright 1959, 3). 
Confucianism is not a simple, unitary philosophical or ethical code, but a complex 
body of values and ideological concepts that has altered through time. 'The meaning 
of "Confucianism" is ambiguous. Since scholars understand the term to mean 
different things, it is no wonder that there is a lack of communication among them' 
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(Liu 1996, 92). As a direct consequence of all the problems associated with the 
Confucian texts and their interpretation, when we refer to China as being a Confucian 
culture the meaning of this term is so widely disputed that it is of little practical use in 
attributing cultural value and significance. Not only is the authority and meaning of 
the so-called Confucian texts disputed, but also the meaning of Confucianism itself is 
disputed, among scholars (and generally neglected among the Chinese people). 
Theodore De Bary writes (1959, 25) that he and other eminent sinologists and 
scholars of the Committee on Chinese Thought 'have been perplexed in defining the 
scope and character of Confucianism.' He and his colleagues speak of Confucianisms 
and stress the multiplicity of Confucian thought and 'the social contexts in which it 
functioned.' He draws attention to our dilemma without really pointing a way out, but 
he does rightly warn us against any simplistic characterizations of Confucianism. 
It is clear that there is no specific set of attributes that describe what Confucianism is, 
and according to Gilbert Rozman (Tu 1992, 5), even in China, Confucianism is 
viewed differently according to social place or position. Confucianism lends itself to a 
number of disciplinary approaches, such as philosophical, religious, historical, 
sociological, political and anthropological, providing a master narrative of both great 
range and great complexity. The outcome is a subject which is often seen as 
contradictory, ambiguous, multi-layered, but always inter-related. 
Dirlik (1995, 251) has assembled an impressive list of Confucianisms (and he 
concedes there are many others he 'may have missed'), which correspond to similar 
lists by Rozman (1991, 160) and Tu, (1992, 40) highlighting the ambiguity and 
uncertainty of the uses of the term: 
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Chinese, Japanese, Taiwanese, and Singaporean Confucianisms ... social 
Confucianism, vulgar Confucianism, low Confucianism, high Confucianism, folk 
Confucianism, bourgeois Confucianism, imperial Confucianism, reform 
Confucianism, social-elites-not-holding-high-government-post Confucianism, 
merchant house Confucianism, and mass Confucianism. 
Robert Eno (1990, 6-7) discusses the use and misuse of the term at length. He 
suggests that the term Confucianism is very confusing and it should be entirely 
abandoned due to its 'ambiguities and irrelevant traditional.' He does however 
suggest another term, Ruism, but warns that its core teachings 'lay outside its texts in 
a detailed training course of ritual, music and gymnastics' (Eno 1990, 9). Eno's 
position here is quite close to that of this thesis, although the emphasis of the thesis is 
obviously ritual and not music and gymnastics, and its approach is more varied and 
trans-disciplinary. 
2:2:3 Elite Confucianism 
The uncertainty around the texts and the meaning of the term Confucianism begs the 
questions of whether these uncertain texts really hold the Confucian tradition together 
or whether there is something else which has been so central to Chinese culture, a 
culture which has proven to be so resilient for so long. One important meaning for 
the term Confucianism is what Arif Dirlik ( 1995, 251) refers to as 'high or social-
elites-not-holding-high-govemment-post Confucianism', and what is often referred to 
as elite Confucianism. It is a Confucianism which is 'the traditional view of life and 
code of manners, [which can be found within the Confucian classics], of the Chinese 
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gentry' (Graham 1988, 357, 359). This type of Confucianism, concerns the use of 
selected Confucian texts and ideas as they are taught to prospective and incumbent 
scholar-officials; it is a gentlemanly code-of-conduct for the Chinese gentry. 
As one type or category of meaning, the term 'elite', when applied to a seemingly 
distinct group in Chinese history, appears to be relatively concrete, but even here 
there are hermeneutical problems. Is Confucianism really, no more than as Graham 
defines it? For even though to some 'Confucianism literally means the tradition of 
literati/scholars' (Yao 2000, 31), for others it is not as distinct. Peter Bol (1992, 15) 
provides an example of the conceptual problems when he writes: 
the use of Confucian and Confucianism as general terms for Chinese political elite 
and their values obscures distinctions among [them] and changes over time. The 
learning associated with being aju, the most obvious equivalent of being a 
"Confucian," was not constant; few Han and T'ang scholars would have agreed with 
Sung thinkers that it meant the learning of Confucius and Mencius. (Bol 1992, 15) 
This leads us to consider another popular misconception - that Confucianism, as a 
practice at least, (whatever that is contrived to be), was importantly ubiquitous 
throughout Chinese post-Han history. In fact in regards to any claims to being 
comprehensive it may be considered elite and no more than a particular array of 
Confucian principles and ethical practices of the scholar-officials. Morton Fried 
(1973, 348) questions 'whether China was ever truly Confucianist, if we mean by this 
that Confucianism permeated all social class levels.' 
Edward Shils (1996, 59) sees the elitist and culturally non-representative aspect of 
Confucianism when he writes that: 
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[Confucius] conceived of society as having one major centre - the ruler and his court 
- and a very large number of peripheral centres - great families and their lineages -
which were largely autonomous and relatively self-constrained. All initiative and 
decision were concentrated in the major center. The vast majority of the population, 
the common people, had no initiative and no voice in any discussions about the 
society in which they lived. 
Nearly all the authors of the important texts of ancient China, whether those texts are 
considered as poetry, history, or philosophy, were at the same time government 
officials, (or sought to be), or members of the philosophical schools which sought 
official sanction and support. They were either members of the ruling elite or aspired 
to be members, and their primary intellectual concern was political. The ancient texts 
of China, 'official or otherwise, deal almost entirely with the activities of China's 
ruling elite and are available to us only in a form ready edited and packaged by that 
elite' (Keay 2008, 5). 
Confucianism is also one of the three religions of China. However there is only a 
tenuous link between Confucianism which is seen as part of the popular folk religion, 
(which treats Confucius as a spiritual entity and which blends easily with ancestor 
worship, and also Taoism, Buddhism, and shamanistic beliefs), and the state cult of 
Imperial Confucianism. Furthermore, both the folk religion of Confucianism, and the 
elite Confucianism of Imperial design, 'differ from philosophical Confucianism and 
Neo-Confucianism' (Fried 1973, 348). Confucianism's role as some sort of key to an 
understanding of Chinese culture comes into question when its connection with 
elitism and hegemony is made clear and its disconnection with the broader society is 
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emphasized. Ancestor worship, on the other hand, connects with the great majority of 
Chinese people. It has been a widespread and egalitarian practice as the ancestors 
have been important for all Chinese. 
For many modem educated [elite] Chinese, as perhaps for the Confucian elite of 
former times, "worship" of ancestors is a matter of remembrance or commemoration 
and nothing more. Yet for the great majority of other Chinese, ancestor worship is 
part and parcel of humanity's religious relations with the spirit worlds. For them, just 
as the stove god represents the family to the Jade Emperor in Heaven and thereby 
links it to the universal divine-human bureaucracy, the home ancestral altar ties the 
family to another religious system that transcends the household. This is the system 
of the lineage ancestral cult, which roots every family in past history and, at the same 
time, ties it to all other families of common ancestry. (Jochim 1986, 170) 
The problematic of using the thoughts of the elite to deduce the thoughts of the 
majority is taken up by Benjamin Schwartz (1985, 407) when he writes that his own 
seminal work concerning the 'world of thought' in China only engages with the 
'modes of thought reflected in the texts of the [elite] "high culture" and not on the 
conscious life of the vast majority who neither read nor wrote.' In partial opposition 
to Maurice Freedman (1979, 355) who maintained that 'elite culture and peasant 
culture [in China] were not different things; they were versions of each other', 
Schwartz's own leaning was not to justify the focus on the elite texts in the 
expectation that the elite exposition was that of an unproblematic 'parallelism' of the 
two versions of the same culture. Indeed he suggests that while the elite culture of 
China may emerge with the rise of civilization out of the same broad neolithic matrix 
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as the culture of the people, it later diverges in crucial ways from the popular culture' 
(Schwartz,1985, 408). 
The most plausible explanation for the focus of Western academia on the elite culture, 
as Elite Confucianism, is simply that there are very few other resources which may 
used to provide direct evidence about the thoughts of the majority and their popular 
culture. And of course the texts of the elite do play an important role in illuminating 
our understanding of the shared culture of the Chinese - elite or otherwise. However, 
as far as those texts actually representing the entire or the general culture, it is 
interesting to note that 'even in the modem period, the highly religious Almanac (Li-
shu) enjoys a much wider sale in China than the rationalistic Confucian classics' 
(Yang 1967, 270). 
Our efforts here in this thesis are concerned with a better understanding of Chinese 
culture, so the illumination we seek is from a number of light sources; an 
understanding gained from various views; a thick description where ancestor worship 
and Chinese culture are described and re-described in an hermeneutical spiral via 
historical texts and text-analogues (relics etc.,), philosophical analysis, empirical 
ethnographic field research, or any other means available. When used in unison under 
the rubric of a symbolic analysis (rituals of ancestor worship), our view of the 
illuminated subject is much clearer, for as different as they are, we are simply dealing 
with an integrated whole of the 'variant versions of a common cultural system' 
(Schwartz 1985, 408). 
2:2:4 Confucianism's inception and Confucius' claims 
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Confucianism postdates the central and inceptive ideas and themes which constitute 
Chinese culture, society and traditions. It is generally agreed that to understand the 
continuous nature of Chinese culture and civilization the process of understanding 
must begin with its embryonic beginnings. The most important texts of ancient China 
are those of Confucius and his followers. The Confucian literati made themselves the 
special guardians of the ancient literature of China and the sole transmitters and 
interpreters of the ancient texts (Watson 962, 124). Confucius had this in mind when 
he often said that he was not an innovator but was just passing on the wisdom from 
the past. The master said in the Analects (7: 1), 'I transmit but do not create. I believe 
in and love the ancients' (Chan 1963, 30). And, from the Doctrine of the Mean (Chan 
1963, 111) we are told that Confucius transmitted the ancient traditions of Yao and 
Shun, and he modeled and made brilliant the systems of King Wen and King Wu. 
Confucius 'never saw himself as a leader or founder of a religious tradition; what he 
did was merely to transmit the ancient culture, which in his mind was the model for 
the present and the guarantee for the future' (Yao 2000, 26). And even though he was 
very important as a transmitter of the Confucian tradition, Confucius himself 'does 
not represent the highest manifestation of the Confucian ideal. Yao and Shun, as the 
sage kings, could be considered more Confucian than Confucius' (Tu 1992, 49). 
The early Confucians were concerned with the conservation of culture, and the 
Confucian aim was to revitalize and strengthen those institutions and values that were 
thought to have maintained a successful society which had existed for centuries in 
harmony and prosperity. While it is recognized that the early Confucians claimed to 
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be transmitting the values and knowledge inherent within the ways of the ancients, 
and that Chinese culture is by its very nature continuous, it seems curious that 
Chinese culture should be so clearly identified with Confucianism-the prima-facie 
case, considering the evidence and not the recent claims, is weak indeed. 
Therefore, in summarizing the hermeneutical problematic it is clear that not only did 
Confucius himself deny any innovation, there is also a lack of convincing evidence 
regarding the so-called Confucian texts and their direct relationship with Confucius, 
his writing, editing, even his spoken word. Much of the words of wisdom and the 
historical settings attributed to ancient writings may in fact be devices used by later 
writers, commentators, and interpreters. There is a distinct lack of other forms of 
textual evidence which offered alternative or different views to those of the literati or 
Ru as the men who were the producers and custodians of so much of this early 
literature. Not only are the Confucian texts open to dispute about authority and 
meaning, but the term Confucianism itself is also open to interpretation and dispute 
about what cultural value and significance can be attributed to it. The indiscriminate 
use of the term Confucianism leads either to Confucianism meaning simply Chinese, 
and therefore providing no more information, or to the term being 'applied to 
everything indiscriminately, is felt to have content, albeit this content is fuzzily 
conceived' (Nivison and Wright1959, 3). 
So the question remains, how is it, that given the doubts and inconsistencies within 
the textual and historical grounds of Confucianism, it remains the preferred key to an 
understanding of Chinese culture. The answer lies in another realm of epistemic 
problems than those of hermeneutics discussed above. 
77 
2:3 Epistemological problems and ideology 
The epistemological problems of the discourse Confucianism-as-Chinese-culture 
align themselves with a constellation of ideas around ideology, hegemony, culture, 
and ritual. The epistemological consideration also relates to the effect that these 
various paradigmatic ideas have on what is known and understood as China in the 
'context of the times' (Schwartz 1975, 4). lt appears that 'despite their variety, 
Western images of China have tended to follow fashions' (Mackerras 1987, 1) and 
that 'what affected the West's images of China was less ignorance than [fashions of] 
politics and ideology' (Mackerras 1987, 5). Conceptions of China have both reflected 
the 'the spirit of the times' (Zeitgeist) in which these conceptions were formed, and 
also the 'stale beliefs of earlier ages' (Dawson 1967, 174) as they continually 
influence the present. 
2:3:1 Ethno-centric Distortion 
The main epistemological problem with the West's understanding of Chinese culture 
is one of Western ethno-centric distortion. An understanding of the multi-layered 
complexities of Chinese culture requires an appreciation of the historical ground from 
which this culture has emerged, and, unable to understand China in any other way 
than to carve up this historical reality and place it into a number of accepted Western 
conceptual categories, the Confucianism-as-Chinese-culture understanding succumbs 
to the falsehood of trying to fit the foot (of actuality and particularity), into the non-
fitting shoe (of Confucianism); the Chinese version of the Procrustean bed. 
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Although both the West and China share the hermeneutical problematic of founders 
and followers their paths diverge dramatically when considered in the broad cultural 
context. 'The consequence of this divergence is that the problematic of Western 
culture and those of Chinese culture are really quite different. They are 'distinct 
enough between China and the West so as to make the task of translating issues and 
meanings from one culture to another extremely challenging' (Hall and Ames 1995, 
xiv), and the over-simple use of the Confucian metonym does not successfully engage 
with this challenge. 
A major obstacle which hinders the West from understanding China on its own terms 
involves the seemingly resolute determination of Western culture/s to impose its/their 
'transcendental pretense' (Solomon 1993). This contradictory intent assumed by 
Western (Enlightenment) ethnocentrism has scientific rationality applied irrationally 
on the basis that Western cultural values are the universal norms for assessing the 
value of cultural activity of all other cultures. The West, having not only directly and 
heavily participated in the making of Chinese history, has taken a leading role in the 
creation of conceptual paradigms for understanding it. This Western-centric influence 
is not restricted to Westerners though. Even the Chinese themselves have consistently 
utilized Western concepts and analytical frameworks to articulate and inquire into 
their recent past and present circumstances (Cohen 1984, 1). These Western 
paradigms for understanding China, to use a phrase with connotations of imperialism, 
make China an intellectual possession of the West, as per Edward Said's (1978) 
construct of orientalism. The implications of the use of the Confucian paradigm for a 
reasonably balanced appreciation of Chinese tradition and even recent Chinese history 
are nothing less than, to borrow Feyerabend's terms, 'epistemological 
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authoritarianism' and 'anarchy': Western-centric authoritarianism and a forced 
anarchy - where the anarchy aims to 'confuse rationalists by inventing compelling 
reasons for unreasonable doctrines' (Feyerabend 1987, 189). 
Paradigms (used in this case for understanding Chinese culture) are, as we know, 'not 
just innocuous models of explanation that guide intellectual work. Paradigms are also 
expressions of social ideologies' (Dirlik 1996, 244). The global hegemony of Western 
intelligentsia, or the 'faculty club culture', as Peter Berger describes it, promotes 'the 
ideas and behaviors invented by Western (mostly American) intellectuals' (Berger 
2002, 4), and reflects the ideologies and values of Western culture. The apparent 
worth of a paradigm, for example the Confucianism-as-Chinese-culture 
understanding, is not epistemic per se, but instead finds its value in ideology. 
Therefore, as paradigms guide and control cultural inquiry (Dirlik 1996, 244 ), and 
ideology chooses the paradigm, it is ideology that has the most influence on our 
cultural inquiry. Paraphrasing Thomas Kuhn (1970, 64-65), and relating his 
comments not just to science but to the social sciences in particular, and to this topic 
specifically, it is ironic that our understanding of China is inhibited and depleted by a 
hegemonic paradigm of Confucianism, hegemonic in that it is a product of Western 
ideological influence. 
The discourse of Confucianism, as the narrative of the historical actualities and its 
consequences, and the dominant paradigm of understanding, controls what texts are 
allowed into its realm, and the texts define the discourse. The Corifucianism-as-
China/Chinese-culture paradigm is a Western-centric view of Chinese tradition which 
has evolved into traditional myth, where contradictory or alternative positions are 
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rarely glimpsed, and its hegemonic power remains unchallenged. So-called 
orientalism is still an epistemic force to be reckoned with, and is not just an out-dated 
way of knowing from the colonial past; it is an integral part of modem Western 
hegemonic inspired thought and ideology. If the term Confucianism, coined by 
Westerners, has any meaning at all, it is clear that it goes far beyond the actual 
personality or teachings of the great sage (Gemet 1982, 87), and has an artificially 
constructed meaning, an ideological spin, which exceeds conceptual clarity. 
The Confucianism-as-Chinese-culture paradigm suffers problems associated with 
comparison to Western paradigms of understanding and hegemonic discourses, again 
a problem of interpretation, but one of a different nature - ideological/cultural 
'encounters'. Western scholarship has bestowed a universal importance on 
Confucianism on the foundation of a perceived parallelism to Western ideas and 
ideals found in modern Western thinking in philosophy and religion. 
These philosophic and religious claims to new universal status have been secured for 
Confucianism by East Asian scholars whose work reproduces in another form the 
interpretive predilections of the Jesuits while it reiterates the current commercial 
fetishization of Confucius. (Jensen 1997, 14) 
The West sees Confucianism as the defining ethos of China, while Confucianism is 
really only the 'consequence of centuries of relationship between China and the West' 
(Jensen 1997, 4). Confucianism both imposes unrealistic limits and constraints on an 
understanding of Chinese culture on the one hand, and on the other it brings with it 
excessive concepts and ideas that detract from an understanding of the significant 
webs (significants) of Chinese culture. European ethno-centric Enlightenment views 
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helped established Confucianism in the 17th century and these same (self-styled) 
Enlightenment views now, by way of the power of the dominant ideology, continue to 
maintain Confucianism and misinterpret the important and underlying features of 
Chinese society. 
The argument for accepting Confucianism as the nexus for understanding Chinese 
culture is (as far as it is an argument at all) an argument ad populum. That is, it is an 
argument which appeals to the people; the people here being the wider and 
generalized set of Western academia and all that they influence - the 'chattering 
class'. This argument is, in philosophic terms, a fallacy which exploits the prejudices 
and widely-held beliefs and dominating Western values and ideologies of the people 
in order to gain support for an argument. 
'Confucianism', writes Yao (2000, 31), 'functions as an ideology and a guiding 
principle permeating the way of life in China'. Yao' s paradigm concept of the 
correlation between Confucianism and Chinese culture exemplifies the popular 
position - a position which as argued above, is a product of orientalism, and a skewed 
paradigm from which to understand Chinese culture and tradition. Confucianism is 
not only a disputed concept, but also carries with it the baggage of being a Western 
invention, with the faults, doubts, and inconsistencies commensurate with what I term 
its guru-text basis, but which is also its Western-centric emphasis on religion and 
philosophy. 
2:3:2 Confucianism's negative oriental narrative 
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Since the early times of Western engagement with China, discourses about China, 
have been bounded by the concepts of Confucius and Confucianism. Confucianism 
was initially seen by Westerners as 'a religion founded by Confucius, as Christianity 
was founded by Christ and Mohammedanism by Mohammed' (Graham 1993, 358). 
Confucianism eventually came to be seen as the identifying marker of the Chinese 
culture. 'Indeed the term "Confucianism" has performed such varied service as a 
charter concept of Chinese culture for the West that it has become indistinguishable 
from what it signifies - China' (Jensen 1997, 4). However the universal acceptance of 
Confucianism conceals its Western created role as the bearer of China's significance, 
as discourses about China found themselves inextricably drawn into Enlightenment 
debates about religion and philosophy. 
'Confucianism was not created by Confucius' (Yao 2000, 17), but it was created. 
'More impressive than Chinese popular culture's reinvention of Kongzi [Confucius] 
have been the steady growth of Sino-Western scholarly interest in Confucius and the 
religio-philosophical complexes of Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism' (Jensen 
1997, 14). However, the greatest problem with the paradigm, 'China as 
Confucianism', is not its artificiality, but its weakness as being more susceptible to 
Western hegemony. As the West modernized, it saw the 'death of God', and the 
relegation of the biblical texts to a discourse outside rationality and modernity, to a 
lesser discourse of faith and religion. For Confucius, his fate is even worse as he was 
not even holy, merely a wise person of 2,500 years ago. When juxtaposed with the 
Western religious narrative or with Western philosophy, Confucius is no more than of 
secondary consideration. Even if Confucianism is only held valuable for its ethical 
stance, philosophers such as 'Hegel and Max Weber saw this objectified, routinized 
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stage of ethical practice as inferior to European ethics' (Chow 2003, 648). Confucian 
ethics were characterized as lacking critical consciousness, and Confucianism became 
a 'trope for excessive ritualism' (Jensen, 1997, 19). Confucianism was at times seen 
as a 'quaint old-fashioned doctrine, with Confucius ... reduced to the dimensions of a 
... character out of a comic, a purveyor of riddles and jokes ... consigned to a position 
of inferiority as compared with Europeans ... [providing here] another clear example 
of [Western] views of China reflecting contemporary [Western] intellectual history' 
(Dawson, 1967, 65). 
The Confucian narrative as the Chinese cultural paradigm reveals much about 'the 
spirit of the times' in which these conceptions were formed (Dawson 1967, 174). In 
doing so it also reveals much about the history of Western culture and exposes its 
dualistic, twin-headed nature as it impacts on contemporary China, where Confucius 
has now been re-invented by the polity to a position equal to that of the Western 
invention. By dualism here I do not mean the polarity of views and judgments by the 
West which over time swung wildly from various positions of extreme admiration to 
opposite positions of disregard and disrespect, as indicated by the quote below by 
Jensen. 
For Voltaire, [Confucius] could symbolize a genuine non-European moral reason, 
while for Montesquieu he represented despotism. This symbolic variability reflected 
contemporary European debates about self, society, and the sacred at the inception of 
the nation-state. (Jensen 1997, 9) 
Furthermore, I am not referring to those Western views of China and Chinese culture 
subjected to degrees of variation and historical inconsistency, (which belies the actual 
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continuous nature of the culture), nor to their range of variation and inconsistency. 
What I mean by twin headed dualism is that the range is bounded by negative views 
when comparing Chinese and Western cultural attributes. In simple words, the 
dualism refers to the West's ethno-centrism, and its positive views of its own culture, 
and negative views of other cultures. 
Ethno-centrism itself is to some extent unavoidable, especially if we consider 
ethnocentrism as merely a cultural perspective, and Confucianism was born from this 
cultural perspective. When ethno-centrism is combined with the hegemony of 
Western culture, epistemic problems increase. One way to overcome or mitigate these 
problems is to recognize the basic cultural differences between China and the West, 
and to attempt to negate the Western urge to describe and understand all cultures 
within Western paradigms. 
2:3:3 Practice, rationalism, Truth, and ritual 
David Hall, and Roger Ames, (1995, xiv) respond to the challenge of this Western-
centric bias and ask us to understand the dramatically diverging historical pathways 
between both cultures. 'The consequence of this divergence', they say, 'is that the 
problematic of Western culture and those of Chinese culture are really quite different' 
and the task of translating an understanding between the two cultures is enormous. To 
just simply situate selected and translated Chinese texts within Western paradigms 
and to speak of them within Western (ideological) discourses obscures the 
fundamental difficulty of cross-cultural understanding. The translation and 
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interpretation of early Chinese texts into Western metaphysical languages, and the 
eventual assignation of these interpretations to the status of cultural significance they 
enjoy today, has inevitably missed the 'simplicity, poesy, and mystery of early [and 
later] Chinese thinking' (Wang 2007, 204). In order to better understand, we must 
identify the priority of "practice" as the distinctive character of early Confucian 
teaching, then it is precisely the meaning of such practice that is still unclear, as its 
spirit remains unthought. For the priority of practice has nothing to do with the 
priority of so-called "practical reason" or "practical philosophy." ... The early 
Confucian classics, which offer initial narratives about such practice, belong neither 
to science nor to philosophy nor to religion. (Wang 2007, 204) 
Here Wang Huaiyu is not only pointing out the difficulty of cross-cultural translation 
and the pitfalls of placing Chinese thought into Western categories as this chapter has 
emphasised, but he is also calling attention to the priority of practice in Chinese 
culture; a central feature of both Chinese culture and the approach of this thesis. 
The Western idolization of metaphysics and language is at odds with Chinese cultural 
thought where the cult of the ancestor is more efficacious in Chinese culture than the 
cult of the book, whether that book be a philosophical or religious text. fu the West's 
quest to understand their most significant cultural other, China, there has been a 
biased emphasis on metaphysics as the paradigmatic key for this enterprise, yet 
it is clear from recent research that the relatively rationalistic approach, [attributed to 
Confucianism and Confucianists] was not at all typical of the vast majority of the 
population, including the aristocracy ... [and] evidence from later centuries indicates 
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that veneration of ancestors was practiced by much of the population. (Overmeyer 
1995, 2) 
Indeed, religio-philosophic ideas such as absoluteness, transcendence, subjectivity, 
self, truth, Heaven, God, and even the terms religion and philosophy themselves, 
which have been essential to the development of Western Enlightenment tradition, 
were conspicuously absent in the articulation of Chinese culture. In order to remove 
the Deweyan 'lumber blocking our highways of thought' it is necessary, as far as 
cross-cultural awareness goes, to clear away 'many of the concepts and doctrines that 
came to comprise the dominant intellectual inventory or Western culture' (Hall and 
Ames 1995, xx). 
During the 'age of expansion', European culture attempted to re-create and resettle 
itself in all parts of the world, and to 'spread, transmit, and disseminate [cultural and 
religious] knowledge, ideas, and information farther and faster', their goal being to 
control space and time- a transmission view of communication (Carey 1990, 16-17). 
In Western culture this transmission view of communication is the most usual view. 
However, when viewed ritually, as suggested by James Carey (1990) and Eric 
Rothenbuhler (1998), the links between the manufacture of Confucianism and 
Western culture become clearer. W estem culture moved through the eras of religion 
as ritual to religion as text and on to the Enlightenment era with its values and ideals 
such as individuality, rationality, and scientific truth. It ritualized the Western 
worldview to 'the degree to which modem rationalism and secularism is expressed in 
ritualistic communication forms' (Rothenbuhler 1998, 117). However there is 
inconsistency and contradiction in this Western view in that 'rationalism presumes 
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that the modem West is in a secular age, that religion, ritual and magic are no longer 
of relevance to important things. But indeed, rationalism has its own religious 
foundations and ritualistic elements' (Rothenbuhler 1998, 119). The hegemony of 
Western culture and its Enlightenment ideals usually regards ritual as outside those 
ideals of rationality and logic. However ritual communication generates its own 
rationality and logic, and the Western idolization of metaphysics and language, even 
-
the terms religion and philosophy themselves, are only examples of what one culture 
considers to universal and rational. The Enlightened, secular, Protestant modem world 
'is a world of taboo, a world of ritual avoidance ... [where] ritual is of no less 
importance; it is of a different character' (Rothenbuhler 1998, 121). 
The common Western view of religion today, and therefore of ancestor worship as a 
religion, is as a belief based on creed as interpreted in its gospels, codes, and texts, 
rather than a practice, as a practice definable in terms of modes of behaviour. Prior to 
the modem era 
a medieval peasant's knowledge of biblical history or Church doctrine was ... usually 
very light. The Church was important to him not because of its formalized code of 
belief, but because its rites were an essential accompaniment to the important events 
of his own life - birth, marriage and death .... Religion was a ritual method of living, 
not a set of dogmas. (Thomas 1972, 76) 
This Western view of religion, or the serious part of life, impinges on our views of 
what is important in Chinese life - it becomes a Western paradigmatic view, and the 
paradigm most suitable is Confucianism. Just as ritual was recognized by Xunzi and 
others as important in Chinese culture (see previous chapter), it has also been 
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important in Western culture, though largely unseen, as the transportation view of 
communication overrode the ritual understanding. However a ritual definition of 
communication (Carey 1990, 18) highlights the shared beliefs of Western culture as it 
[unwittingly] shares its beliefs with China in the form of a Confucian paradigm of 
understanding Chinese culture. The cultural ideas that the West transmitted found 
greater reception over time due to the hegemony of the West, and it was these ideas, 
and indeed the paradigms which bound them, that found there way into Chinese 
culture - especially the high culture where contact was more prolific. Ideas such as 
philosophy and culture gave rise to the concept and authority of Confucianism and its 
perceived cultural importance, at least within the confines of the elite culture. As 
noted earlier, the impact of Western thought is not restricted to Westerners, for even 
the Chinese themselves have consistently utilized Western concepts and analytical 
frameworks to articulate and inquire into their recent past and present circumstances 
(Cohen 1984, 1). 
The ritual acceptance of the truth and rationality of many Western cultural ideas and 
ideals leads to argument from false authority. Although many take for granted the 
Confucianism-as-Chinese culture master narrative, a largely unchallenged, 
conventional, and unverified concept, many sinologists have another view. Around the 
time of the May Fourth (1919) protests, ancestor worship was seen by some Western 
observers and academics as 
the most vital factor in the religion of China ... [and] it continues to hold a position of 
supreme consequence in the religious and social life of the people. It has been 
described as 'the essential religion of China', 'the keystone to the arch of China's 
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social structure' and 'the most deeply rooted of all forms of religion in the very fibre 
of the Chinese character' .(Addison 1924, 492) 
In more recent times, Benjamin Schwartz, in his influential work, The World of 
Thought in Ancient China (1985, 20, 21) wrote that 'the orientation to ancestor 
worship is so omnipresent and so central to the entire development of Chinese 
civilization'. Keightly (1990, 44-45) is even firmer in his positive assessment of 
ancestor worship and his disregard of Confucianism when he maintains that 
To the extent that it is possible to speak of one strategic custom or institution in the 
mix of early China's cultural variables - strategic because of its pervasive ability to 
sanctify all other aspects of life and to legitimate or and reinforce the lineage - it 
would seem to be ancestor worship and its social and political corollaries involving 
hierarchy, ritual deference, obedience, and reciprocity. 
To reiterate, the task of understanding Chinese culture is difficult and the problematic 
should not be underestimated. It is hard work to overcome any Western-centric bias 
and to understand the dramatically diverging historical pathways between both 
cultures. For example, Hall and Ames (Thinking Through Confucius, 1987 ), 
although they previously insisted that Western intellectual traditions were broadly 
irrelevant in translating cultural concepts (my own sentiments), believe that they can 
'hermeneutically ... recover the true 'Confucius'. (Jensen 1997, 17), but, as Jensen 
points out, 
... by considering their account of Confucius to be truer than preceding ones, Hall and 
Ames fall victim to the Anglo-European philosophic paradigm of commensurability 
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against which Richard Rorty, whom they hold in high regard, has so eloquently 
written. (Jensen 1997, 17-18) 
So like De Bary and Wing-tsit Chan and others, they too fall victim to a lack of 
awareness of their ideological and ritually understood values of their own culture. 
2:4 Conclusion 
The beginnings of Confucianism may be found in Confucius' attempt to restore the 
ideal conditions which he understood could be found in previous times. 
Confucius emphasized the priority of practice (ritual/Li) and this is what was 
distinctive about early Confucianism as opposed to modem day manufactured 
Confucianism. Early Confucian teaching did not belong to science, philosophy, or 
religion. The knowledge Confucius wished to impart 'was not theoretical and abstract 
but concrete and factual' (Schwartz 1975, 11). As Wang has hermeneutically deduced 
from his study of The Great Learning, 'the priority of practice has nothing to do with 
the priority of so-called practical reason or practical philosophy' (Wang 2007, 204 ). 
The priority of practice which Wang attributes to Confucius is ironically the same 
priority given to practice by me in this thesis - an epistemological priority of practice 
as ritual over theory, supposition and gospel (in its many forms). My focus is on 
understanding culture - Confucius and his followers were concerned with continuing 
that same culture. Victor Turner (1995, 8) could just as well have been referring to 
Confucius, when he claimed that with 'eyes wide opened to the importance of ritual' 
he began to see many features of culture that had previously been hidden to view 
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because of the theoretical blinkers our culture had imposed on him. And he would, I 
think, have agreed with Monica Wilson (1957, 60) that 'any analysis not based on 
some translation of the symbols used by people of that culture is open to suspicion.' 
However, he may not have agreed with the orthodox Western intellectual traditions 
which assert that Confucianism is a philosophy and/or a religion which is implied in 
its current understanding. 
This chapter has not engaged directly in the teleological debates over whether it a 
philosophy or a religion, as the thesis argument in this part is that Confucianism does 
not equal Chinese culture and that Confucianism is anyway such a misunderstood 
term as to be of little analytical use. 'Confucianism as a form of thought, as a way of 
life, as a spiritual orientation, on the one hand is narrower than Chinese culture, which 
is a much broader term; but at the same time it is much broader than Chinese culture' 
(Tu 1992, 49). Any concerns over whether it is one of the two streams (philosophy or 
religion) of the Western-centric Enlightenment meta-narrative are mostly irrelevant. 
The main aim of this chapter is to show that by understanding Chinese culture in this 
Western-centric way, Chinese culture is misunderstood and misinterpreted. 
Chinese culture exhibits a way of thinking that is suspicious of, or at least ignores the 
supposed power and efficacy of theory - it leans towards the aesthetic and historical, 
a feature that is common to all schools of thought over China's long history. This 
attitude is juxtaposed to a belief in human wisdom gained experientially and 
historically. Chinese thinking is more concrete, worldly, and practical than its 
Western counterpart known as philosophy, and if philosophy is thought of as grand 
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systems of discursive thought as epitomized by Kant or Hegel, as it conventionally is, 
the idea of a Chinese philosophy is logically awkward and semantically challenging. 
If Confucianism finds its roots in ritual, and ritual works by logic of signs with 
meanings distinct from the logic of rationality, Confucianism' s allocation to the 
category philosophy is questionable. This point is exemplified by an account by Tu 
Wei-ming (1992, 123) who recalls that 'when at Peking University in 1985, [he] was 
explicit in telling his class that that he was introducing a foreign cultural subject: 
Confucian philosophy.' 
If not a philosophy, then perhaps Confucianism is religion or at least part of a 
religion? For many, ritual is action regarding the sacred and the Confucian tradition 
places a high value on ritual. Ritual becomes the sacred, and the sacred is whatever is 
treated as the utmost seriousness by the members of that community. In this sense of 
religion the relation to the category of serious makes Confucianism a religion and 
according to, Durkheim, the foundation of religious thinking. There is no requirement 
here for a creator God. Religion as the serious life is a phenomenological category, 
and as such is easily accepted. The problem however is the transference of meaning 
from the phenomenological to the divine which occurs as soon as we leave the focus 
of the subject as phenomenon. As an important construct within the concept of 
culture, the religion of China, infused as it is with ancestor worship, is a variety of 
beliefs and practices that depend on no univocal or single text or canon for its inherent 
logical consistency as a homogenous concept. Chinese thought, though, expressed as 
it is incongruently in text, has 'explicitly stressed that, while words may help point to 
the truth, they should never be mistaken for the thing itself (Jochim 1986, 170). 
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A major obstacle which hinders the West from understanding China on its own terms 
involves the seemingly resolute determination of Western culture to impose its 
'transcendental pretense' (Solomon 1993). This contradictory intent assumed by 
Western (Enlightenment) ethnocentrism has scientifically and rationality applied 
irrationally on the basis that Western cultural values as the universal norms for 
assessing the value of cultural activity of all other cultures. Confucianism, as a master 
narrative, symbol, and epistemological key or paradigm for understanding China, 
contains these Western cultural norms. Confucianism is many things and undoubtedly 
it is infused with much wisdom. However, it is not the metonym for Chinese 
traditional culture. The Chinese understand their own culture through a variety of 
deep and inherent norms related to family, kin, and ancestors. 
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Chapter3 
Watching the Ancestors: What is Ancestor Worship? 
It has long been observed that ancestor worship is much more than just some simple 
practices and ceremonies for the departed kin - its cultural implications are enormous 
and considerable. However, why ancestor worship has been important is not at first 
apparent. This and the following chapters will gradually reveal that the importance 
lies in its connections; connections to the family; from the family to whole socio-
political realm; and to the dominance of this realm in Chinese history. However, in 
order to gain an understanding of the full significance of ancestor worship, it is first 
necessary to examine the concrete practices which constitute this phenomenon. 'No 
attempt to understand the Chinese can be anything but imperfect without at least a 
brief description of the ritual practices concerning the departed kin, ancestor worship 
and ancestor veneration' (Latourette 1964, 537). Therefore, and ignoring Latourette's 
minimum suggestion of brevity, for a continuing better understanding of Chinese 
culture, a description of these practices is an essential starting point. 
3:1 The Chinese practice of ancestor worship 
As has been observed by various scholars of classical China, the Chinese concern 
with ancestor worship has been ubiquitous and essential for the 'entire development 
of Chinese civilization' (Schwartz 1985, 21). 'The whole pattern of Chinese life and 
thought was set in the ancient and classical times' (Harrison 1972, 3). Indeed, 
according to another scholar, 'to the extent that it is possible to speak of one strategic 
custom or institution in the mix of early China's cultural variables ... , it would seem to 
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be ancestor worship' (Keightley 1990, 44-45). Therefore it is reasonable to assume 
that to understand Chinese ancestor worship, and therefore Chinese culture, it is 
necessary to go to the very beginning of its inception. 
Although the physical origin of the Chinese people is still much debated and is 'a 
subject not fully understood' (Roberts 2006, 1), recent research and scholarship has 
provided a historical picture of much improved clarity from what was known and 
mythologized in the past. Archaeological evidence such as inscriptions on bronzes 
and newly excavated Zhou oracle bones fit together with the literary records of 
ancient places, people, and events long known from the classics and earliest histories. 
These archaeological discoveries, especially since 1920, have 'broken through the 
ancient crust of Chinese myth and legend, confirming much of it' (Fairbank 1992, 
xvii). Archaeological discoveries have revealed a complex picture of early Chinese 
development, where several regional cultures almost simultaneously achieved the 
transition from food gathering to food production and did not originate, as was once 
thought, in one area of the North China Plain (Roberts 2006, 2; Eberhard 1950, 10). 
Due to the 'remarkable continuity of post-Neolithic cultural development in China .. .it 
is probably truer for China than for most parts of the world that as the Neolithic twig 
was bent the modem tree has inclined' (Keightly 1990, 22). 'Certainly by 2000B.C. 
very many of the features we think of as typically Chinese were already in evidence' 
(Milston 1978, 45). It is China's remarkable cultural continuity that makes it 
imperative to study China's past, even when considering China's present. 'Distinctive 
features of Chinese life today, such as autocratic government, come down directly 
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from prehistoric times' (Fairbank 1992, 29) and there is no doubt that the early history 
of China is of crucial relevance in any understanding of China. 
Over 10,000 years ago, at the beginning of the Neolithic period China, the climatic 
conditions were favourable to the development of early Chinese culture. 'At some 
point, probably still in the Neolithic, the commemoration of the dead - a feature 
common to many early cultures, including the Greek and Mesopotamian - probably 
became more orderly and articulated in China, taking on an ideological and juridical 
power of its own' (Keightly 1990, 45). The Neolithic Chinese spent much of their 
time and effort in burying their dead and maintaining them after death. The dead were 
set apart in what looks like kinship groupings; they were worshipped, being the 
subject of religious-like practices and oracle bone divination. 'The presence of some 
of these "oracle bones" in cemetery areas suggests that the living, by cracking oracle 
bones, were attempting to communicate with the dead' (Keightly 1990, 23). Evidence 
from the late Neolithic period suggests that the community invested enormous 
amounts of their energy on tombs, coffins and other artifacts buried with the 
ancestors. 
Neolithic China ranged from the 'Y angshao culture of the middle Yellow river, the 
Dawenkou culture in Shandong, the Majiabang culture of the lower Y angzi River, and 
the Dapenkeng culture along the south coast and Taiwan' (Roberts 2006, 2). During 
the Yangshao period, 5000-3000BC, in the northwest and central plains, the practice 
of collective secondary burial thrived. Chang Kwang-chih (1968, 103) reports that 
'the probable lineage arrangement in the village cemetery ... makes it highly probable 
that the cult of the ancestors ... had already been initiated' during this period. 
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Although collective secondary burial was never a dominant practice, it is nevertheless 
revealing as it implies not only the will and the ability for what must have been a 
large mobilization of labour for such an intensive task, (there were 'up to seventy or 
eighty skeletons in one pit'), but also implies that the 'dead must have been kept alive 
in the minds of their survivors during the period of months, if not years, between the 
primary and secondary burial' (Keightly 1990, 24). 
The favourable conditions of the Neolithic in China led to the establishment and 
continuing development of many villages and eventually to the development of the 
Bronze Age capital cities of the Xia, Shang, and Zhou, the Three Dynasties. The 
transition from the Neolithic villages to the Bronze Age cities should be seen 'as 
successive phases of a single cultural development' with a high degree of cultural 
homogeneity and continuity (Fairbank 1992, 35). This continuity of culture, 
mentioned in the introduction, and argued throughout, is the cultural 'web of 
significance', the significants, being the 'plans, recipes, rules, or instructions' for the 
regulation and control of behaviour. 
The picture of ancient China as was once understood, especially by the readings and 
interpretations of the Classics and ancient Chinese histories, is now considered 
incorrect. The three ancient dynasties of the Xia, Shang and Zhou, were not only 
centred in three different areas, but also appear to have co-existed (Fairbank 1992, 35; 
Milston 1978, 56). Prior to that period and during the times traditionally attributed to 
the reign of the sage-kings Yao and Shun, from the late Neolithic (2600-2100 BC), a 
culture 'centring on sacrifices to natural and ancestral spirits' gradually assimilated 
with other cultural communities, heralding the first Bronze Age dynasty of the Xia 
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(Cheng 2001, 497-498). This transition from the numerous Neolithic villages to the 
cities of the Three Dynasties was a smooth transition and 'a single cultural 
development' (Fairbank 1992, 35). Interaction among these Neolithic farming 
villages, (numbering in excess of one thousand), resulted in kinship networks and 
other associations, which gradually provided the conditions for regional centralized 
political control. 'Family lineages, derived from large tribal clans, each set up their 
separate walled towns' (Fairbank 1992, 37). 
During the Three Dynasties, a fluid and dynamic situation developed where 
prominent clans jostled with each other for influence over other clans and villages. 
This clan-based socio-political dynamic 'is a prominent feature of the ancient Chinese 
state'. Another important socio-political feature of ancient China, from the family, 
clan, village to city and state, is that they became highly stratified along genealogical 
lines. The lineage system of ancient China, due to lack of sufficient data, is not fully 
understood, but what is not doubted is that 'political status was genealogically 
determined' (Chang, K. C. 1983, 16). The link between genealogy, and by inference 
the ancestors, to politics is well exemplified by the development of Chinese towns. 
The thousands of towns that dotted the Three Dynasties political landscape were 
linked together - by invisible lines as it were - into hierarchical systems of 
administrative control and wealth distribution, and the town hierarchies largely 
coincided with the hierarchies of clans and lineages (Chang, K. C. 1983, 25). These 
towns, underpinned socially and culturally by their ancestral relations, were 'above all 
a political nucleus.' They were not 'a spontaneous accumulation of population or 
capital or facilities of production'. They were merely a sum-total of individuals, each 
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of whom was closely linked with the village from which the family originated and 
where its ancestral clan temple stood (Needham 1971, 71). 
These thousands of small networked towns over time gradually formed larger political 
units 'through the process of continual subjugation' (Chang, K. C. 1983, 25). The 
states of Xia, Shang, and Zhou were the most important but they were not the sole 
political power. John K. Fairbank (1992, 39) gives an account of this process and 
some idea of the number of towns at this time when he writes that the 'Zhou of the 
Wei River valley became strong enough to conquer the Shang in warfare in about 
1040BC. Each side mobilized from seven to eight hundred villages or petty "states".' 
The Bronze Age rulers, indicating the importance of and reflecting the social realm, 
were, besides political rulers, also religious leaders. However this social-religious 
connection was not restricted to the elite or to royalty. 'The worship of his ancestors is 
also a part of the state ceremonial, but in performing this the sovereign does not stand 
alone - the worship of their forefathers has always been the practice of all the Chinese 
people' (Legge 1880, 69). Due to the many restrictions and proscriptions concerning 
the worship of ancestors on the correct performance of rituals imposed by the 
Confucian texts, it is often supposed that this was actually the historical case. 
However, 'as centuries passed and the numerous states which followed the Shang 
period were absorbed into a unified empire, the formerly aristocratic practice of 
ancestor worship spread downwards among the common people' (Milston 1978, 56). 
Since those ancient times, ancestor worship was practiced by much of the population 
of China, and it has remained an essential part of Chinese religious practice [and 
culture] until modem times (Roberts 2006, 7). 
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As the ultimate interest of this thesis is an understanding Chinese culture, it is 
important to notice the cultural homogeneity of the ancient Chinese and the smooth 
transition from the Neolithic to what seemed like a timeless traditional culture. This 
cultural homogeneity, 'contrasts remarkably with the multiplicity and diversity of 
peoples, states, and cultures in the ancient Middle East' (Fairbank 1992, 40). The 
early Mesopotamian cultures, the cradle of Western civilization, clashed continuously 
for thousands of years in a flux of Middle Eastern warfare and politics - 'the contrast 
with ancient China could not have been greater' (Fairbank 1992, 41). The Chinese, 
due to the effectiveness of their culturally formed socio-political institutions and 
methods, and feeling comfortable with their cultural position in relation to other 
peoples and cultures on their periphery, found themselves assimilating others more so 
than dominating them through military conquest - harmony was more important than 
dominance. Furthermore, China's geographic isolation added to the mix of conditions 
that enabled cultural and political unity. The archaeological discoveries of the last two 
decades are not only enough to remind us that China is the oldest continuous 
civilization in existence, but they also indicate that during the formative stages of 
development it was a world apart, cut off geographically from other early centres of 
civilization (Cotterell 1988, xiii). 
By the end of the beginning of the Iron Age (600-500B.C.) and the start of the (text-
evidential) age marked by Classical literature, 'the Chinese people had already 
achieved a degree of cultural homogeneity and isolated community hard to match 
elsewhere in the world' (Fairbank 1992, 45). Chinese culture was already and would 
continue to be, a culture dominated by the socio-political. The commercial, military, 
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religious, and artistic realms, often dominant in other cultures, found themselves 
subordinate to the socio-political realm- the realm structured around the family, its 
heirs, and especially its antecedents. Fairbank (1992, 45) has a view of this situation 
closer to my own with his use of the term culturalism in the quote below, when he 
says: 
It would be an error for us today, so long accustomed to the modem sentiment of 
nationalism, to imagine ancient China as an embryonic nation-state. We would do 
better to apply the idea of culturalism and see ancient China as a complete civilization 
comparable to Western Christendom, within which nation-states like France and 
England became political sub-units that shared their common European culture. 
(Fairbank 1992, 45) 
The important point I want to make here is that ancestor worship played a pivotal role, 
both in the development of the political sphere in China, and also by promoting the 
socio-political to sphere to eminence. David Keightly (1990, 31) hypothesizes that 
ancient Chinese ancestor worship provided the conditions and impetus for the 
'hierarchical, proto-bureaucratic conceptions' of the Bronze Age Chinese, and for 
'more secular forms of government [that] replaced the Bronze Age theocracy'. The 
patrimonial-theocratic state gradually transformed into a more secular institution 
during the Neolithic-Bronze Age transition (Fairbank 1992, 39), but the importance of 
the ancestors never waned. The Chinese state, as it might be recognized politically 
today, finally comes into view with the emergence of the Zhou Dynasty; however its 
political culture had developed long ago. 
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Here, in the embryonic period of Chinese culture, can be found the connections and 
correlations between ancestor worship, and the well recognized juxtaposition of the 
family (writ large) and with the political realm- a social-political nexus, almost 
unconsciously centering on ancestor worship. My goal in this section is to emphasise 
the connections between the Chinese practice of ancestor worship and the Chinese 
social and political realms. It is also a strategic goal which attempts to stress the high 
value placed upon the political and social realms, and to show their intrinsic 
correlations, both with each other and with ancestor worship. 
3:2 Who were the ancestors? 
It has been established that ancestor worship has been practiced in China from ancient 
times. However, 'who was worshiping whom' is not as clear as it first seems. That is, 
what exactly is meant by the word ancestor in the term, and indeed the act of ancestor 
worship? This question concerns not only the ancient understanding of the term, but 
also its pre-modem and modem understanding. From the time of Confucius, when he 
is quoted in the Analects (2: 24) as saying that 'to sacrifice to ancestors not one's own 
is considered presumptuous' (Waley 1996, 23), to De Groot, who wrote that there is 
'a prevailing social rule which forbids their contributing in any way to other people's 
ancestral sacrifices' (Baker 1979, 76), the term ancestor worship has been clearly 
distinguished from merely the worship of the dead. 'Other people's dead were of little 
concern: the only dead to be worshipped were one's own dead, one's ancestors' 
(Baker 1979, 75). 
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Early ancestor worship, from about 4500BC, was of the group type, 'probably 
conducted on behalf of and for the common interests of the entire community'. Later, 
around c.2600-2000BC, it moved towards worship of individuals (Li 1999, 602). To 
be sure, the term ancestor worship should be distinguished from just the worship of 
the dead, but the distinguishing features are more nuanced and ones of emphasis and 
not of delineation. When considering ancestor worship in its wide historical and social 
scope as this work does, it is apparent that the answer to the question, 'who were the 
ancestors?' is a complex and complicated matter of significance. 
This complexity is significant in two ways: on the one hand it is significant due to the 
interrelationship between ancestor worship and every other important aspect of 
Chinese culture and society; and on the other hand the complexity of ancestor worship 
should be understood as the ,complexity of certain customs and manners at particular 
times and places which fall within the greater understanding or phenomenon of 
ancestor worship in its overarching cultural role. Who was worshipped, and which 
ancestor was worshipped, was a matter of local custom and present circumstance. 
What was not a matter of custom and local circumstance was that the ancestors were 
always, to a greater or lesser degree, worshipped. Besides the regional variations of 
concepts of Chinese ancestors and patterns of ancestral worship, these concepts and 
patterns of worship have been subject to change throughout history, most often 
relating to general historical socio-political transformations. 
3.2.1 Ancestors: an historical view 
There are many regional and historical variations as will be seen from the outline 
provided below. Li Liu (1999, 603) has suggested four types of ancestors in ancient 
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China, from the apparently egalitarian group to the individual within a stratified 
society. During the Neolithic period, a period of about 10,000 years, the ritual 
changed from group ancestor worship to individual ancestor worship, and parallel to 
this, indicating its close relationship with the socio-political aspects of the culture, 
was the transition of social organization from non-stratified to stratified. Neolithic 
ritual practices were not static and the types of ancestors and the way they were 
worshipped were modified over time. 
The first type described by Liu is the group-ancestor worship of the Y angshao culture 
(c. 4500-4200 BC). The ancestors were probably communal ancestors, belonging and 
advantageous to the entire community. Some secondary burial sites, also at Y angshao 
(c. 4300-4000 BC), are examples of the second type, distinguished by their exclusion 
of females from the community of ancestors. A noticeable transition occurred around 
2500-2300BC at Y angshan when worship of individuals was first identified. 
'Although economically unstratified' (Liu 1999, 604), this third type of ancestors 
constituted most probably important religious or military men who 'continuously 
received ritual offerings for many years'. In the fourth type of ancestor worship (and 
by inference ancestor) identified by Liu, as observed at Longshan culture sites (c. 
2600-2000 BC), we see the culmination of transition from group to individual 
worship, from the early Neolithic flat social system to a stratified and hierarchical 
bronze age social system. The latter form of this ritual practice seems to have deeply 
influenced the religious and political systems of the Shang dynasty (and probably the 
Xia's - but empirical evidence is scarce) .. 
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The Shang put an enormous effort into their worship of the ancestors. The ancestral 
tombs were rectangular pits accessed by ramps and steps leading down to the burial 
chamber where the coffin was situated. Surrounding the coffin were many ornate 
objects of pottery and bronze, such as eating utensils, 'weapons, helmets, masks and 
ornaments, carved objects in jade, bone ivory and stone, musical instruments, oracle 
bones and shells with inscriptions' (Milston 1978, 50). 
The Shang people regarded sacrificial rituals as a crucial part of life. One relatively 
recent study found that eighteen different kinds of offerings were made in a single 
year. The performance of all these rites occupied 110 days out of each year. In the 
rites, offerings were most frequently made to ancestors. (Fu 2003, 638) 
By the end of the Shang period, around 1100 BC, many cultural significants were 
already in place. There was one dominant significant and that was ancestor worship, 
'with the accompanying practice of divination by scapulamancy (bones) and 
plastromancy (tortoise shells), and the emphasis on family continuity, family status 
and family hierarchy' (Milston 1978, 68). Becoming highly hierarchical and 
institutionalized, ancestral-worship and its associated symbols and rituals, provided 
the ideological basis and legitimacy for the political authority of the ancient ruling 
elite and for the socio-political structures of China throughout its history. 
Another type of ancestor is the ancestor who may be considered to be legendary or 
historical. Liu (1999, 603) views these legendary and historical ancestors as separate 
categories; however it is sufficient here to treat them as one under the rubric of 
'legendary'. Legendary ancestors take on a more symbolic role and both underpin and 
provide legitimacy for the socio-political system or the larger community, ranging 
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from the lineage to the nation or state. Although less personal than one's own direct 
ancestors, they were still one's ancestors connected through history and legend. These 
legendary ancestors had a moral supremacy over other types of ancestors even though 
they might not be blood-related, and quite often filled the supreme position in the 
hierarchy of ancestors. This position is important and must be filled if the ancestral 
realm is to mirror the social realm - and it must. The creation and acceptance of 
legendary ancestors was a culturally significant socio-political strategy. 
According to the Laws of Sacrifice in the Li Ji, the worship of these departed great 
ancestors was intended for, 'those who had died in the diligent discharge of their 
duties, those whose toils had established states, and those who had warded off or 
given succour in great calamities' (Legge 1880, 88). The sacrifices to legendary (and 
historical) ancestors also included the worship of natural features and forces such as 
mountains, forests, rivers, and valleys, and of cosmological phenomena, although 'the 
worship was really paid to the [ancestral] spirits presiding over them (Legge 1880, 
88). Most important in this category are the legendary and historical ancestors of the 
Neolithic age - they are culture heroes. The significance placed upon these culture 
heroes is most evident in the classical accounts provided by the writers of the late 
Zhou period and during the Han dynasty. 
One of the most prominent of these early culture heroes and legendary ancestors was 
Huangdi, the Yellow Emperor, who, according to the Li Chi, reigned from 2697 BC 
to 2598 BC, and to whom is credited a number of important inventions (Chang, K. C. 
1983, 42). The conception of the Yellow Emperor was usually that he was a 
compassionate and ethical ruler, a defender of the people, and the person to whom the 
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invention of writing is credited. He was not, though, as is now customarily viewed, 
the common ancestor of the Han people or of the nation-state of China. In the past 
many deities and ancestral heroes were worshipped and he was probably treated as 
just another one of the many but powerful deities and legendary ancestors. Dynastic 
rulers, Han or non-Han, such as the Mongols and the Manchus worshipped the 
Yellow Emperor but did not recognize him as their ancestor. Today however, 'his 
status has soared ... and he is now regarded [by many] as the common ancestor of all 
Chinese people, including non-Han ethnic groups' (Li 1999, 605). 
The Yellow Emperor and other historical and legendary ancestors play an important 
role as part of a broader conception of 'ancestor worship-the big picture' and in the 
still broader conception that is Chinese culture. They are 'The Great Ancestors [who] 
are watching' (Sheils 1980, 247) and as such are 'able to influence the entire 
population of a society and not simply their own descendents'. Besides the Yellow 
Emperor, the Emperors Yao and Shun, along with the founder of the Xia dynasty, 
Emperor Yu, were among the throng of legendary ancestors receiving worship. It is 
with the reign of Yu and with knowledge of the Xia, however scant that might be, that 
legend merges with history. 
3:2:2 Ancestors: an anthropological view 
The view so far of the ancestors has been one seen through the lens of history looking 
at their ancient beginnings and their inevitable continuation. It has provided some 
depth to our understanding of what worshippers were doing and who they were doing 
it to. There are many drawbacks in this type of view, none more so than the 
108 
(relatively) limited amount of evidence that provides such a view. However, other 
evidence is available which enables us to achieve a picture or view of much more 
clarity. Chinese culture as we have already established is a culture of continuity of 
tradition, and as we will continually highlight, the important strands, streams, or 
significants continue over time. So with this in mind, we now turn to anthropological 
studies as a means of providing clearer and more insightful views of ancestor worship. 
Although these views necessarily depict life and culture as observed today or only in 
the more recent past (anthropology is a young discipline), they show a continuing 
culture in its ever evolving, but paradoxically unchanging form- that is, just as the 
stream continuously flows, and is therefore seen to change, it is nevertheless, the same 
stream. 
Maurice Freedman (1979, 274), in The Study of Chinese Society, suggests a way to 
delineate various types of ancestors which is different from those above and which 
gives more emphasis to where the ancestor was worshipped. 'Little was achieved in 
the study of Chinese ancestor worship' he remarks, 'until it was made clear that there 
are two distinct kinds of worshipped ancestors: domestic and extra-domestic; private 
and (quasi) public.' This influential approach to the taxonomy of ancestors is 
important and it is dealt with below in more detail. However it is sufficient to say now 
that what he means with this typology is that the ancestor worshiped at home and the 
ancestor worshiped in the clan or lineage hall have to be understood and treated 
differently. It is equally important however, that these two categories themselves are 
subject to further differences in locale and in time, although perhaps to a lesser 
degree, and are themselves further delineated. 
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Sheils (1975, 427, 429) is perhaps saying something similar when he rebukes most 
research in this area for its 'tendency to lump varieties of ancestor worship in a single 
category'. He proposes another 'taxonomy of ancestor worship based on intensity of 
involvement of the ancestors with the living'. His categorization is sociological and 
he provides the categories of 'descent, conjugal formation, and marriage type as the 
major factors in the rise of ancestor worship'. Shiels' concern with ancestor worship 
is however more of a universal nature. While there may be merit in such a general 
taxonomy of ancestor worship, its efficacy is tied to the understanding of ancestor 
worship as a universal phenomenon. The more specific and particular understanding 
of Chinese ancestor worship required for this and similar studies is usually dealt with 
in other ways by Sinologists and others concerned with Chinese ancestor worship. 
Francis Hsu's (1971, 244) important 1942 West Town (Yurman) study provides 
another variation of ancestor types. Referring to the spirits worshipped he finds four 
types, although only the first type actually represents ancestors in the meaning as it is 
used here. These types are: (1) spirits of members of the same kinship group and of 
the group of relatives by marriage; (2) spirits of persons not related by kinship or 
marriage; (3) officials and functionaries in the world of the spirits; and, (4) spirits of 
dead persons from unknown or unfamiliar racial or cultural groups (such as Muslims). 
The first type of ancestors/spirits is obviously the most dominant and what is 
generally regarded by worshippers as their own ancestors, unlike the other three types. 
Hsu's informants agreed that 'these ancestors were always well disposed and never 
malicious toward the members of the family to which they are related. In fact, the 
question does not arise at all.' However, some reports in other studies (Ahem 1973) 
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suggest that the ancestors could be malevolent, though this finding is not common. 
Freedman (1979, 303) represents the majority when he writes, 'While they will 
certainly punish their descendents ... they are essentially benign and considerate.' The 
second type, those spirits who are not related by birth or marriage, may be dangerous 
under certain circumstances, though their exact position in the spiritual hierarchy is 
unclear, as is the third group, and the last group are rarely even considered. 
One study in Yurman south China (Hsu 1971, 285) states that even though 'no 
assumption is made that West Town culture is identical with that in other parts of 
China', and that there indeed some distinguishing features, it nevertheless matches 
other studies by the author and is corroborated by other research. This problem of the 
relation of the universal or general to the particular is engaged with by Qian Mu (see 
below), but is also a matter of interest throughout the thesis. Hsu importantly 
emphasises the correspondence between the dead and the living when he writes that 
'the attitude of the dead toward the living is completely in line with that of the living 
toward the dead' (1971, 245). We have already encountered this correspondence on a 
wider social level between ancestor worship and the broad socio-political situation as 
seen at any one time or place - the way the ancestors were worshipped and the 
importance placed upon this practice were mirrored in the society at large. As the 
worship became more hierarchical so did the society and as the rituals to the ancestors 
remained significant, this social realm continued and predominated throughout 
Chinese history and the long tradition of Chinese culture. Although a link between the 
family (jia) and its descent group (jiazu) to the 'people's descent group' (minzu) is by 
extension commonly made, it is important to recognize that the primary source is the 
family, the close relatives and the descendents. 
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Another important distinction is made by Francis Hsu concerning ancestor worship as 
it might be seen as religious in a similar or comparable way with the general and 
stereotypical Western view of religion. The Chinese, according to Hsu, 'deduce the 
existence of the world of the spirits from the existence of the world of the living, but 
not vice versa as in Christianity' (Hsu 1971, 246). To worship the ancestors, at least 
as he found it in West Town, is not a matter of belief, for to believe means to entertain 
the possibility of non-belief, and in West Town this is not the case. Ancestor worship 
is a normative behaviour accepted by all - it is a fact- a fact that 'no sane West 
Towner ever challenged' (Hsu 1971, 244), not just a matter of belief. 
If religion were defined by the more or less explicit adherence by individuals to a 
dogma, and their more or less great respect for clergy, it would be equally false to 
say the Chinese practise two or three religions or that they practise one. Indeed, in 
China there exist as almost definite beliefs only those about Ancestors, and if anyone 
deserves the title of priest, it is a layman: the paterfamilias. (Granet 1975, 146) 
3:3 What is 'practising ancestor worship'? 
So far we have addressed the question, 'who were the ancestors?' Now we tum our 
attention to what we would see if we were to observe someone worshipping his or her 
ancestor/s? Of course, given the above account, in response to this question we might 
also ask at what time and place they were worshipping and to what kind or type of 
ancestor? So already we can expect to find some regional and historical variations and 
some variations in regard to what type of ancestor - domestic or extra domestic, 
actual (historic) or legendary, personal or communal, and so on. 
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However, for our purposes it is not so important to provide a picture for each instance. 
First, although we have evidence for the thousands of years prior to historical written 
records, and while it shows some forms of ancestor worship, it does not give us a 
clear picture of what the worshipper might actually have been doing or practising. 
Much of the evidence concerns just the elite and a limited number of ceremonies 
around their activities. We do not know with any degree of clarity precisely how the 
rest of ancient Chinese society worshipped, nor indeed how the elite worshipped on a 
daily or regular basis, although there are many Confucian or classical texts which 
prescribe the correct practices. By the time of the Han dynasty, what 'the people were 
already actually doing and believing far exceeded what state-supported ritual texts 
prescribed' (Overmeyer 1995, 3). However, from the Imperial times onward there is 
sufficient textual evidence to indicate that the rituals of ancestor worship have, by and 
large, occurred in such a similar way over this entire period for any variations to be 
just that, variations on an important, but necessarily generalized, cultural 
phenomenon. 
Such a cursory denial of the importance of actual and historical detail, even at a very 
general level such as I propose, will disturb many anthropologists and, to a lesser 
extent, some historians. However, this level of generalization is not meant to lean 
towards vagueness, but to lean towards inclusion. The primary function of this thesis 
is to eventually provide a better understanding of Chinese culture, a culture that must 
necessarily encompass and include all the variations of ancestor worship. Qian Mu 
(1894-1991) has another way of expressing this approach. Qian uses the Chinese term 
Ii to mean rites or propriety. Although Ii is not the same as ancestor practice as such, 
for our purposes at this stage it is sufficient to see it as a close relationship and nearly 
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synonymous. The early meaning of Ii concerned its use as a term for religious rites 
(Cua 2003, 370). It related to not only ritual performance, but also proper conduct and 
the ethical reasoning behind this conduct. These religious rituals, Ii, are inextricably 
linked to the worship of ancestors and to the 'principles which regulate or group life, 
and particularly the life of kinship groups' (Liu 1959, 68). 
The relationship between ancestor worship and Ii as rites or ritual is dealt with more 
comprehensively in the chapter (six) on ritual. However it is timely here to present 
parts of Qian Mu's Lesson in Chinese Culture at length, as it cleverly and succinctly 
links the universal with the particular, and the particular customs of ancestor worship 
with Chinese culture. 
For a Westerner, culture is bound to place, so that local customs and language 
serve to distinguish cultures. For a Chinese, culture is universal, so that languages 
and local customs only serve to distinguish place. To understand the difference, you 
need to understand the concept of li13, "rites" or "propriety." 
There are no Western language equivalents for the word Ii. It is a general concept that 
applies to standards of customary behaviour throughout the Chinese world and 
distinguishes Chinese culture from all others. Because Western cultures have no Ii, 
you distinguish among them by measuring the differences between fengsu, "local 
customs," as if a Chinese culture were the sum total of the customs practised in that 
area of influence. If you set out to observe local customs in China, you will find that 
they vary greatly from place to place ... The [local customs or 'small' cultural] 
differences from one end of the country to the other are much greater. But the Ii are 
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the same. By the same token, the li that are the standards for the family - its internal 
relations, its external relations, birth, marriage, death - are equivalent to the Ii that are 
standards for the workings of government and state ceremonies - internal relations, 
relations between state and society, recruitment, treaties, successions. This is the only 
way to understand Chinese culture. It is different from customary practice . 
. . . If you want to understand the culture, you need to raise your sights until you reach 
the heart and mind. The heart and mind of China is the li. (in Denner line 1988, 8-10) 
So while I am now going to describe the customary practice of ancestor worship, it is 
done in such a way as to be general enough so that customary practice, different as it 
is from 'Chinese culture', nevertheless acts as a conduit towards such an 
understanding. I also take into account Fairbank's (1992, 14) view that in spite of the 
immensity and variety of the Chinese scene, this sub-continent has remained a single 
political unit, [and a single cultural unit] where Europe has not, [and that China] is 
held together by a way of life and a system of government much more deeply rooted 
than our own, and stretching further back uninterruptedly into the past. 
The traditional way the Chinese worshipped their ancestors is presented below as 
though it was unchanging and permanent. Of course such a presentation is a distortion 
in that it occurred differently in different places and at different times, but it is a 
useful and necessary generalization for the purposes required here and in any broad 
cultural view of this sort. For instance the use of ancestral halls was not common 
until the beginning of the Ming Dynasty (Baker 1979, 175), and lineage organization 
is usually stronger and of a slightly different construction in south China as compared 
to north China (Freedman 1971, 1; Baker,1979, 65). 
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Freedman (1965, 1) found that nearly everywhere in China, although most 
pronounced in the southeast, 'lineage and village tended markedly to coincide, so that 
many villages consisted of a single lineage.' Here, burial grounds had immense 
symbolic importance for the lineage. However, Myron Cohen (1990, 513) found that 
in 'Yangmansa and north China generally the common graveyards of lineages 
contrasted with the dispersed burials characteristic of much of south China.' North 
China cemeteries provided a genealogical focus which in Guangdong, Fujian, and 
Taiwan was furnished by ancestral tablets placed in homes or ancestral temples. 
Adding to these differences, James Thayer Addison (1924, 493) found that 'in some 
parts of the country there are two tablets' (Addison, 1924, 493), and Cohen found that 
in north China 'ancestral tablets tended to be found in better-off households, while 
most families had ancestral scrolls' (Cohen 1990, 516). The significance of the 
ancestral tablets, both in ritual and in social representation, were found to be 
remarkably different in north China from those in south-eastern China. 
The frequency of rituals concerning the tablets was also an area of localized 
difference. 
In contrast to the practices reported for south-eastern mainland China and Taiwan, 
where tablets were in permanent display in homes or ancestral halls, tablets and 
scrolls in Yangmansa were kept under wraps for nearly the entire year by the families 
owning them. They were brought out - the scrolls unrolled and displayed on a wall -
for only a three day period at [New Year]. (Cohen 1990, 516) 
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Patricia Ebrey ( 1984, 211) expresses an earlier view of how these practices may have 
changed over time, when she writes that until the Song period (960-1279) government 
officials were not concerned with the religious and family life of the commoners. 
However during Song dynasty times what were seen as uncanonical Confucian 
funeral rites 'were outlawed or otherwise discouraged by the government.' They were 
also obliged to rewrite new guides for practice of rites that included and linked the 
contemporary Song practices with those of the classical period. For instance, 'in Song 
times graves had become a major focus of ancestor worship, [even by the Literati], as 
actually practised'. However, there was no canonical basis for such graveside rites. 
This wa~ changed by Imperial government on the grounds that 'this was the only 
place that commoners could perform ancestral rites' and by Cheng Yi (1033-1107) 
who argued that: 
rites at graves were an expression of filial piety and that commoners should be able to 
worship as many generations of ancestors as officials. This position was reiterated by 
Chu Hsi ( 1130-1200), the most important intellectual figure of the period, who 
included these revisions in his highly influential guide to the performance of family 
rites. (Ebrey 1984, 211) 
Chinese kinship organization and their related family and ancestral practices differ 
from region to region and also change over time. Although they have a 'complex 
history that is just beginning to be mapped out' (Fairbank 1992, 20), they will be 
presented here as the more general case. It is not the task here to do that mapping, and 
statements made about the particular case, should only be seen as parts of the geo-
historical mosaic. David Jordan's (1972, 93, 97) study in a Taiwanese village, as an 
example, reveals that 'every house (not necessarily every family individually) has a 
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family altar' and that 'Chinese ancestors are not moralistic arbiters of their 
descendents behaviour.' Here, as in most examples, the particular merges with the 
general. 
In another example of difference, Arthur Wolf (1974, 131) describes the practices 'in 
the rural areas along the southwestem edge of the Taipei Basin, where 'conservative 
families bum three sticks of incense every morning and every evening.' He then infers 
from his study that, 'all people worship the same gods just as they live under the same 
government', and 'whether a particular spirit is viewed as a ghost or an ancestor 
depends on the point of view of a particular person. One man's ancestor is another 
man's ghost (Wolf 1974, 146).' 'Ordinarily, however, the ancestors were thought to 
be benevolent' (Eastman 1988, 47). Francis Hsu (1971, 45) sees the ancestors in a 
positive manner, where not only are they benevolent, but they do not punish at all, 
whereas Emily Ahem (1973, 199-200), on the other hand, challenges the view that the 
ancestors are 'essentially benign'. While we know that ancestor worship varied over 
time and location, we also know that it has been universal in Chinese culture. In order 
to begin to gain a full appreciation of the practice it is necessary and desirable to 
describe the phenomenal aspects of the main ways the ancestors have been 
worshipped. 
3:3:1 Grave based worship 
There are three main places where ancestors reside and where they may be 
worshipped-the graveyard, the domestic family shrine, and the clan or lineage 
temple or ancestral hall. 'A "good" graveyard is the concern of every family, rich or 
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poor. .. A proper graveyard is just as essential to the family as a proper house' (Hsu 
1971, 41). Grave based ancestor worship has been practised since the Neolithic 
period, where group/community worship mirrored the social structure. Ebrey (1990, 
201) writes that 'by the Han Dynasty ancestor worship and elaborate funerals and 
burials were widely practised among the upper class and were also of some 
importance among common farmers'. 
Although much of the classical literature proscribed commoners from sacrificing to 
the ancestors at any place, visiting and worshiping at graves, even by the literati, was 
an important part of ancestor worship. Eventually the custom of visiting graves and 
worshiping ancestors there became so entrenched that they received government 
approval and renowned scholars such as Cheng Yi and Chu Hsi included grave site 
worshiping in their writings about 'proper conduct' and about rites and rituals 
conducted there (Ebrey 1990, 211). This worship included such actions as cleaning 
and repairing graves and tombs, showing reverence by doing prostrations, sharing 
meals with the ancestors, lighting incense, and burning paper money, 'but not paper 
horses, carriages or houses, [in West Town] as in other parts of China' (Hsu 1971, 
158). Baker, (1979, 86), referring to more recent Imperial times, informs us that 'the 
ancestor could be worshipped wherever his remains were, regardless of the stage of 
burial, whether in unburied coffin, temporary grave, um or permanent grave.' 
Grave based worship has become increasingly popular in recent years. One example 
of this increasing popularity comes from Shanghai where it is reported (Peoples Daily 
01/04/2004) that: 
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The number of people in [Shanghai] expected to mark Qingming, a traditional festival 
for mourning beloved dead ones, is a sign that the Chinese patrilineal clan culture and 
tradition of ancestry worshiping may be making a comeback. 6.46 million in 
Shanghai - an increase of 6 percent. Shanghai people now attach more importance to 
family bonds despite quick economic development. 
During Qingming (the Clear and Bright festival), held early in April, the family, (clan, 
lineage) became mobilized as a ritual group. Worshippers would ensure that the 
graves were rebuilt with fresh earth and tidied up, and they would tie white paper 
streamers to the graves to indicate that the dead were in fact being remembered. 
'Incense was offered, ritual paper money burned, fire crackers set off, and those 
participating prostrated themselves in front of the graves' (Cohen 1990, 521). 
3:3:2 Domestic ancestor worship 
An ancestor could be worshiped in a number of places, although where the ancestor 
went after death, or how he (or his soul) could be in more than one place at any one 
time was probably not even considered by most Chinese (Baker 1979, 84) [and indeed 
it never bothered their intellectuals to the degree that it did in the West]. The Chinese, 
according to Ebrey (1990, 211) who found them more precise in these matters, 
believed that not only did a person have a soul which was based in the body, but there 
was also a soul which separated from the body and 'went everywhere'. This 
'everywhere' soul resided most often, among other places, in 'an "ancestor tablet" in 
the home and was of the utmost importance in ancestor worship' (Baker 1979, 86). 
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The fact that the soul resides in the tablet does not, of course, involve the belief that it 
is confined to the tablet. A common belief in China today is that each man has three 
souls [the grave, the tablet and the other world] ... the doctrine arose to account for 
the fact that all these ceremonies were equally customary and yet logically 
contradictory. (Addison 1924, 495) 
Usually each ancestor is represented by a wooden tablet with their name and age 
inscribed upon it. 
Other characters on the tablet show the date and hour of the person's birth, as well as 
the direction according to geomancy of his or her tomb. These tablets are either 
housed in single wooden pavilions or in double husband-wife pavilions. The tablets 
of dear ones are often specially decorated with coloured silk. These tablets are 
arranged in order. In front of them are always offerings of dishes of food, incense 
tripods, candlesticks, and a vase or fresh or artificial flowers. (Hsu 1971, 50) 
The tablets and other associated other ritual paraphernalia constituted an altar, and 
'every house has an altar in its main hall' (Freedman 1979, 275) or it was 'placed in 
such a position that it overlooked much of the life that went on there, a permanent 
presence watching over the doings of its descendants' (Baker 1979, 86). Domestic 
ancestor worship was of the utmost importance because the ancestor watched over the 
household while the household watched the ancestor, in that the ancestor was 
constantly in the mind of those in the household - they were always aware of their 
ancestors' presence - when they practised any kind of ritual they were practising what 
a Buddhist might refer to as 'mindfulness practice'. These ritual included daily 
'offering of tea or food, the burning of incense, and the burning of a (an eternal) light' 
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(Baker 1979, 86). Ancestors were presented offerings as venerated members of the 
family (Eastman 1988, 48). In West Town food is only offered at special occasions 
(Hsu 1971, 184). Just who was worshipped varied according to 'the occasion, the 
locality, and the family ... The forms of Chinese ancestor worship are simple, for the 
rites constitute a family meal in which the dead share' (Addison 1924, 497). 
The domestic worship, at least the daily rituals, was usually the concern of the 
women; however, on more significant occasions the men would most likely officiate. 
'There were no priests, and ancestors could only be worshipped by their own 
descendents, and the simple rites required no great ritual expertise' (Baker 1979, 88). 
But this does not mean they were neglected by the men at other times. The ancestors 
participated and were concerned with all major family and household events of each 
individual. Each household has a family shrine where the ancestors are represented 
either in a large scroll or on separate tablets. 'There was not one comer in this vast 
land of China where one did not find temples, shrines, altars, and other places of 
worship' (Yang, C. K. 1967, 6), yet it was the traditional Chinese home that was most 
important place of worship, 'for it contained spirit tablets of the ancestors, and 
pictures and idols of many household deities' (Yang, C. K. 1967 16). They often 
shared this shrine with a number of gods and deities, who also share in any offerings 
of incense or food. In West Town, 'The popular gods in all family shrines are three: 
Kuan Kung (the warrior from the Three Kingdoms), Confucius, and one or more 
Buddhas ... In addition, there are often other spiritual figures in family shrines which 
the family members cannot identify' (Hsu 1971, 51). 
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Besides the usual set days of ritualised worship, there were also other occasions when 
formal announcements were made to the ancestors. These announcements take place 
on any occasion of importance in the life of the family, such as births and birthdays, 
weddings, and occasions of success for members of the family. Other family rituals 
were also of great concern to the ancestors. 'The joint worship of ancestors by bride 
and groom is the critical point of the marriage rite, and actually determines its validity 
for purposes of legal decisions' (Addison 1924, 498). 
3:3:3 Ancestor worship and larger kin groups 
Although it may appear otherwise, 'the Chinese have never overburdened themselves 
with ancestors' (Freedman, 1979: 277). Once the family shrine had accumulated too 
many ancestors (tablets) the oldest and least remembered would be ceremoniously 
disposed of- usually by burning or by moving to a clan or lineage hall or temple. 
Although the majority of ancestor rituals were performed privately within the home, 
'public religious observances ... were a prominent feature of Chinese social life' 
(Eastman 1988, 49). Ancestor worship in ancestral halls and clan temples provide, 
ideally, the same outcomes as ancestor worship in the homes, except that the home-
based worship is restricted to ancestors whose descendants within the house have a 
common great-great-grandparent- that is wufu: five generations. The ideal however, 
rarely matched the practice. Some family shrines retained the tablets of much older 
and more far removed ancestors, while others might only contain the last few lineal 
ancestors. Not all families, and in some regions, few families belonged to clan or 
lineage halls and temples, the family shrine containing all the ancestors in the line as 
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best they could. 'Those who had their tablets burned and disposed without removal to 
the lineage hall would simply fade away from memory. Grave sites also often 
succumbed to the same treatment, becoming overgrown and forgotten' (Baker 1979, 
90). 
There where no hard and fast common whole-of-culture particular practices which 
determined how and when each ancestor was disposed of (although the ritual Classics 
provided hard and fast rules). Often it came down in the family to the importance of 
the ancestor as to just how long and where they were worshiped, especially as it 
concerned wufu. In a simply structured small family it would be rare that more than 
five generations of ancestors would be worshipped. However, 'in more complex 
structured larger families there may be a requirement to go back further to find a 
uniting founding ancestor' (Baker 1979, 92). For the lineage, being an extension of 
the large family in structure, this was even more the case, as only in the founding 
ancestor could there be found all the requirements of unity for the larger group. 
Ritually and symbolically the founding ancestor was extremely important and it was a 
frequent practice for lineages to construct ancestral/lineage halls in which to place the 
tablet of the founding ancestor. Here ceremonies and worship to the founding 
ancestor, and all that he symbolically stood for could take place. It was, however, also 
used for other more worldly functions such as lineage meetings and events, schooling, 
and as temporary accommodation. It was 'the centre of rituals and state affairs' 
(Chang, K. C. 1983, 37). One again this is an example of the close relationship 
between the dead and the living. And just as it is difficult to delineate the world of the 
ancestors from the world of the living, it is also difficult to delineate the world of 
gods, deities, spirits and Buddhas etc., from the world of ancestors. 
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Although Freedman (1979, 277) distinguishes ancestral halls from temples and from 
domestic shrines on the basis that 'temples are devoted to gods', this secular 
distinction seems only to be a matter of local custom in that lineage halls and 
ancestral temples as preferred places for extra-domestic ancestors were a matter of 
local preference. Also, as the border between the ancestors and the gods was indistinct 
at best, this need for distinction is superfluous for the generalized focus of this study. 
In South China family lineages are of primary social significance, whereas in the 
North the importance is not so evident, and organization of the lineage is different. 
'Chinese kinship organization varies by region ... [and has] a complex history that is 
just beginning to be mapped out' (Fairbank 1992, 20). This also means that the way 
these kinship organizations worship their ancestors is also respectively different. 
In the hall or temple the founding ancestor would take pride of place, often flanked by 
his progeny, and sometimes even his wife. Other ancestors might also be worshipped. 
Depending on the circumstances and history of the lineage this could include any 
number of ancestors who were considered to have succeeded, or to have permanent 
wealth and power in the wider community, enhancing its prestige and pride in its 
achievements (Baker 1979, 92). To be included in the ancestral forum in such a place 
was a privilege, and not a right as it would be in the home. In the home could be 
found the most recent ancestors, whereas in the hall or temple it is most likely that the 
most distant would be found (Baker 1979, 93). The tablet in the hall was essentially 
the same as that of the home and it was worshipped in much the same way. This 
included the ubiquitous burning of incense, the daily provision of tea, and the 
occasional offerings of food and other items on special lineage or ancestral occasions. 
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Once an ancestor left the personal and domestic confines of the family home and was 
relocated to the hall, he or she lost their individuality and became just another of one 
of the many ancestors, which were the body corporate of ancestors representing the 
lineage as a whole, and which would receive the worship of the entire lineage (Baker 
1979, 94; Freedman 1979, 277). The lineage was more than a religious concern- it 
also had important social and political implications - and so the lineage hall had 
important community socio-political functions. The importance of the ancestors, 
symbolizing the lineage in its wider meaning and connections, thus transcended any 
religious considerations, reflecting their indispensability in the socio-political realm. 
The significance of the ancestral temples and the rituals involved mirror the 
significance of the ancestors and indicates the social worth or value placed on 
ancestor worship. 
3:4 Ancestor worship in recent times 
The changes that occurred during the early modem period [of China] were of 
immense significance, but equally interesting to the historian is what did not 
change. For in the midst of the technological, institutional, and political 
transformations of the past 100 years and more, the traditional socio-cultural 
traits held on with a remarkable tenacity. (Eastman 1988, 242) 
Since the 1930s, the challenge to familism has grown, but even today, after another 
fifty years of political revolution and economic development, the traditional 
sociocultural traits endure in all areas of Chinese life. In the rural areas of China 
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especially, where the vast majority of Chinese (still) live, the traditional ideas, 
attitudes, and values remain, albeit in a moderated form (Eastman 1988, 242-3). 
Ancestor worship during these times of change did not die, and in the less brutal 
environment of today's China, it is showing a substantial recovery. Also, perhaps as 
an early indicator, it is noted that in Taiwan, where the political pressures against the 
folk religion are not as strict as they are in the PRC, there are signs that the belief in a 
distinctly Chinese spiritual world remains. According to Eastman (1988, 245), there 
are signs everywhere of this revitalization and he reports that newly constructed 
houses [now] contain ancestral altars. 
The immense changes which China has endured over the past century emphasize not 
so much the change itself, but more importantly, the continuity. It appears that even 
revolutionary political changes may have limited impact on cultural continuities (Blair 
1993, 2). The continuing importance of the family, kin, and ancestors provides insight 
into China's cultural continuity. 'Ancestor worship may have lost its traditional 
religious justifications, but assuring family immortality by having at least one child 
still offers a kind of significance beyond the individual to which any Chinese 
individual can aspire' (Blair 1993, 5). 
During the near chaos of the immense social, political and economic changes since 
the Republican era, most of the traditional cultural family values have remained 
intact. There has been an enormous challenge to the position of the family in Chinese 
society, yet it appears that after all the 'political revolution and economic 
development, the traditional sociocultural traits endure in all areas of Chinese life.' In 
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the villages of rural China those socio-cultural qualities related to the family and 
kinship are still of paramount importance. 'The old attitudes thus persist in the 
countryside, even if some of the more brutal aspects of traditional family life appear 
to have moderated' (Eastman 1988, 242). 
Although most religious practices since the 1950s were labelled superstitious and 
were seriously ridiculed, ancestor worship was (for a long time) not open to this 
ridicule and criticism (Baker 1979, 209). It was not until the coming of the Cultural 
Revolution and the Red Guards that many ancestral tablets, altars and other religious 
relics were destroyed. Although it was attacked, ancestor worship was not consigned 
to the dustbin of history, and today, in a more open socio-political atmosphere 
following the Cultural Revolution it is showing a considerable resurgence (Eastman 
1988, 242), not just in the countryside, but in China generally, as many urban 
'agnostic Chinese intellectuals retain a childhood memory of sensing the realistic 
presence of the ancestors' spirit in front of the shadowy ancestral altar on a dark 
night' (Yang 1967, 17). 
Even though 'the dynamics of Chinese society are still poorly understood' (Parish 
1978, 1), rituals and ceremonies towards the dead ancestors remain important for 
many Chinese, as they 'reinforce core social relationships and values in the present 
lives of the Chinese people' and 'mirror the social world and the concerns of the 
living' (Parish 1978, 248-9). No longer do we find the ancestral tablets in the lineage 
hall, for there are few functioning ancestral halls, 'but many families establish 
ancestral tablets or surrogates for them at home for their deceased relatives' (Parish 
1978, 263). Although the Red Guards had destroyed much of the paraphernalia of 
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ancestor worship during the 'Smash the Four Olds' 14 stage of the Cultural Revolution, 
most has now been replaced, although as Parish reports, now it is 'hidden away when 
not in use' and ancestor worship in the home is reported as 'present in some form in 
thirty seven villages and absent in sixteen' of the study (Parish 1978, 263). Although 
there have been no studies concerning the practice of ancestor worship China-wide, 'it 
is probable that ancestor worship is still very much alive in China, but it is the 
ancestor worship of the family and not of the lineage, and it is practised for the most 
part out of the public eye' (Baker 1979, 211). 
Under Mao the study of sociology was deemed to be potentially dangerous, and there 
have been no major studies in relation to ancestor worship. However, since the end of 
the last century 'Western sociologists, anthropologists, and demographers [and] 
China's own social scientists were able to begin serious research of their own' (Unger 
1993, 25). While this research did not deal directly with ancestor worship it did deal 
with the family in general, and it is from these studies that we are able to ascertain 
that many of the traditional aspects of Chinese are alive and well, and many are on the 
increase. 
It now appears that while the political changes of the last century 'undercut the power 
and authority of the patriarchs and destroyed the economic logic of family farms and 
businesses ... it [also] created demographic and material conditions conducive to large, 
multigenerational households with extensive economic and social ties to nearby kin' 
and 'permitted more Chinese parents and children than ever before to realize core 
ideals of traditional Chinese familism' (Davis and Harrell 1993, 1-2). 
14 One of the Cultural Revolution imperatives was the destruction of the Four Olds: Old Customs, Old 
Culture, Old Habits, and Old Ideas 
129 
One study (Johnson 1993, 132) in south east China reports that many lineages are 
once again functioning and that 'graves have been repaired, rituals are performed at 
the graves for apical ancestors, ancestral halls are being restored, [and] ritual feasts 
occur in the halls once more.' The same study reveals that although 'their material 
standard of living improve significantly. They have benefited directly or indirectly 
from the incorporation of the broad region into the global economy.' It appears that 
any negative consequences of globalization have not impacted upon Chinese families 
as they have on rural folk in other situations. 'They [the Chinese] have been able to 
hold the world-system at arms length to an important degree and to protect themselves 
from some of its most pernicious effects' (Johnson 1993, 135). 
These moves towards a strengthening of traditional family values are not only found 
in south east China, as a north China study has found that 'stem and joint families 
have increased' (Seldon 1993, 150-151). A south west China study, in Chengdu 
(Whyte 1993, 216), found 'there is enough evidence ... to state emphatically that 
family based cooperation and negotiation between generations remain absolutely 
central in reform-era China. These studies reveal that the ideal of the Chinese family 
remains sound, providing the ground, and perhaps being an effect (besides other 
causes and conditions) of the Chinese traditional practice of ancestor worship. 
Another study (Chau, 2005, 236) in northern Shaanxi province in north-western 
China, found that from the early 1980s onward, tens of thousands of temples had been 
rebuilt and that popular religion enjoyed a momentous revival. This included all 
aspects of ancestor worship and the religious ideas and practices enabled and 
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associated with it. 'A government agency in Yulin prefecture estimated that by the 
mid-1990s there were well over 10,000 temples in the prefecture alone.' 
Chau (2005, 237) also reports that despite 'state-imposed political ideals and 
campaign goals, villagers today are engaged in social interactions based on kinship or 
community obligation and responsibilities.' 'Popular religion' (although it is unclear 
what exactly this term refers to) or at least some of its aspects is illegal and considered 
superstitious by the state. However 'the police almost never crack down on popular 
religion; indeed, they are often invited by the temple association to attend the temple 
festivals and help maintain order and direct traffic (Chau 2005, 239).' 
Writing a decade earlier, Ann Anagnost (1994, 222) noticed a similar disjunction 
between official policy and community norms. Referring to the 'overt confrontation 
between the Chinese socialist state and local communities over ritual practice' she 
noticed what she refers to as a 'politics of ritual displacement'. 
During the often violent political campaigns of the Maoist period, such politics were 
far from unforgiving, allowing the forcible seizure and destruction of ritual places by 
agents, whether Red Guards or local activists, acting within an aggressive 
modernizing project. Although this campaign mentality has subsided, its methods 
persist, whether as implicit threat or explicit intervention. 
It now seems that the category of 'feudal superstition' is uncertain, and 'what 
practices are included in it, and its strategic deployment in political discourse, all 
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follow the prevailing political wind.' Given what Chau, Eastman, Yang, Parish, 
Bakerand others have said above, the 'political wind' is blowing the way of the 
popular culture. No more does it seem that 'the state continues to hold a militant line 
in discouraging popular religion, only to have its efforts mocked by the resurgent 
vigour of popular culture that has accompanied the economic reforms (Anagnost 
Anne 1994, 224 ). ' It seems that the deep-seated cultural norms, for the present at 
least, hold sway. 
3:5 Conclusion 
.The purpose of this chapter has been to describe the practice of ancestor worship, 
thus providing a starting point for exploring the meaning of ancestor worship in all its 
semantic scope. Due to recent research, a new picture of ancient China is gradually 
emerging, different from that which was available less than three decades ago. The 
importance of the unfolding story 'lies in the cultural continuity that it discloses. 
Distinctive features of Chinese life today, such as autocratic government, come down 
directly from prehistoric times' (Fairbank 1992, 29). It is a most important and 
interesting development which includes an appreciation of the continuing nature of 
Chinese culture, from the Neolithic villages, through to the Bronze age cities, and into 
Imperial and, perhaps, even contemporary modem times. What it is that has been 
continuous has been the subject of the chapter. 
In describing ancestor worship both its ubiquity and variety have been highlighted. It 
is not only seen as a continuing thread throughout Chinese history, it has been 
practised everywhere, albeit in a range of various ways and forms. The continuity and 
ubiquity of ancestor worship underscores the importance of the family in the practice 
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of ancestor worship and therefore in Chinese culture. It becomes clearly discemable 
that there is a correlation between the social and political spheres which dominates the 
cultural landscape of China throughout its entire history. 
This chapter begins to answer the question that an inquiry into the relationship 
between the concept of cultural continuity and the apparent dominance in Chinese 
history of the socio-political asks: where does the importance of the family throughout 
the history of China fit in this correlation? Western interrogators have habitually 
stopped there, with the family, and accepted its importance without asking 
vociferously, why? For the Chinese it did not stop with the family. Yes of course the 
family is important, but grounded in a philosophy of change, Chinese cultural 
thinking went deeper and the centre of attention has been the ancestors, and by 
inference a biological line stretching back into the past, and forward into the future, 
indefinitely. 
The exposition of Chinese worship has provided both the initial meaning of ancestor 
worship, especially in its broader context, but importantly it has also highlighted that 
while local customs serve to distinguish historical and geographic place, the cultural 
universal has been the practice of ancestor worship. Reports and studies will find a 
variety of ancestors who are worshipped in a variety of ways. However, the common 
cultural denominator throughout time and place transcends the particularity of local 
custom and is found in the universality of ancestor worship. Of course just how 
significant is ancestor worship to an understanding of Chinese culture, is a matter still 
not settled. The following chapters endeavour to do just that. 
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Chapter4 
Mind-ing15 the Ancestors 
4:1 Exploring the meaning of ancestor worship 
The previous chapter provided a starting point, and a work-in-progress description 
and meaning for ancestor worship. In the process it made clear ancestor worship's 
position as a Chinese cultural universal. It engaged with the question, 'what were the 
Chinese doing when they practised ancestor worship throughout their long history?' 
The aim of this chapter is to show that the intrinsic reverence for ancestors provides 
the starting place for the worldview and subsequent ethical, social and political life of 
the Chinese people - it shows what ancestor worship means to the practioners and to 
Chinese culture. It deals with the importance of the ancestors in the minds of the 
Chinese and in the Chinese mind. It shows how ancestor worship was instrumental in 
the inception and continuation of Chinese culture, and it asks the question, 'what were 
the Chinese thinking when they practised ancestor worship?' The focus remains on 
the clearly observable empirical object (the rituals of ancestor), however it is also 
necessary to make 'implicit claims about what [the cultural] symbol means' (Swidler 
2001, 75). In making these rational claims about an empirical object it is recognized 
that: 
no simple either/or contrast can be made between theory and practice; [that] no 
indefeasible distinction can be established between visible external practices and 
invisible external states; [that] any attempt to give a satisfactory description of social 
15 The hyphenated spelling here indicates a combination of meanings, from the contemporary general 
meaning to care, and the more original meaning to keep it (the ancestor) in mind in order to care. It 
also has implications in the relationship between mind and philosophy, and mind and spirit and its 
religious connotations. 
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life must make reference to much else besides practice; and [that] practice does not 
account for its own production and reproduction. (Barnes 2001, 19) 
This chapter therefore seeks meaning in the practice and it will try to find an answer 
to the question raised by Kenneth Latourette (1964, 540) when he stated that: 'As a 
factor in moulding Chinese life, [ancestor worship] can hardly be exaggerated.' It will 
also examine the assertion made by Donald Holzman (1998, 186) that the worship of 
ancestors played an absolutely vital and central function in the lives of the Chinese. 
Holzman was referring to the ancient Chinese. However, as Thomas Metzger points 
out, and as I have previously mentioned, cultural continuity is a hallmark of Chinese 
culture, there being a 'great continuity between modem and premodem Chinese 
thought', (Metzger 1990, 268) and therefore 'distinctive features of Chinese life 
today ... come down directly from prehistoric times' (Fairbank 1992, 29). 
The hermeneutic method employed here inquires about culture by exploring its 
'pattern of meanings' (Geertz 1973) and the 'world of thought' (Schwartz 1985) of 
the Chinese to discover their 'shared cultural assumptions' (Nathan 1993). The overall 
argument remains, in that it still gives priority to what people do: it is still practice 
theory, although it may also properly be called hermeneutic because it consistently 
and constantly oscillates its focus from the symbol and practice of ancestor worship, 
(as the sum of the original solutions), to particular instances of Chinese culture and 
history. As we are seeking a better way to understand Chinese culture, within these 
shared cultural assumptions, we are seeking and trying to isolate 'certain dominant 
orientations which came to prevail' in the long continuity of Chinese culture, finding 
it of course, in the 'pervasiveness' (Schwartz 1985, 9) of what we call ancestor 
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worship. I believe, along with Derk Bodde (1967, 19), 'that it is possible to detect 
certain concepts or patterns which, because of their frequent appearance in widely 
separated times and contexts, may fairly be regarded as basic in Chinese philosophical 
thinking'. 
David Keightly (1990, 44, 45) refers to a cultural pattern when he writes: 
To the extent that it is possible to speak of one strategic custom or institution in the 
mix of early China's cultural variables - strategic because of its pervasive ability to 
sanctify all other aspects of life and to legitimate and reinforce the lineage - it would 
seem to be ancestor worship and its social and political corollaries involving 
hierarchy, ritual deference, obedience, and reciprocity. 
In order to examine and explore the pattern of meaning or world of thought of 
Chinese culture we will here open to view ancestor worship and its social and political 
corollaries. Here the initial focus is on thinking rather than doing (the overall focus). 
It is a kind of analysis with an incorporated interest in metaphysical (philosophical 
and religious) questions. Here, the terms philosophy and religion are used in two 
modes. First, current philosophical and religious terms and ideas are used to elucidate 
and discuss important characteristics of Chinese culture, characteristics which lend 
support to the overall thesis concerning the importance of ancestor worship in Chinese 
culture, or characteristics which show the connections between ancestor worship and 
Chinese culture. Second, the history of Chinese thought, considered as Chinese 
philosophy or Chinese religion, is explored and discussed. Although it should be 
noted that the categories philosophy and religion are merely cognitative tools and 
cannot be separated from other categories which enquire into, or go to make up an 
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enquiry into culture. Ideas, whether seen as individual or communal, may be 
expressed in many ways; and [only] one of these is through its articulation in 
philosophy (Solomon 1993, 4). 
However, before I explicate the meaning of ancestor worship and its corollaries, I 
want to present the following excerpts from a Tang poem written by Ou-yang Xiu 
(1007-1072). The author is described by Shi Shun Liu (1979, 137) as 'the greatest 
prose writer of the Sung dynasty' and as 'a literary genius who wrote in a free and 
natural style'. Titled 'Inscription on the Memorial Tablet for the Passage to the 
Shuangkang Tomb' it economically provides an insight into a [or even 'the'] Chinese 
mind as it experiences filial and ancestral piety. I will not provide a commentary on 
the poem as I consider it will only detract from the inherent insights found within the 
text. I believe that the poem reflects much of what I want to say throughout this thesis. 
Alas, sixty years after the burial of my revered father, the Duke of Ch 'ung, at 
Shuangkang, I am at last able to erect this tablet for the passage of his tomb! The 
reason for the long delay is not that I have ventured to procrastinate, but that I have 
been obliged to wait. 
Unfortunately I was bereaved of my father at the age of four. My mother 
vowed to live out her life as a widow, though she had to maintain a poor family by 
working to earn food and clothing. She reared and taught me until I grew up, when 
she told me: 
"Your father was an incorruptible official, but he was fond of giving to others 
and extending hospitality to his guests. Though his emoluments were few, he always 
saw to it that nothing was left. 'Let not this be a source of embarrassment to me!' he 
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would say. And so he died without leaving even a house with a single tile on its roof, 
or a single piece of cultivated land on which the family could have depended for its 
living. What was it, then, that I counted on to sustain me? I knew one or two things 
about your father, which gave me reason to wait for you to grow up. 
"When I married into your family, I was not in time to serve my mother-in-
law. But I knew that your father was a filial son. You lost your father when you were 
young, and I could not be sure that you would one day stand on your own feet. But I 
knew that your father was destined to have worthy offspring. When I first joined with 
your father, he had hardly passed the mourning period for his mother a little over a 
year earlier. Whenever memorial services were held, he would say with tears: 
'Sacrificial offerings, however abundant, cannot compare with even scant food for 
parents when they are still alive. ' 
When I witnessed his expression of grief once or twice, I thought that it was only 
because he had recently passed the mourning period. Later I observed that his grief 
was always the same and it was no different for the rest of his life. 
[The mother continues for a few more paragraphs extolling the virtues of the father] 
It was twenty years after the decease of my father that I began to receive official 
emoluments for the support of my family. 
Eight years later, despite my humble talents, I was appointee Vice Premier and given 
the opportunity to participate in important affairs. 
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Since the time when I was invested with the Vice Premiership, Their Majesties have 
extended favors to my family by posthumously honoring three generations of my 
immediate forebears. 
I cannot help being moved to tears when I say this: 
"Good deeds are never unrewarded, though it may be early or late. That is a truism. 
My grandfather accumulated many good deeds and had great virtue. He deserved 
indeed a rich reward. Although he did not receive it in his lifetime, yet posthumously 
titles and honors have been bestowed on him and have been sanctified by the solemn 
mandates of three imperial reigns. This is an illustrious example for future 
generations and a blessing for his own children. " 
Wherefore I have set down the tabular history of the family and caused it to be 
engraved on the tablet. I have also recorded in it my father's testaments and the 
manner in which my mother taught me and waited for me to grow up. I have done this 
to make known that there is ample reason why I have been so fortunate as to be able 
to keep my integrity intact and brought no disgrace upon my ancestors, though, with 
my modest virtue and limited ability, I have merely been favored by the times and 
never deserved the positions I have held. (translated by Liu 1979, 200) 
4:2 Ancestor worship and Chinese philosophy 
Chinese philosophy opposes conventional Western philosophy, which persistently 
explores truth with the help of a single, individual mind, aiming at the crystallization 
of a truth relevant for everybody. What matters here is that the truth of Chinese 
philosophy and culture, (philosophy is considered the elucidation of much of what I 
139 
have called 'shared cultural assumptions'), is made open to view or exposed by 
foregrounding the Chinese way of life that is found within the culture. Wittgenstein's 
term Lebensform or 'form of life' is appropriate here as it stresses the intertwining of 
culture, worldview and language (Glock 1996, 124). This study is radical in the sense 
that it aims to make clear for the Western audience the established and unique 
Chinese way of thinking that the thesis suggests may be found in the cultural practice 
of ancestor worship. I want to emphasis in this chapter, among other things, that 
Chinese culture is distinctive (Nathan 1993, 923) and that ancestor worship is vital to 
(an understanding of) Chinese culture. In the process I will at times compare the 
Chinese way of thinking with the Western way of thinking, for as John Blair (1993, 
29) reminds us: 
It is precisely the function of comparative culture studies to make basic postulates 
explicit in the process of comparing one way of life with another, in particular by 
using the cultural other to bring into conscious definition unspoken presuppositions 
that inform familiar habits of mind. 
4:2: 1. The beginning of Chinese philosophy 
Chinese philosophy finds its beginnings in the everyday life of the ancient Chinese 
and is part of the cultural background of the Chinese people. In this way it is like any 
philosophy which is a 'conscious effort to formulate, [and articulate], views and 
values as expressions of the fundamental beliefs of a people' (Cheng 2001, 494). 
Philosophy is one way to uncover those essential elements which underpin the 
culture. Here we seek, the 'essential ways of thinking', usually conceptualized by 
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philosophy as cosmology, ontology, and ethics, but what we might also understand as 
'worldviews, configurations of culture, themes, ethos, and eidos' (Wright 1967, vii). 
The articulation (and the philosophical texts) comes only after an idea has already 
gained access to the wider cultural understanding. Philosophy articulates something 
more basic than itself - it articulates cultural ideas. These ideas may be articulated by 
a single philosopher or the philosophical school which may be attributed to them, 
such as Confucius and Confucianism. When ideas are expressed in common 
behaviour and ritual they define that culture. However when it is articulated, 'it is 
usually identified, and becomes a philosophy.' Western ideology, as a bourgeois 
ideology, places a very high premium on this articulation, on philosophy (Solomon 
1993, 5). 
However, this thesis has little concern (being trans-disciplinary) for any distinct focus 
on what category or by what discipline the subject, or by which ideological values 
Chinese culture, is understood. Although philosophy as such is the current tool in use, 
what is more important here is a self-critical approach towards these conceptual tools 
that emerge from one's culture. An awareness of the use of conceptual categories 
employed here and a negation of their habitual usage as categories of 'precision and 
exactness' will guard against their employment becoming 'spuriously lucid' (Cohen 
and Goldman 1990, 3). 
In considering both the temporal and cognitative beginnings of both the Chinese 
culture and its 'other', Western culture, it is certain that these beginnings of individual 
and collective thought, as basic orientations and ultimate values in life, were, and are, 
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influenced by their respective environments (Cheng 2001, 500). David Keightly 
(1990, 22) points out, in regard to the impact of the environment on Chinese culture,: 
Neolithic cultures in China flourished during the Postglacial Climatic Optimum, 
when it is probable that temperatures were some two to four degrees Celsius lower 
than they are today and rainfall, in at least the middle Yangtze and north China, was 
more abundant. The development of early Chinese culture must be understood in the 
context of these relatively beneficial natural conditions. 
These 'beneficial conditions' led to 'a self-sustaining agricultural system [which] 
made its debut around 5000 B.C.' and help explain why China is 'the only major 
civilization of ancient origin that is still distinctive and vital today' (Ho 1976, 547). 
More than just longevity, though, the geographical and climatic conditions of early 
China led to a different worldview and to the formation of a different culture. 
4:2:2 Different beginnings and worldviews 
Archaeological evidence indicates that thousands (7000 confirmed sites according to 
Overmeyer 1995, 124) of villages in China flourished in the Neolithic period. This 
suggests a 'greater population density than in Mesopotamia and Greece', and a 
Chinese 'experience' and worldview which would be 'less individualistic, more 
group-oriented' (Keightly 1990, 48)' - an organic humanism. 
Joseph Needham (1956, 283-284) has demonstrated a phenomenon of signal 
importance which differentiates Chinese from Western patterns of thinking. We in the 
West, he points out, have been dominated by a worldview in which the cosmos, far 
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from being a self-contained, self operating organism, is conceived of as having been 
initially created and since then externally controlled by a Divine Power who 
'legislates' the phenomena of the non-human natural world. This conception, from 
which has arisen the 'Laws of Nature', is, of course, not of European origin, being 
traceable all the way back to ancient Mesopotamia. Of China though, Needham sees a 
different worldview: 
Not in human society only but throughout the world of Nature, there was a give and 
take, a kind of mutual courtesy rather than strife among inanimate powers and 
processes, a finding of solutions by compromise, of avoidance of mechanical force, 
and an acceptance of the inevitability of the birth and doom of every natural thing. 
Jacques Gemet (1982, 29) summarizes the variation in worldviews and philosophy by 
providing a of list ways in which China is culturally different (he sees it in 
philosophical terms) from the West. He writes that in general: 
China does not know the transcendent truths, the idea of good in itself, the notion of 
property in the strict sense of the term. She does not like the exclusion of opposition, 
the idea of the absolute, the positive exclusion between mind and matter; she prefers 
the notions of complementary, circulation, influx, of action at a distance, of a model, 
and the idea as order as an organic totality. 
This account of cultural distinctions between China and the West is addressed below, 
and indeed throughout the thesis. Here I will provide a general overview of these 
differences, showing their relationship to ancestor worship by discussing them in the 
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categories of: change, negative vs. positive, death, harmony, and vagueness vs. 
clarity. 
In China, where worldview was heavily influenced by the biological and social, and 
manifested in ancestor worship, the question of origins was more often one of history 
and genealogy. The Chinese worldview was less likely to contain problems of origin 
in the way that the Greeks concerned were with questions of origins, first causes and 
first principles (Keightly 1990, 35). The distinctive Greek (and Western) inclination 
to question and complain about the human condition - whether that questioning was 
religious, metaphysical, or political - may be related to the marked difference that 
distinguished humans from some first cause entity, be it God, gods, or in later times, 
the laws of nature. This conceptual otherness, leading to ontological and 
epistemological dualism, which was not found to any degree in Chinese philosophy, 
led to a more critical view of the world by the Greeks and by Western philosophy 
generally. For the Chinese however, their world was more organic and unified. The 
ancestors, the centre of origin, were like themselves, and not conceptually seen as the 
'other'. Therefore the past was not a period of unknown and frightening quality, but 
was, through ancestral connection, the incorporated source of cultural (biological, 
religious, social and political) identity. 
Both pre-modem and modem Western science presupposes that existence is governed 
and can be known by a natural order which is the foundation for truth. Therefore any 
explanations or explications concerning the world are both possible and desirable in 
this rationalized format. Even the Western religious worldview, (now) assumes this 
quasi scientific-rational view of the world, albeit in a spiritual context. The West, as 
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Derk Bodde (1952, 20) rightly makes clear, has been subject to a worldview 'which is 
conceived of as having been initially created, and since then externally controlled, by 
a Divine Power who "legislates" the phenomena of the nonhuman natural world.' 
Here in this religious discourse, the orderliness of existence is accountable to 'divine 
creation and the Laws of God' in opposition to an independent, rule governed natural 
world. However, both views, the religious and the scientific, have for hundreds of 
years presupposed 'a stable and ultimately predictable fundament. Whatever changes 
does so in function of certain immutable laws of God or nature which we like to think 
we are on our way to understanding' (Blair 1993, 7). 
In philosophic terms, Western thinking separated reality from appearance, and 
objectivity from subjectivity. From Mesopotamian thought, through to the ancient 
Greeks and onto modem thought with Descartes, Western thinking searched for and 
gave precedence to the real and the objective. Chinese thought did not lack 
metaphysical concern. However, it did not separate the practical from the 
metaphysical concerns as in both ancient and modem Western dualistic thought. This 
belief in an inconclusive ground of what appeared to be conclusive highlights the 
decision to give change a fundamental place in Chinese ontology, rather than an as 
the absolute and unwavering being of early Greek ontology as reflected in its notions 
. 
of substance (Cheng 1989, 1991, 2001). 
4:2:3 The concept of change and other philosophic differences 
It is in its basic ontology that Chinese philosophy (particularly its worldview) 
fundamentally diverges in a basic cultural difference from Western thinking and 
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Western philosophy. 'The ancient Chinese from the very beginning recognized and 
accepted change and transformation as irreducible attributes of the world, including 
both things and human selves' (Cheng 2001, 502). The Chinese worldview gives the 
characteristic of change extraordinary importance (Blair 1993). Reality itself is 
understood as constantly and elusively changing. The huge importance given to 
change may be seen, at least in text form, in and about the Book of Changes (Yi Jing), 
one of the oldest surviving Chinese classics. Here in this text 'the entire universe is 
characterized by a process of change' (Watson 1962, 152). 
In the Western view, and here is the nub of the argument (about change as a cultural 
distinction), change is not fundamental and therefore it lacks importance. Whatever 
changes does so due to God's or nature's laws, whereas for the Chinese the 
experience of changes in nature 'becomes consciously organized and articulated into a 
system of thinking about and organizing reality' (Cheng 2001, 502). This system of 
thinking about reality, a worldview no less, we can rightly call Zhou Yi (another title 
for the Yi Jing, The Book of Changes), the understanding of the world in relation to 
change according to the Zhou, as Cheng indicates: 
In the deep experience of ancestral unity, one can detect elements of totality, mutual 
placement, mutual support, interdependence, and a natural process of transformation 
and return. The key point for this experience is the experience of time in the act of 
reverence for the ancestral spirits as related to us. (Cheng 2001, 497) 
What at first appears to be incongruous is that Chinese philosophy is comparatively 
concrete, worldly, and practical, and at the same time is underpinned by change. It 
assigns only modest value to the powers of theorizing, analysis, and argumentation, 
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yet places a high value on practical human wisdom, a wisdom that apparently greatly 
exceeds human discursive resources for grounding and explaining its successes. 
While Western philosophy does display some similar characteristics, notably in works 
by Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, who also apply non-argument modes of persuasion, it 
is important to note 'that such features distinguish Chinese philosophy through their 
comparative centrality to the tradition as a whole' (Wong 2003, 55). 
The way that the concept of change is apprehended and used has a number of 
consequences, not necessarily related causally, but nevertheless related. One of these 
ways of understanding this view of reality is whether or not it is considered in a 
negative or a positive manner. 'Optimistic faith in the comprehensibility and 
benevolence of the universe' is connected to the "'epistemological optimism" of early 
Chinese philosophy' (Keightley 1990, 21). For the Chinese any circumstances of 
decline or disintegration are understood as temporary in a continual overall situation 
of change which is eternally moving to and then away from the most orderly of 
conditions. 'Negative [pessimistic] judgments about any state of being are not 
permitted because they are seen as the total process of reality' (Blair 1993 4). 
David Keightley (1990, 21) defines this optimism as the willingness to accept large, 
roughly defined moral ideas - like 'benevolence' or 'righteousness' - as 'reliable, 
universal, and objective', adding that the Chinese system of government has for over 
two millennia been a product of this optimism, for, 'if leaders are good - and if good 
is unambiguous - who needs to be protected against them?' And with further 
optimism, the works of Confucius and Xunzi especially, are resplendent with verses 
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which argue that all people were able to be educated to be good. The example below 
is from the Xunzi, On Nature (Chl 7): 
Nature (Tien, Heaven) operates with constant regularity. It does not exist for the sake 
of (sage-emperor) Yao nor does it exist because of (wicked king) Chieh[16]. Respond 
to it with peace and order, and good fortune will result.. .. When [natural disasters or 
bad omens occur], all people in the state are afraid and ask, "why?" I reply: There is 
no need to ask why. These are changes of heaven and earth, the transformation of yin 
and yang, and rare occurrences. It is right to marvel at them, but wrong to fear them. 
For there has been no age that has not had the experience of eclipses of the sun and 
moon, unreasonable rain or wind .... If the ruler is enlightened and the government 
peaceful, even if all these things happen at the same time, they would do no harm 
(Chan 1963, 120). 
The twentieth century Chinese philosopher and thinker Qian Mu, when referring to a 
culturally distinctive pattern in Chinese history, provides an interesting analogy of the 
difference between the West and China, and how they view their world: 
The pattern [of Chinese history] is China's, and it differs from the West's as a poem 
differs from a drama. The one develops in a metre from rhyme to rhyme, always by 
the same rules; the other develops in stages, from act to act, always with a different 
plot. The one expands to fill a space when it is ordered and disintegrates when it is 
not. The other progresses from conflict to conflict toward some inevitable conclusion. 
(Dennerline 1988, 66) 
I 16 _Chieh is Jie in pinyin 
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Another means of discussing cultural differences between the West and China, still 
under the rubric of the positive/negative dichotomy, is how they approach the 
problem of death. The Chinese see death as unproblematic. It 'was simply not the 
issue it was for the ancient Mesopotamians or the ancient Greeks' (Keightly 1990, 
34). China did not concern itself with the great mythic themes of death that so 
interested the Greeks. Their interest was almost entirely about social order and 
morality. Chinese society, underpinned by a concern for ancestors, did not see the 
great distance between mortality and heaven (and God) that was evident in early 
Western thought, and which is still so evident today. 
The culmination of the development of thought which emanates from an ancestral 
world is the sense of connection and correlation between individuals and their family, 
between individuals and the state, and even between individuals and nature or the 
cosmos. There is a positive and deeply rooted feeling of ancestral unity and harmony, 
understood as order and symbolic meaning. We know that ancestor worship has been 
practised by the Chinese since the earliest recorded times and that since then the 
ancestors of the Chinese people have needed a considerable amount of attention from 
their descendents. All Chinese, regardless of different faiths or philosophies, shared a 
common (cultural) confidence in the unity of all things (Ropp 1990, xv). It therefore 
can be assumed that 
The Chinese people as a whole experienced a sense of centrality and totality and thus 
seemed to strive for more integration and cohesion in history than other people. This 
no doubt contributed to the philosophical awareness [ worldview] of harmony as an 
underlying strain of both cosmos and society in the sphere of Chinese culture. (Cheng 
2001, 500) 
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One of the most well-known and celebrated accounts of this idea and aim of harmony, 
is the following passage on The Age of Grand Unity from the Li Chi (De Bary 1960, 
175-6): 
Once, Confucius was taking part in the winter sacrifice. After the ceremony was 
over, he went for a stroll along the top of the city gate and sighed mournfully. He 
sighed for the state of Lu. His disciple ... asked: 'Why should the gentleman sigh?' 
Confucius replied: 'The practice of the Great way, the illustrious men of the Three 
Dynasties - these I shall never know in person. And yet they inspire my ambition! 
When the Great Way was practice, the world was shared by all alike. The worthy and 
the able were promoted to office and men practised good faith and lived in affection. 
Therefore they did not regard as parents only their own parents, or as sons only their 
own sons. The aged found a fitting close to their lives, the robust their proper 
employment; the young were provided with an upbringing and the widow and 
widower, the orphaned and the sick, with proper care. Men had their tasks and women 
their hearths. They hated to see goods lying about in waste, yet they did not hoard 
then for themselves; they disliked the thought that their energies were not fully used, 
yet they used them not for private ends. Therefore all evil plotting was prevented and 
thieves and rebels did not arise, so that people could leave their outer gates unbolted. 
This was the age of Grand Unity. 
The bifurcation of dualities in the Chinese worldview is not as clear or distinct as the 
Western worldview. It has about it a particular vagueness. Nor does it function as it 
does in the Western worldview. Western culture is predisposed to 'differentiate binary 
concepts as opposing and contending forces' for example, god/devil; true/false; 
right/wrong 'or indeed the limitless other dichotomies that give shape to Western 
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thought and orientation to western cultures' (Blair 1993, 8). The Chinese view may be 
seen as a cultural disinterest in particularity, and may be found in, and is related to, 
ancestor worship. An empirical example was highlighted in the previous chapter 
where the vague and somewhat casual way that many Chinese viewed the numinous 
world of ancestors, gods and spirits was noted. Considered from a religio-
philosophical viewpoint, 'the line dividing the divine from the human is not sharply 
drawn, and it seems that humans may possess or take on qualities which are truly 
numinous' (Schwartz 1985, 25), or, as argued previously, the numinous realm came to 
be seen nearer to the phenomenal human world. 
Chinese philosophical vagueness may also be related to ancestor worship (Keightly 
1990, 42). Ancestor worship involves belief about the dead ancestors who are 
conceived in a certain way. There exists a correlation between an emphasis on social 
hierarchy and the vagueness with which the afterlife is imagined. When the social 
structure, with its emphasis on hierarchy, is seen to be successful, there is little need 
imagine and describe in detail the 'other' world. 
The Mesopotamian and Greek concern in both religion and art with personality, 
social role, and the chaos of constructed, adversarial existence was replaced in China, 
if it had ever been present, by a generalized concern with harmonious order and 
design and with ingrained and symbolic meanings. (Keightly 1990, 43) 
This vagueness or absence of boundary concerning the Chinese worldview, as 
understood both religiously and philosophically, helps explain the close connections 
between the world of the ancestors and the social world, and points to the crucial role 
of the ancestors, and therefore of kinship, in the entire development of Chinese 
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civilization. Ancestor worship, focusing on ancestors, remembering ancestors, mind-
ing the ancestors, not only means another way of conceptualizing change, it also 
serves as a link between past, present and future, and the secular and sacred, what we 
in the West may term the philosophic and rational with the religious. 
Chinese culture emphasizes continuance. Understanding Chinese culture in this way 
helps to explain many of its obvious characteristics. The ever-present importance of 
the family is an example of the emphasis on cultural (and biological) continuity. 
Survival of the family line, from ancestors to heirs, is a basic expectation. Ancestor 
worship for the Chinese provides significance over and beyond any individual 
aspirations. The ancestors were the central element in the Chinese worldview and 
connected with all other significant things (significants) in the Chinese world. 
4:3 Ancestor worship and religion 
I mention above that the division or distinction of dualities in the Chinese worldview 
is not as apparent as it is in the Western worldview. Curiously, how we in the West 
view religion in China is also somewhat indistinct. Marcel Granet (1975, 147) notices 
that 'at first sight, the distinction between the sacred and the profane is less 
appreciable in China than among us' and so we give to them, 'according to 
observers,' the status of being both at the same time, 'the most practical or the most 
superstitious people in the world.' 
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But that does not mean that they are religious: we do not always mean that religion 
equals superstition. Throughout their history and across any social divides, the 
Chinese have been 'deeply concerned about mystical forces and the supernatural.' 
Spirits and gods were thought to be everywhere - usually unseen, but nonetheless 
real. .. And in any town or village, regardless of the day of the year, a visitor could 
see incense and spirit-money burned, food sacrificed, and fire crackers exploded. The 
sense that supernatural beings were omnipresent was expressed by the small boy 
who, before relieving himself alongside a dark street, warned the spirit lurking in the spot: 
'I am going to urinate. Please stand aside'. (Eastman 1988, 41) 
Yet 'numerous observers' have seen the Chinese as 'highly rationalistic people, 
spared the religious prejudices and superstitions that have tarnished the history of the 
Western world' (Eastman 1988, 41). One of those numerous observers was Joseph 
Needham (1971, 90) who clearly stated that the 'Chinese mood was essentially 
secular.' David Keightley (1978, 212) refers to the 'secular values [of] the great 
tradition of the Chou [Zhou] and Han dynasties' and of the 'religious logic' of Shang 
thought. Yet he also warns us that this way of understanding the (Shang) Chinese 
should obscure 'the fact that all aspects of Shang life could be impregnated ... with 
religious significance.' This 'paradoxical religious logic,' which is 'permeated with a 
commitment to ancestors' and is 'strongly religious in the totality of its demands' may 
also be characterized as 'nonreligious, non-mysterious, and rational in its logic.' 
Keightly is able to talk about these seemingly illogical and paradoxical equations as 
he rationally and reasonably explains that as a religion 'Shang ancestor worship and 
Shang political culture stressed the lineage as a source of authority' - the religion was 
a source of social rationale (Kneightley 1978, 214). 
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This apparent inconsistency of thought or 'paradoxical religious logic' as it relates to 
the practices of the Chinese, and whether they are religious or not, superstitious and 
practical or not, may be explained away by our grammatical confusion and how we 
understand and use the words. And of course our Lebensfonn, our cultural and 
ideological form of life, our own cultural bias leads us to particular understandings 
and uses. 
There are more practical matters which provide nuances of meaning. The Chinese 
gods, it must be noted, 'were something less than omnipotent. Gods they were, but 
they differed from human beings by degree rather than kind. Many gods in fact were 
thought to be simply the spiritual emanations of former prominent mortals' (Eastman 
1988, 44). A critical view of this ancestor centered thesis, perhaps a view influenced 
by a religious paradigm of understanding, would undoubtedly point out the 
importance of gods in the Chinese worldview, and would also point to the absolute 
authority of shangdi and tian in early China, and therefore note their influence in 
Chinese culture. However, I would argue, that this apparently important cultural 
(religious, social, and political) viewpoint is questionable on two grounds. First, as 
Cheng Chung-ying (2001, 499) posits, 'there is an intrinsic organic interrelation 
between the rise of beliefs in shangdi and tian, the institutionalization of Ii [ritual] as a 
system of social ordering and the formation of a unified social-political economy 
based on agriculture.' Benjamin Schwartz (1985, 29) in referring to a number of key 
anthropological texts notes that they all have in common a hypothesis that the 
appearance of a supreme deity 'coincides with the supremacy of Shang and its ruling 
clan.' 
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It is also important to consider the approach that many of the literati took in relation to 
religion. While most 'never resolutely taught the vanity of belief in gods or in the 
survival of the souls, the majority professed a prudent agnosticism' (Granet 1975, 
149). What the literati wanted to avoid was a head on clash with ancestor worship, 
'probably for fear of undermining the realistic beliefs which seemed necessary for the 
popular cult of the Ancestors.' The popular position was one of 'prudent agnosticism.' 
Therefore, the 'popular cult of the Ancestors' was never really challenged and it may 
be considered 'as a firm and lasting popular faith' (Granet 1975, 149). Even though 
the early literati were often employed as 'presiding priests, particularly for funeral 
ceremonies,' and 'advocated funeral rites of remarkable length and complexity' (Eno 
1990, 61), and the Analects (e.g., A: 2.5, 3.12), 'placed great value on rite of sacrifice, 
Confucius appears sceptical about the ability of prayer to influence events' (A:7.35). 
Another aspect of Shang religion is that 'the God-on-high (shangdi) does not seem to 
have been thought of as a creator, but as part of the total existing universe' (Milston 
1978, 57). There is a striking difference between Western and Chinese cosmo-
ontological views. In other words, shangdi most probably emerged as a consequence 
or even as a political strategy from the historical social conditions of the time, and its 
supreme importance was only a conditional outcome of specific political needs. It did 
not have the underlying cultural significance required to be considered an ongoing 
and continual cultural imperative. 
Second, as previously noted, there was no sense of radical difference between spirits 
and humans. The Shang and Zhou may have seen these deities, and also other spirits, 
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such as that of rivers and mountains, and fertility gods, as originally local gods, and 
tribal ancestors (Schwartz 1985, 20). There is some evidence that shangdi, the God or 
Lord on High, was the first ancestor of the Shang lineage (Keightley 1978, 213), and 
that the 'great bulk of Shang sacrificial wealth and divinatory attention was devoted to 
the ancestors.' Indeed 'the two religious orientations, ancestor worship and all the 
other gods and spirits may not have been mutually exclusive' (Schwartz 1985, 20). 
Although there were other deities spirits worshipped, their separate realm, if it 
existed, was unclear. In any case they were somehow always connected biologically 
via the ancestors. The paradigm of understanding other gods, nature spirits, and 
deities, and the realm in which they existed, was the same paradigm which understood 
the ancestors and their realm. 
Chinese civilization, as the 'world's longest continuous civilization,' and one that 'is 
generally conceded to be a unique phenomenon in world history' (Ropp 1990, x), has 
a correspondingly wide range of explanations provided for this uniqueness The one 
overriding concern by the Chinese, which may account for this uniqueness, is a focus 
on the biological and social, and its continuation. This concern is regarded 'as a focal 
value in Chinese culture', which has its 'beginnings ... in prehistoric times' (Ho 1976, 
547). Although the religiosity, as such, of ancestor worship is unclear and not a matter 
able to be settled, one thing is clear; and that is [ancestor worship's] 'universal vitality 
and its unrivalled importance in the national life. The ancestral tablets possess as great 
a significance as ever' (Addison 1924, 492). 
4:4 The social and political significance 
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The significance of the ancestors is a social significance. Although they do have a 
central position in the religious realm, and they have an important originative position 
in Chinese philosophy, the real power of the ancestors, in regard to their exemplary 
position in Chinese culture, lies in the social realm, and consequently, as will be seen, 
in the correlative political realm. It is not by accident that the majority of 
philosophical texts throughout Chinese history concerned the political and the social. 
Even the more metaphysical Taoist texts address these issues, albeit often in a 
negative way. The ancestors are not just residents of a spiritual (religious) world. 'As 
members of a familial community across the barrier of life and death, they ... play a 
familial role in that community and their kinship status retains its importance,' an 
'importance which is found in its connections with the living' (Schwartz 1985, 21). 
Ancestors are not only the progenitors of the present generation, but also represent the 
ideal paradigm model for the social order. It is from the ancestors that the present 
generation finds a sense of value, and an understanding of what is right and wrong, 
good and evil. The ancestors provide both the values and the structural model for 
social unity. 
The social and political importance of ancestors is apparent when it is realized that a 
particular civilizational accomplishment by China is its socio-political organization 
which has proved so successfully long-lasting and so effective in maintaining a 
unified society over such a vast special area and over such a long period of time. 
When compared to a similar space and time frame, such as that of Europe, it is quite 
an accomplished performance. 'The development of the political sphere in the 
Chinese world and its pre-eminence over all other (military, religious, economic) is 
one of its most characteristic marks' (Gemet 1982, 27). The key to political success 
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and the control of society was not to be found in technological or military dominance, 
but through the social control of family line; lineage and the ancestors. When 
formalized, ancestor worship leads to a bureaucracy. Ancestor worship explains the 
genesis of bureaucracy and its importance throughout Chinese history. 
The form that political authority, and the civil theology supporting it, eventually 
took as the political culture became increasingly secularized in Chou times continued 
to manifest a commitment to hierarchical, authoritarian, quasi-magical, bureaucratic 
features whose presence may be discovered in the characteristic generationalism and 
contractual logic of Shang ancestor worship. Other civilizations have certainly 
developed centralized administrations that were more or less bureaucratic; it is only 
in China however, that the bureaucratic role, with all its kin and ritual elements, has 
been so passionately cherished. (Keightley 1978, 223) 
The Chinese cosmos also became bureaucratized. The social world produced the 
religious and metaphysical world (such as they were), and the religious and 
philosophical world helped explain and sustain the social and political realms. 
Although as Schwartz (1985, 29) argues, 'the ancestral cult as an ultimate source of 
political legitimation has its limitations. Yet in the end everyone has ancestors. 
Ancestor worship is, in a sense, an egalitarian religion, since all people have kin.' 
With ancestor worship, and its social and political correlations, 'the common source 
of the family becomes the revered centering origin of all the life in the family' (Cheng 
2001, 498), and when the common source is extended to a higher level social level, 'it 
becomes the common and revered source for the community. With the concept of 
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minzu, the people's descent group [or larger community], comes the idea of family 
extending to the state or nation' (Dennerline 1988, 165). 
Although ancestor worship played an important role in the establishment, structure 
and maintenance of the polity in China, and ancestral-worship ritual provided the 
ideological basis and legitimacy for the rule of Shang royal lineages, the assumption 
that rulers throughout Chinese history have deliberately cultivated ancestor worship as 
the foundation of royal legitimacy is incorrect. Benjamin Schwartz (1990, 21) argues 
that ancestor worship's pervasiveness is not directly related to political ordering. 
Ancestor worship may have indeed contributed to an extraordinarily powerful 
conception of political ordering China. This does not prove that it had not 
previously been a pervasive orientation of neolithic culture. Its continuing strong 
hold on the religion of the people in China hardly seems to be an imposition 
from above. 
Furthermore, Francis Hsu (1971, 307) importantly notes that although 'Chinese 
dynasties lasted much longer along hereditary lines' than pre-modem European states, 
this was despite the 'prevalence of the notion of Mandate of Heaven which provided 
for the replacement of an incompetent dynasty by a new and more efficient one.' The 
Mandate of Heaven seems to undermine the argument that ancestor worship was 
cultivated to continue royal legitimacy, for other families also had ancestors. 
4:5 A confluence of significants 
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Ancestor worship was not only a religious phenomenon, it was also important to 
Chinese culture generally, for it was through the cult of the ancestors that emphasis 
came to bear on those familial and kinship aspects that tended toward social harmony 
and stability. The unity and good order of the family and the state were achieved 
through a focus on ancestral worship, or ancestral piety. This became better known as 
filial piety or xiao. This ancestral/filial worship/piety, 'together with those other 
religious features which were intertwined with them, powerful urges to conformity in 
family and state, are probably what was meant by those people who have spoken of 
Confucianism' (Baker 1979, 105). 
The so-called Confucian texts and other classical texts provide powerful metaphorical 
images surrounding the efficacy of ancestor worship and its corollaries. However 
access to what the sages and writers knew could only be achieved through the practice 
of ancestor worship itself. 'No matter how sacred the text may be', Qian Mu tells 
Dennerline (1988, 15), 'its meaning depends on the context and on the receptivity of 
the reader's mind. When you study, you must also understand the meaning of what is 
not said. For every word written, there may be three that are not written." The 
relevance of this quote goes back to the theories underpinning this thesis, and 
especially its prime focus on practice theory, its postmodern suspicion of the meta-
narrative, and the inherent hermeneutical weakness of the Confucian narrative 
generally. I mention this here, not as a criticism of Confucianism, (although I have 
questioned Confucianism's role as the cultural master narrative), or the classical texts, 
but merely as an introduction to another important factor in assessing the significance 
of ancestor worship, and that is the rituals of the practice themselves, again a subject 
that will be discussed at length in chapter five. However what I do want to make clear, 
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is that although this chapter deals with the significance of ancestor worship in the 
minds if the Chinese, this does not, or should not, lead to an assumption, that the 
significance can somehow be found in philosophical texts, and as such in the minds of 
the elite. 
Maurice Freedman (1979, 37) in On the Sociological Study of Chinese Religion (and 
here I seek the sociological rather than the religious insights), posited that both the 
elite religion and peasant religion in China 'rest on a common base representing two 
versions of one religion that we see as idiomatic translations of each other.' Whether 
or not Chinese culture is viewed as homogenous or as two separate entities, elite and 
peasant, a common and enduring characteristic is the practice of ritual. And although 
the focus in this chapter is more mental or cognitive, and certainly philosophical and 
religious, the rites and rituals of the Chinese, especially as they concern the worship 
of the ancestors, played an important role in those 'mental' and even philosophical 
aspects of Chinese culture. 
The rituals and rites of Chinese culture, the li, began with ancestral worship during the 
dim Neolithic times. 'In fact part of the word li refers to the offering of patterned jade 
for sacrificial ritual' (Cheng 2001, 497). According to Xunzi, who saw the social and 
symbolic function of rituals, 'li is important to all aspects of human society .. .it 
distinguishes civilised patterns of behaviour, and maintains the political order' (Chow 
1994, 56). Chapter five discusses at length all the ramifications of ritual or li; however 
for now it is important to introduce it as a significant part of the considerations of the 
importance of ancestor worship in Chinese culture. 
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In the Lilun (Discussion of Rites) Xunzi says of li, that: 
heaven and earth are joined in harmony; ... through li men's likes and dislikes are 
regulated ... [and] through the li, the root and the branches are put in proper order; 
beginning and end are made consonant; the most elegant forms embody all 
distinctions; the most penetrating insight explains all things. (Watson 1964, 89) 
In an effort to understand the significance of the experience of li, it is, I think, 
necessary to dwell on the relationship between one's personal ancestor and the 
ancestor as an ideal, stretching back into the dim past and forward into the limitless 
future. 'It is in both limiting and stretching oneself that the essential meaning of li is 
formed' (Cheng 2001, 498). This experience of li can now be linked back to the 
previous discussion on worldviews and cultural distinction, as only with an 
appreciation of the concept could the distinctive Chinese worldview develop. The 
Chinese culture, expressed as it often is as that of the literati, was a unifying 
mechanism, as cultures always are, and it was the concept of li that held and 
conditioned the people. 'So long as the customary practices of the people could be 
explained as consistent with li, they were tolerated and unity was maintained' 
(Dennerline 1988, 164). The Chinese understanding of the power of social 
conditioning, as shown by the works of Xunzi and other literati throughout Chinese 
history highlights the importance and efficacy of ritual in Chinese culture (Ropp 
1990, xvii). 
4:6 Conclusion 
This chapter expresses the core sentiments of the thesis and addresses the main 
hypothesis -concerning the intrinsic importance of ancestor worship in Chinese 
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culture. It engages with a particular symbolic-hermeneutical understanding of culture 
that has been articulated and reinforced throughout this work. The cognitative aspects 
are emphasized in this chapter and culture is seen to emerge from the conditions and 
subsequent worldview of a people. From the worldview emerges values; from the 
inherent values comes a hierarchy of values and a set of strategies and plans enabling, 
ideally and actually, these values, as a set of goals, to be realized. 
Ancestor worship, including its corollaries, was integral in the origination and 
inception of Chinese culture, and in its continuing motivation. Ancestor worship, 
expressed in another way is the ritualized concern for the biological (links); a 
strategy; a concern for the social; and its cultural outcome. Expressed rather 
inadequately, (due to their limitations which are addressed by the thesis overall), but 
necessarily, in philosophical and religious terms, the cultural strategies of the Chinese, 
their worldview, ethos, way of thinking, is shown to be unique. Chinese 
distinctiveness, its cultural uniqueness, emerges from the complex interaction 
between the way of life and the environment to produce a Chinese form of life 
(Lebensform). Using the categories of change, positive and negative (optimism), 
harmony, and vagueness, the difference between the development of Chinese thought 
and Greek inspired Western thought, is made apparent. Also made clear is the 
association of ancestor worship to the Chinese cultural distinctions. 
Ancestor worship is often thought of in religious terms to the detriment of its 
significance as the prime cultural paradigm. This argument is discussed more fully in 
the chapter on Confucianism. However, here and in the previous chapter, the role and 
the nature of religion and God/gods, and how they are apprehended in Chinese culture 
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are discussed. An important point which emerges from these philosophical 
discussions is the social role of ancestor worship and its strategic function and 
significance in Chinese culture. Here I draw the connections between the religious, 
the philosophical, and the biological with the social. Xiao and li, that is filial piety and 
ritual, are introduced as important aspects of this strategy - aspects that will be dealt 
with at length in the following two chapters. 
This chapter's importance to the thesis is that it builds upon and reinforces the 
previous chapter and therefore the overall approach of giving evidential precedence to 
'what the Chinese were doing' throughout their cultural journey, as opposed to what a 
particular text or author supposes or suggests they were doing, or, more importantly, 
what they were thinking. It also, in connection with the first chapter, exemplifies the 
hermeneutical approach that this thesis has taken 
Furthermore the symbolic approach is now more apparent as ancestor worship as a 
symbol of a significant cultural trait is examined, not by analysis, as one might do by 
analyzing a particular action in an anthropological study of say, West Town, but by 
looking at the connections that made the particular action in West Town a cultural 
significant and then by looking at that significant, in this case ancestor worship, and 
looking at its connections. These connections are highlighted throughout this chapter, 
and when considered as a cultural whole (and when they are further enhanced and 
elaborated in coming chapters), they make it clear that ancestor worship is at least an 
alternative cultural paradigm, and perhaps even a better cultural paradigm than the 
current master narrative of Confucianism. This thesis argues that there is an over-
reliance on texts, classical and philosophical, in trying to understanding Chinese 
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culture. It is clear from recent research that these texts were not at all representational 
of the vast majority of the population. Furthermore, more recent evidence infers that 
'veneration of ancestors was practised by much of the population; it has remained a 
central concern until today' (Overmeyer 1995, 125). 
The social strategies and their incumbent social mores which originated in ancestor 
worship profoundly influenced not only the religious and philosophical views of the 
Chinese, but also the socio-political orders. 
Within the family, the kin members both here and in the world beyond are held 
together in a network of role relationships ideally governed by the spirit of peace, 
harmony and ritual decorum. Here the value of order is central. .. As a model for the 
socio-political order, it projects the picture of an immanent order based on networks 
of clearly defined roles and statuses and ideally held together by a system of sacred 
ritual .(Schwartz 1985, 31) 
The aim of this chapter has been to begin the expose of the pattern of meanings of 
Chinese culture and to explore the world of thought and the shared cultural 
assumptions of the Chinese (as they practised ancestor worship). Chinese philosophy 
and religion assist this aim as they articulate the worldviews and its inherent values as 
expressions of the fundamental beliefs of a people. Starting at the beginning, in the 
dim Neolithic and ancient Classical past not only assists in finding those inceptive 
conditions of Chinese philosophy and religion, but it has an element of distance which 
is more efficacious in considering cultural distinction. 
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Our examination shows the positive nature of Chinese thought, the way it perceives 
change, and the positive way it considers death. Here we begin to see the connection 
with the ancestors, noting that the delineation between divine or metaphysical with 
the human world is indistinct. This religious or philosophical vagueness helps to 
explain the close connection to the ancestors and then to the social world. This close 
ancestral connection - a biological-social connection - shows the crucial role of the 
ancestors, kinship, and family in the entire development of Chinese civilization. 
Ancestor worship, as a means of conceptualizing change, provides a link between 
past, present and future, also linking the philosophical and religious to the social and 
political. Ancestor worship also helps make clear why the one overriding concern of 
the Chinese has been their focus on the biological and social, and its continuation. The 
significance of the ancestors is a social significance. Although they do have a central 
position in the religious realm, and they have an important originative position in 
Chinese philosophy, the real power of the ancestors, in regards to their exemplary 
position in Chinese culture, lies in the social realm. This social significance is 
explored further in the next chapter. 
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Chapter S 
Living with the Ancestors: Filial Piety 
Ancient Chinese wisdom has this to say about filial piety: 
A superior man is devoted to the fundamentals (root). When the root is firmly 
established, the moral law (Tao) will grow. Filial piety and brotherly respect are the 
root of humanity (ren). (Analects 1.2. Chan 1963, 31) 
The reading above indicates a particular characteristic of China's culture has been its serious 
concern with filial piety towards parents, ancestors, heirs, family and kin. The emphasis on 
family is extended to the state and by inference to the nation. This chapter engages with the 
discourse of the family and filial piety. The dominant social strategies and their 
incumbent social mores which originated in ancestor worship profoundly influenced 
not only the religious and philosophical views of the Chinese, but also the socio-
political orders. The core sentiments and the main hypothesis of the thesis are 
addressed -that is, that ancestor worship and its connections and corollaries were 
integral in the inception of Chinese culture and in its continuing motivation. 
An important element of this chapter is to reinforce and re-emphasize connections. As 
a cultural connection, filial piety connects the biological with the social and the 
political. Filial piety confirms the individual, as a member of a larger family-kin-
ancestor web, as the nexus in this web of significants that is Chinese culture. Its 
biological connections allow communication across space and time. 
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Ancestor veneration and worship stressed social unity and social order. It is primarily 
concerned with the continuity and survival of the ancestors and the present generation 
as future ancestors. Expressed in another way, ancestor worship is a ritualized 
concern for the biological (links), leading to a concern for the social, and a strategy 
for achieving the outcomes of this social concern. Conversely, one of the significant 
correlates of ancestor worship is to be found in the social realm. Here the connections 
between the religious, the philosophical, and the biological with the social are 
exposed and made clear. The importance of the social realm in Chinese culture; the 
importance of the family in Chinese society; and the central role of filial piety (xiao) 
in the family and its influence extending to the wider social world, and even to the 
cosmos are stressed. 
Other cultures and the religions important to those cultures also stressed the 
'functional needs of the societies and governments they served in the course of their 
history' (Jochim 1986, 78-80). Of course the concern for family and indeed the ethics 
of filial piety are common to many if not most cultures, and are not unique to China. 
However, Chinese culture is distinctive in the amount of attention paid to and the 
importance claimed for this particular virtue (Ivanhoe 2004, 189). Gary Hamilton 
(1990, 77) provides a sociological view of this difference when he argues that in 
'Western society legitimate domination is seen as the intentional, directional, and 
consequential acts of individuals acting within the boundaries of their jurisdictions', 
whereas 'in China .. .it is seen as an aspect of specific sets of social roles, and hence 
as impersonal, non-intentional, and harmony-seeking.' In China, 'familism (along 
with ancestor worship) was the oldest and most basic of Chinese religious 
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conceptions. Filiality, the root of familism17, was praised in all the ancient scriptures' 
(Jochim 1986, 78-80). This overriding concern with family is distinctively Chinese 
and describes 'a system in which all ideas and behaviour were judged by whether or 
not they contributed to the well being of the family' (Eastman 1988, 15). 
Although some of [filial piety's] component ideas (obedience for example) are 
shared by other cultures, filial piety surpasses all other ethics in its historical 
continuity, the proportion of humanity under its governance, and the encompassing 
and imperative nature of its precepts. The attributes of intergenerational relationships 
governed by filial piety are structural, enduring, and invariable across situations 
within Chinese culture. They may be generalized to apply to authority relationships 
beyond the family, and they are thus potent determinants of not only 
intergenerational but also superior-subordinate interactions. (Ho 1996, 155) 
From its very cultural beginning filial piety held an almost absolute position in 
Chinese onto-cosmology and it became 'something so exalted in their minds that it 
becomes difficult for us of another culture to appreciate today' (Holzman 1998, 185). 
It is in an examination of its correlations and connections that such an appreciation 
may come to fruition. 
Family, kinship and clanship, and the ancestors have a profound, entrenched and 
inherent relationship with the political, economic and social systems in traditional 
Chinese society (Hsieh 1968, 17 4, 183 ). This is evidenced by the importance attached 
to social harmony, and of the significance of Confucianism and the Confucian 
17 So important was the institution of the family that the termfamilism has been coined to characterize 
Chinese social values and organization (Eastman 1988, 15). 
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doctrine of filial piety throughout Chinese history. Filial piety (xiao) is supported by 
an understanding of the mutual interconnectedness between self, parents and 
ancestors, and a devotion and piety to continue that concept of identity and 
relationship. 'It involves a heightened awareness that one not only owes one's 
existence to parents and ancestors but also has been shaped by them to become the 
kind of person one is' (Shun 2003, 793). 
It is the family and not the individual that is the basic unit of humanity in China, and 
it has been that way since the beginning. The doctrine of filial piety is fundamental 
and essential to Chinese ethical and social life. One of the more significant cultural 
strategies of Chinese civilization has been the value it has given to social harmony 
and solidarity and its various means of achieving this aim. China's success in being 
able to maintain a highly organized and complex society over such a vast area for 
such a length of time is due to its emphasis on the social realm and especially on the 
social institution of the family. This family-dominated social realm was maintained by 
'deeply ingrained patterns of behavior' which 'are among the oldest and most 
persistent social phenomena in the world' (Fairbank 1992, 18). The Chinese family 
was, at one and the same time, an economic unit ... a religious unit. .. and a social 
security organization. (Eastman 1988, 16) 
The concept of filial piety was already in use in Chinese culture generally before it 
became an integral and important value ethic in Confucianism, where 'it enjoyed a 
primary position of importance' (Yin 2004, 141). Filial piety was mentioned 
seventeen times in the Analects and twenty seven times in the Mencius ( 4A26) where 
it makes it clear that to fail to extend the family line by not having children [and let 
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the ancestors be forgotten] are the most heinous ways to be unfilial, and unfiliality 
was 'thought to be a most serious crime, an attitude that continued for most of 
Chinese history' (Holzman 1998, 188). Here, filial piety covers not only duty towards 
one's parents, 'but also indirect filial duty towards one's clan to carry on the family 
line so that ancestors will continue to be worshipped by the future generations' (Yin 
2004, 142). 
Besides the supreme importance given to the family in Chinese society, immense 
worth was also place upon the relationship between father and son. 'It was universally 
accepted as the most important human relationship' (Baker 1979, 102). However, this 
hierarchical relationship gains its importance not only as a relationship between father 
and son, but as it is extended to other social relationships by example and analogy. 
The degree of importance placed upon this social relationship may be inferred by its 
inclusion in the Confucian canon as the Classic of Filial Piety (Xiao Jing) which is an 
attempt to extend the social relationships within the family into the political sphere, 
and by analogy to compare the relationship (especially) of the father and son to the 
ruler and the ruled. The Classic of Filial Piety brought serving the monarch into the 
sphere of filial piety: 
One serves one's mother in the same manner in which one serves one's father, and 
the love towards them is the same. One serves one's monarch in the same the same. 
Therefore to serve the monarch with filial piety is to show loyalty; to serve the senior 
with reverence is to show obedience. Not failing in loyalty and obedience in the 
service of one's superiors, one will be able to preserve one's emolument and position 
and to carry on one's family sacrifices. (Yin 2004, 147) 
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This relationship between filial piety and politics is examined in detail below. 
However, it is filial piety's relationship to the social realm, and the social realm's 
position above all other realms which are the most important features of Chinese 
culture. One of the early and most respected of Chinese writers, Xunzi (c. 298-238 
BC), in his Discussion of Rites (Watson 1965, 89) expressed succinctly the wisdom 
and underlying strategic thinking inherent within Chinese culture when he wrote that 
humans are prone to make excessive demands to satisfy their passions, and that social 
control mechanisms, such as that gained by practicing the rituals of ancestor worship, 
are necessary for the well being of society. Here Xunzi is simply articulating the 
reasons behind the social and cultural strategy, noting its necessity and its means. 
What is not apparent in Xunzi's statement is the extent that the social realm, and 
especially as it relates to the political, is prioritized over all other realms. This is 
exemplified in the literature of the early times. 'Nearly all the authors [of early 
Chinese literature] ... whether poets, historians, or philosophers, were at the same time 
government officials, or members of philosophical schools which sought official 
sanction and support' (Watson 1962, 5). 
The Chinese character for filial piety shows an old man being held up by a child -
obviously showing the parent-child relationship. Here, in the important cultural value 
and ensuing strategy of filial piety, is to be found another cultural distinction, which 
by its sheer contrast, leads to a better understanding of Chinese culture. In the 
previous chapter I discussed a Chinese cultural difference in relation to change and to 
what Cheng Chung-ying (2001, 497) has called the Zhou Yi way of thinking where the 
'deep experience of ancestral unity' leads to a world view of 'totality, 
interdependence, transformation and return.' Here, with filial piety, we find a similar 
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outcome. Filial piety may be considered the social transformation of the Zhou Yi, and 
the social realm may be considered to have been extended to include the ancestral 
realm To be filial is to remember one's parents and to maintain memory of the past. 
'Those who are inclined to value the past maintain intimate relations with their roots -
"inter-dependence" and "predictability". Interrelating with the collective, they are no 
longer absorbed with mere individual goals' (lsay 2005, 450). Filial piety as a 
supremely important social virtue was 'not the kind of lineage virtue that would have 
been validated by the independence and unpredictability of the Mesopotamian and 
Greek gods and heroes' (Keightley 1990, 45). The emphasis on filial piety in Chinese 
culture is a response to a need for harmony and control - for dependence and 
predictability. As an organizing metaphor, filial piety projects itself from the family to 
the social community and political institutions, and thence to the cosmos in the form 
of harmony (Hsieh 1968, 170). 
The Analects define filial piety this way: 'When parents are alive serve them 
according to ritual, when dead bury them according to ritual and sacrifice to them 
according to ritual'. This statement tells us that filial piety is concerned with the 
rituals (li) of ancestor worship. It is a quasi-religious concern, and it is this religiosity 
which provides the approval of, and endorsement for filial piety (Baker 1979, 105). 
By implication it also suggests an awareness and knowledge of the ancestors which in 
turn provided the font of meaning for the important values within Chinese culture -
filial piety being the strategic outcome of these values and family continuity the goal. 
Ancestor veneration, worship and piety18 emphasized in particular those aspects of the 
family that stressed unity and order - a requirement for continuity and survival of the 
18 I again stress the use these terms interchangeably to underpin their synthetic nature; their meaning-
in-use, and their connections. 
173 
ancestors and the present generation as future ancestors. Further reading of the ancient 
texts also tells us that filial piety is concerned with the orderly and harmonious 
operation of the family and by extension to the ruler and the state. Chinese society 
was built up on the basis of filial piety, which has penetrated into every corner of 
Chinese life and influenced every aspect of Chinese society. Its traditions, religious 
life, social life and political life show the influence of this ethical practice and these 
lines from the Great Learning (1.4.) indicate this influence: 
In order to rightly govern the state, it is necessary first to regulate the family; in order 
to put the empire in peace and prosperity, it is necessary first to regulate the 
state ... prior to setting up of a community or a state, there must be a social unit called 
the family. 
Filial piety is essentially a unifying and strengthening strategy of Chinese culture. An 
edict from Emperor Chengzu in the Ming Dynasty recognized this and decreed that 
'there are five human relationships, the sovereign and the parents are the most 
important. Serving his parents with filial piety, thus his loyalty can be transferred to 
his sovereign' (Yin 2004, 151). 
For a small but influential part of Chinese society, understood as the elite literati, 
government officials and potential officials, or the Ru or Confucians, self 
development was seen as a most important value. According to Confucius, to manage 
the state one has to manage the family first and in order to manage the family well 
one has to cultivate oneself. Filial piety and its associated rituals are not only the 
initial step for self development but also the basis for political and social order. The 
link between filial piety (family) and good and harmonious governance (government) 
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can be seen in Confucius' observation (Analects, 2.21), 'that participation in 
government need not involve actually taking office but can be a matter of exerting 
one's influence throughxiao [filial piety]' (Shun 2003, 795). 
Filial piety was not just a matter of reverence to the father (or parent, older brother, 
senior person or ruler), it was also a matter of reciprocity. Reciprocity is an important 
factor in Chinese culture and society and is clearly seen in Chinese family 
relationships. The individual understands that he exists by virtue of his interdependent 
relationship with his ancestors, whereby his ancestors exist through him, and that he 
will continue to exist only through his descendents. This sense of mutual 
responsibility and understanding is most apparent between parents and son, and was 
essential to the successful continuing institution of the family and of Chinese society 
generally. Of course it is obvious that such mutual responsibility between parents and 
children is not markedly a Chinese cultural trait as such, but where the Chinese 
situation differed significantly from the Western, apart from the obvious higher value 
and emphasis, was in the continuing piety of the son after the death of the parent. 
'Death did not release the son from his duty to his parents; it merely altered the form 
which his duty took' (Baker 1979, 71-72). Filial piety is not, though, a requirement 
for absolute compliance to parental authority. It is more a respectful attitude which 
demands reverence and veneration (Tu 1990, 118) towards our direct source oflife, 
our biological links, our parents and ancestors. 
5:1 Filial piety's connection with ancestor worship 
Recently unearthed silk and bamboo texts from early China have added to our 
understanding of the role of filial piety in early Chinese thought (Chan 2004, 3) and it 
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is becoming increasingly clear that 'filial piety or, more exactly, ancestral piety, was 
an essential element in ancient religion and thus in ancient life in general' (Holzman 
1998, 186). It was ancestor worship, reverence, or piety that coloured the entire social 
realm, and it is piety within the family and directed towards the parents (the closest 
ancestors), but especially the father, that we now refer to as filial piety. The roots of 
filial piety probably arose in Neolithic burial customs (Keightley 1990, 45), but direct 
evidence of filial piety 'first appeared on Shang or early Zhou bronze vessels, where 
the concept of filial piety was already well developed' (Yin 2004, 141). 
Although it is generally thought that filial piety was more a social matter (dealing 
with parents only) and therefore less a religious matter (dealing with ancestors), I 
favor the argument that although attitudes and values within Chinese culture have 
changed over time, filial piety and therefore ancestral piety and worship, have 
changed little. There is ample evidence to conclude that filial piety extended from the 
social realm to include the more numinous, religious, meta-physical world of the 
ancestors. One line of argument (Baker 1979, 83) is that 
'[I]f the parents when alive needed food, clothing, shelter and money, and if the after-
life closely resembles this life, then the parents when dead would continue to need 
food, clothing, shelter and money. To supply them with these essentials was one of 
the fundamental purposes of ancestor worship.' 
In Arthur Waley's (1949, 38) view, founded partly on evidence from the Shijing and 
Shangshu, filial piety 'seems originally to have meant piety towards the spirits of 
ancestors or dead parents.' Also based upon a poem from the Shijing, Donald 
Holzman (1998, 187) adds that 'although we know very little about family life in 
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ancient China ... this ancient poem and the fact that Chinese poets have echoed it down 
to the present day, do suggest real continuity', in that filial piety as a social 
phenomena has continued unabated from the distant past down to the present day. 
The modem Confucianist, Qian Mu (1895-1991), disagrees slightly, but nevertheless 
argues that, although filial piety was assessed differently at different times, its 
relationship and influence extended beyond the parents: 
Since antiquity, the value of filial piety has undergone many changes. In the more 
remote stages, this worship of ancestral figures was related to feeding the ancestors 
with offerings. By the time of Confucius (551-479BC), ancestor worship was adapted 
to the relations with the more recent dead ancestors and also the living, and gradually, 
to the relations between superiors and subordinates in public office. (lsay 2005, 442) 
A passage from the Shangshu, which Holzman (1998, 188) believes was written about 
lOOOBC, 'clearly ... shows us that filial piety played an important role in Chinese life 
during the Zhou dynasty not only in ritual observances of ceremonies for the dead, but 
in actual filial behaviour towards living parents': 
The king said: "Feng, our hatred of the worst criminals is great indeed! But how 
much more do we hate those who are not filial or fraternal! When the son does not 
reverently carry out the orders of his father he wounds the old man's heart grievously. 
The father cannot love his son, and then begins to hate him. The son's younger 
brother can no longer think of what Heaven obviously wants him to do, and he can no 
longer respect his elder brother. The elder brother, moreover, thinks no more of the 
sadness of his younger brother and is quite lacking in fraternal feelings towards him. 
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If such men go to extremes [of unfilial conduct] and are not considered criminals by 
our government, then the law of Heaven given to our people will fall completely into 
ruin". (Holzman 1998, 188) 
Other important texts also provide clear evidence of the links between ancestor 
worship and filial piety. In The Doctrine of the Mean (DOM) Confucius is reported to 
have said, 'King Wu and Duke Chou were indeed eminently filial. Men of filial piety 
are those who skillfully carry out the wishes of their [ancestors] and skillfully carry 
forward their undertakings' (Chan 1963, 106). It also, in another passage, explicitly 
states that filial piety is connected with the activities of ancestor worship: 
[T]o remember the ancestors, to perform the same rites, and the same music which 
they performed when living, to reverence what they reverenced, to love what they 
loved, to serve them after death as they were served during their life, and to serve 
them though they have disappeared as if they still existed, that is perfect filial piety. 
(DOM 19 in Chan 1963, 106) 
Therefore, ancestor worship may easily be seen here as an extension of the piety 
towards parents, a piety which 'involves paying due respect not only to one's living 
parents, but also to the deceased and to remote ancestors' (Bi and D' Agostino 2004, 
451-467; Hsieh 1968, 179). 
The importance of this argument about the links between filial piety and ancestor 
worship/piety is that filial piety should not be seen as a modem or developed aspect of 
ancestor worship. Rather it should be seen as a correlate of ancestor worship - one 
could not exist without the other. The overwhelming empirical evidence such as that 
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provided by archaeology provides mostly a religious view of filial piety as an action 
concerned with the dead (ancestors). However, just because there is empirical 
evidence of the religious aspect of filial piety, this should not preclude us from 
considering the social aspect, for the religious aspect is after all the one area where 
relics are expected to be the most abundant - it being difficult to imagine these time 
consuming artifacts being part of everyday Neolithic or ancient Chinese life. 
5:2 The social connection 
From ancient times in China filial piety has been understood to be a natural basis for 
all social behaviour. 'And the most biological rooted of all human institutions - the 
family- was likewise to be considered to be a model for all human social 
organization, including government' (Jochim 1986, 161). From a functional 
perspective, the purpose of ancestor worship is social harmony and maintenance of 
the family centered social structure. Underpinning this interpretation is the classical 
concept of yang sheng song si, (supporting the living and bidding farewell to the 
dead), a concept that has been effective down to the present in summarizing the 
essence of filial piety (Yang, 1967, 45). 'If a Chinese died before his father, the father 
beat the coffin- symbolically punishing the son for unfilially having abandoned his 
duties of caring for his parents in this world and the next.' Lloyd Eastman (1988, 15) 
points out in this quote that although this ritual act is only a small part of the funeral 
ceremonies, it focuses on the emphasis of family in ways that are much different from 
those in the contemporary West. From a strategic and social point of view, ancestor 
worship was a means of maintaining filial piety as the cornerstone of the ancestor-
family-kinship system. The practice of ancestor worship, and especially its social 
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corollary of filial piety, 'laid stress on precisely those aspects of the moral equipment 
of the family that tended toward unity and good order' (Baker 1979, 104). 
The large family with several children has not been the norm among the Chinese- it 
is a myth. The large, joint, multi-generational family with several married sons all 
living within one walled abode is an ideal exception (Fairbank 1992, 21). Due to 
environmental and economic conditions, and the social mores which abandoned 
primogeniture, the average peasant family was limited to four, five, or six people in 
total (Fairbank 1992, 21). But the 'actual' family was not where the values for family 
originated -it was in the ideal family. Patricia Ebrey (1984, 200-223) informs us the 
Chinese family throughout its history has been enormously influenced by three ideas 
- ideas, I would argue, that are easily associated with ancestor worship - filial piety, 
patriarchy, and patrilineality. 'Marriage,' for example, 'was not an affair forged 
through instinctive desire alone but was based also on the higher concept of creating 
new life or lives so as to prolong those of one's ancestors, including ones parents' 
(Hsieh 1968, 177). Highlighting the association between family practices and ancestor 
worship, and recalling that this thesis argues for a cultural understanding, it is also 
noteworthy that Ebrey sees 'the relative high level of standardization of family 
practices in China across regions, classes, and dialect groups' as an 'intriguing 
historical contrast between China and the West'. Furthermore, she maintains that: 
The Chinese family had little reason to change because it was nearly perfectly 
constructed of reinforcing strands: ethics, property law, marriage practices, concepts 
of descent and gender differentiation, even criminal law all served to strengthen fixed 
principles of family behavior. (Ebrey 1990, 199-200) 
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As everyone's parents, and by inference also his ancestors, are the source of life, this 
fundamental blood relationship legally as well as morally dictates the imperative rule 
that one owes certain unavoidable obligations to his parents (Hsieh 1968, 175). 
This 'perfectly constructed social entity,' the Chinese family and the family system, is 
'among the oldest and most persistent social phenomena in the world. China has been 
a stronghold of the family system and has derived both strength and inertia from it' 
(Fairbank 1992, 18). In response to Fairbanks statement about the Chinese family, 
Ebrey, I would suggest, has already addressed Fairbank's charge of inertia19 by 
asserting that it had no need to change because it was already 'perfect'. But it is his 
other claim that China had derived strength from the family system that I now want to 
briefly address, using some of Fairbank's own words. 
Referring to the Chinese farming people (in contrast to the West) Fairbank thought 
that it was 'amazing' that they could 'maintain a highly civilized life' under the 
relatively poor conditions available to them throughout much of their history. He 
asserts that it is the family oriented social system that 'carried the individuals of each 
family through the phases and vicissitudes of human existence according to deeply 
ingrained patterns of behavior' (Fairbank 1992, 18). As is argued throughout, it is the 
cultural significant, or the cultural strategy of ancestor worship and filial piety, and its 
function of promoting harmony, stability, and continuity that Fairbank infers when he 
talks about 'deeply ingrained patterns of behavior'. This focus on the ancestor-family-
kinship system, where 'the individual exists by virtue of his descendents, and where 
his ancestors exist only though him' (Baker 1979, 71), and where the importance of 
19 This charge of inertia is addressed in more detail in the final chapter. 
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reciprocity and mutual responsibility between family members, (especially the father 
and son relationship) was clearly discemable, is another cultural distinction par 
excellence. Where Chinese culture is more organic and emphasizes community, 
Western culture is atomistic and emphasises individualism. 
5:3 The religious connection 
The Chinese family, besides being a social, political, and economic unit, was also a 
religious institution. This religiosity, reinforced by the rituals of ancestor worship, 
extolled the values of familism. 'The Chinese imperial state similarly acquired a 
sacred and inviolate character as a result of the diffused nature of the popular religion' 
(Eastman 1988, 57). 
Religion in China 'borrowed much from the religious product of filiality: ancestor 
worship. Even when we call ancestor worship a religion, the fact remains that its 
distinctive characteristic is the element of filial piety, an element lacking in every 
other form of religion' (Addison 1924, 502). 'As we have seen, the genesis of popular 
gods in China owed much to the ancestral cult' (Jochim 1986, 162). As mentioned 
above, the earliest appearance of the word filial piety is on a bronze vessel of the 
Shang or early Zhou era. Most of these early inscriptions indicated filial piety towards 
parents or kin who had died. It is reasonable to judge that these vessels and their 
markings of filial piety ' ( xiao) originally referred to a religious act, a form of pious 
commemoration to one's ancestors' (Holzman 1998, 186). What was most important 
in Chinese culture was the social realm, and because what is most important or most 
serious may be considered the subject of a (sociological) view of religion, the social 
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realm in China may be viewed from a religious perspective, and indeed it often has 
been. K. C. Yang (1967, 296) viewed ancestor worship in the family as having 'all the 
primary qualities ofreligion diffused into [its] institutional structure.' Ancestor 
worship as the religious system was naturally concerned with continuity of the family 
and it focused on those moral aspects that led to continuity, unity and good order 
(Baker 1979, 104). 
Benjamin Schwartz (1985, 31), below, provides a clear overview not only of how the 
religious and the social are connected, but also the connections between the political 
and the wider worldview. 
[The] powerful model of social order which we find in ancestor worship may have 
profoundly coloured the entire "elite cultural" religious views of both the socio-
political and cosmic orders. Within the family, the kin members both here and in the 
world beyond are held together in a network of role relationships ideally governed by 
the spirit of peace, harmony and ritual decorum. Here the value of order is central. As 
a metaphor for the cosmos, it suggests a world of entities and energies held together 
in familial harmony under the authority of the high god. As a model for the socio-
political order, it projects the picture of an immanent order based on networks of 
clearly defined roles and statuses and ideally held together by a system of sacred 
ritual. 
The role of religion (as such) in understanding China and in China's history is much 
misunderstood. If we were to heed the advice of many of the early Western 
commentators, especially some of the early sinologists who were also Christian 
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missionaries, we might conclude that China was not really religious, nor that it could 
effectively be understood in a religious sense. For them 
China [was] primarily a country of heathen who lacked the light of God and must be 
rescued from eternal damnation. Consequently even the best minds ... and Confucius 
himself were necessarily consigned to a level of inferiority as compared with 
Europeans, while the masses where exposed to what the American missionary Wells 
Williams described as 'a kind and degree of moral degradation of which an excessive 
statement can scarcely be made, or an adequate conception hardly be formed. 
(Dawson 1967, 134) 
However, he was wrong and an 'adequate conception' could be formed. As K.C. 
Yang so emphatically points out, 'the undervaluation of the place of religion in 
Chinese society did not find much support from reality.' Temples, shrines, and altars 
are ubiquitous in China, and, 'every traditional Chinese home was a religious shrine, 
for it contained spirit tablets of the ancestors, and pictures and idols of many 
household deities' (Yang 1967, 16). Of crucial importance and significance to 
Chinese (religious) family life and Chinese culture was the worship of ancestors, a 
fact indicated by the almost universal keeping of family altars. This public and private 
display of worship stood as 'a visible indication of the strong and pervasive influence 
of religion in Chinese society, for they stood as symbols of social reality' (Yang 1967, 
16). 
To be sure, this was not the same type of religion to be found in the West where the 
object of worship was a supreme, originating, and creative God. However it may still 
be compared to Western religion in that 
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Filial piety in China came to be seen as having absolute value and that the worship of 
one's parents can be compared to the worship of God in the West. For the Chinese, 
their only creators are their parents and ancestors. Love for God in the West is 
replicated by filial piety for parents in China. (Holzman 1998, 198) 
Although this comparison is both of a religious and a philosophical nature, it also 
contains a wider cultural problem for Western interpreters: the Chinese from very 
ancient times, held filial piety in a very lofty position and 'treated it as something one 
might almost call an absolute, metaphysical entity' (Holzman 1998, 198). Baker 
(1979, 103) sees filial piety and ancestor worship as two distinct phenomena. 
However, he also sees them combined with 'other religious features' and with other 
'powerful urges to conformity in family and state', as 'what was meant by those 
people who have spoken of "Confucianism". Here he is, I venture to claim, referring 
to Confucianism as the Chinese cultural meta-narrative, a position this thesis aims to 
change. Patricia Ebrey (1984, 200) sees filial piety as an ethical concern, and with this 
we could place it either with religion or philosophy. However the relationship 
between religion, filial piety, and the social realm is construed, it has always in some 
manner been central in Chinese culture and was very seldom if ever called into 
question. As Wolf (1974, 131) reminds us, 'the most important point to be made 
about Chinese religion is that it mirrors the social landscape of its adherents'. Given 
that scenario, filial piety is most definitely a religious practice, but it must always be 
considered with its connections and correlates, the family, kin, ancestors, the other 
wider realms. 
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Where ancestor worship laid stress on generation, with the ancestor superior to the 
descendent, filial piety required a similar order of precedence in the family and in the 
wider social realm. From a religious view which concerns itself with the social realm, 
ancestor worship gives primacy to the family-kinship group as a paradigm of social 
order. This social order transcends 'the world of the living, and the numinous world of 
the dead may indeed enormously reinforce the sense of the "ontic" reality of role and 
status and of the order in which they are embedded' (Schwartz 1985, 22). 
Although I have been speaking about Chinese religion as though it were a synonym 
for Chinese ancestor worship, I am speaking about it in one sense only, and that is in 
the sociological sense where it is just concerned with what is the most serious and 
important issues in life. In another more conventional sense, there are of course many 
variants in Chinese religion. 
The Chinese tolerated a range of religious belief and practice which is staggering in 
its breadth. Ancestor worship [incorporating filial piety] may well have been the most 
systematically viewed, was probably the most ancient, and was certainly the most 
widely practiced religious element, but it existed side by side with many other beliefs. 
(Baker 1979, 106) 
The traditional three religions of China are Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism. It 
is well known filial piety was very important to Confucianism as is made clear above 
and below. However, Buddhism went to considerable lengths to incorporate 
Confucian ethics into its canon in order to have a widespread appeal and a special 
Buddhist doctrine of filial piety was created and extended, according to Ch'en, in the 
following three ways: 
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First, by pointing out the numerous sutras in the Buddhist canon which stress filial 
piety; second, by forging a body of apocryphal literature which emphasizes piety as 
its central theme; and third, by contending that the Buddhist concept of filial piety 
was superior to that of the Confucians in that it aimed at universal salvation (this 
would include all the previous ancestors in different forms), while the Confucian 
piety was limited to just one family. (Ch'en 1973, 18) 
To enhance their appeal, Buddhists argued for a deeper understanding of filial piety 
and deemed that a person who became a monk or nun could accumulate merit for his 
or her ancestors. The Buddhist literati also published a large number of treatises 
which argued for the consistency of Buddhist and Confucian ideas of filial piety (Yao 
2000, 234). 
Central to the Daoists efforts in the process of transformation was the incorporation of 
Confucian ethics, especially ethics and filial piety, into Daoist religious doctrines 
(Yao 2000, 230). 'Daoism learnt from Buddhism how to integrate filial piety into its 
teachings' although 'as a religious Daoist concept, xiao is ultimately concerned with 
universal salvation' (Chan 2004, 6). For example, He Hong composed his book 
Baopuzi or The Master who has Embraced Simplicity in two parts: the inner chapters 
deal with alchemy, immortal elixirs, methods of prolonging life and driving away 
evil, while the outer chapters deal with social and family affairs based on Confucian 
ethics. He maintained that the Daoist cultivation of immortality must be based on the 
virtues of loyalty, filial piety, humaneness and faithfulness (Yao 2000, 231). Wang 
Daoyuan, at the beginning of the Ming dynasty, for example, played an important role 
in the integration of Neo-Confucian doctrine and Daoist practice (Yao 2000, 232), 
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incorporating Neo-Confucian social ethics into Daoist doctrines and arguing that the 
Five Constant Virtues (humaneness, righteousness, ritual/propriety, wisdom and 
faithfulness) were the fundamental way of the world, and that loyalty and filial piety 
were the path to Daoist truth (Qing 1993, Vol.3, 500-502). 
Baker (1979, 105) provides an example of the difference between the philosophical 
and the religious approach to filial piety when he presents the oft quoted text by 
Xunzi, noting that 'the intellectuals of his tfme were not unaware of the value of 
religion in social control, while cynically placing themselves above it.' 
If people pray for rain and it rains, how is that? I would say: Nothing in particular. 
Just as when people do not pray for rain, it also rains. When people try to save the sun 
and moon from being swallowed up [in eclipse], or when they pray for rain in a 
drought, or when they decide an important affair only after divination - this is not 
because they think in this way they will get what they see, but only to add a touch of 
ritual to it. Hence the gentleman takes it as a matter of ritual, whereas the common 
man thinks it is supernatural. He who takes it as a matter of ritual will suffer no harm; 
he who thinks it is supernatural will suffer harm. (Xunzi: 17, Concerning Heaven, in 
De Bary 1965, 103) 
There has been throughout Chinese history, an awareness of the social impact and 
indeed the necessity for ancestor worship as a cultural strategy by the educated elite. 
For them it was more a rational (logical and philosophical) factor, rather than a 
religious factor, and it is to a philosophical view as articulated by the Classics, as 
opposed to a religious view, of the social importance of ancestor worship, that I now 
tum. 
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5:4 The Classical connection 
As noted above, other religions also stressed the importance of the family, although 
not to the degree of the Chinese, yet it is equally interesting that in Western 
philosophy the family was often neglected (Solomon 1993, 15). 
Bourgeois ideology expended so much of its attention on abstract universals that it 
virtually forgot about the social and sexual bases of everyday life. If there is a single 
omission that should shock us in its persistence, it is the almost total absence of 
explicit awareness of the family and the local community in an ideology self-
consciously concerned with everyday human life and happiness. In Kant, for 
example, the entire fabric of human morality and practical reason could be described 
without a single analysis of interpersonal relationships. (Solomon 1993, 16) 
However this was definitely not the case when it came to Chinese philosophy and the 
Chinese Classics. The Confucian canon and its teachings regarding filial piety have 
been 'for four thousand years [in] the most important place in Chinese ethics and also 
in the Chinese cultural tradition as a whole' (Hsieh 1968, 167-170). However, these 
ethics did not rely on systems of theory, nor even on language or words, 'but in 
energetic striving for practice20' (Hsieh 1968, 169). 
The Classical understanding of filial piety cannot be understood without reference to 
filial piety in its social, religious, symbolic and psychological categories. It is already 
made clear that filial piety was an absolute, critical, and central concept in Chinese 
20 My emphasis - noting the priority of practice in Chinese thought, and the priority of practice as a 
theory for this thesis regarding the understanding of Chinese culture - an interesting juxtaposition. 
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culture. Filial piety, an inadequate but most common translation for xiao, and its 
relationship aspects between father and son, transcended the family sphere to become 
an extremely influential concept in other social relationships, and also in other non-
social relationships including the natural and cosmological world. 
Filial piety is undoubtedly important in Chinese culture, and Confucianism has 
always adopted a positive attitude towards filial piety. 'This does not mean however 
that its advocacy of filial piety is straightforward and unproblematic,' for it has 
always been 'open to interpretation ... and competing interests' (Chan 2004, 3-4). The 
role of filial piety, xiao, in Confucius' and Mencius' philosophies (which are not, I 
argue, correlates of Chinese culture) is not as important as benevolence (ren), 
although it is an important factor within it. Where Mencius does mention it he does 
not condemn it, mostly finding praise for it and finally fitting it into in his system as a 
first step towards universal love. 'Mencius is known in later tradition for his defence 
of filial piety against Yang Chu, the individualist, and Mo Tzu, the exponent of 
universal love' (De Bary 1965, 97). By making a special point of it, he gave added 
importance to filial piety among the Confucian virtues. Daoists are less certain in their 
philosophical position toward filial piety. Sometimes, as in the Zhuangzi, there are 
criticisms of filial piety, whereas in other parts it is considered as 'fundamental to 
human psychology' (Holzman 1998, 189). It is mentioned or referred to in many of 
the Chinese classical (philosophical) works, and it 'forms the subject of the Classic of 
Filial Piety, 21 a very early work which came to form part of the Confucian canon. In 
this text filial piety is described as 'the basis for cosmic and human activity' with 
21 I will say more about this book and its importance in the section below. 
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'Heaven, Earth, and man all following filial piety in their actions and movements' 
(Holzman 1998, 192). 
Many Western commentators see filial piety as having an ethical basis. For Patricia 
Ebrey filial piety evokes 'the set of ethical ideas, generally associated with 
Confucianism, which came to provide an explicit ideology of the proper basis for 
family life.' Here she is referring to the notion that each person has a station and 
corresponding role in the social structure and is morally bound to fulfill the role 
obligations of that position. Ebrey also implies that these moral obligations had a 
somewhat immoral role in that they were merely a social means for the ruling elite to 
control the people. This is the general position taken by many sinologists, though I 
would argue a flawed position of a discourse surrounding Confucianism as an elitist 
tool. I shall comment on this later as it is here a distraction, but it is sufficient to say 
that this discourse tends to undermine the very important position of filial piety in 
Chinese culture. 
Holzman (1998, 188-9) also sees the ethical basis of filial piety when he writes that 
'filial piety is exalted as the root of all virtue'. Although he also sees (correctly) that 
the focus is on filial piety towards the emperor and the official hierarchy, he also 
makes it clear that an equal emphasis is on filial piety in the family. 
5:5 The political connection 
Much of what has been written about the social, religious and philosophical aspects of 
filial piety tend to inevitably lead to some kind of political interest. Reaching into 
other domains or realms, the social concept of filial piety and its emphasis on family 
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sometimes comes into conflict with the political structure and its relationship with the 
social structure, and loyalty to the monarch or leader comes into question. 'The 
Classic of Filial Piety was written to promote filial piety and to coordinate filial piety 
and loyalty in case of conflict' (Yin 2004, 145). 
The Classic of Filial Piety is a Confucian text meant to make clear the concept of 
filial piety. It is a short manuscript and its date and authorship is unclear although it 
seems likely to be of the Han period. The book was part of the Seven Classics in the 
Han Dynasty and one of the Thirteen Classics in the Song dynasty. In the Classic of 
Filial Piety the concept of filial piety was reworked into a single and practical 
doctrine where the social and political obligations coincide and work together with the 
important practice of ancestor worship. 
The book begins by saying that 
Filial piety is the root of all virtues, and from which all teaching comes ... The 
body, the hair and the skin are received from our parents, and we do not injure 
practice of the Way, so as to make our name famous in future generation and 
glorify our parents, this is the end of filial piety. Filial piety begins with the 
serving of our parents, continues with the serving of our ruler, and is completed 
with the establishment of our own character. (Yin 2004, 146) 
The purpose of filial piety is ultimately human success and prosperity. The Chinese 
worldview has the ancestor-descendent metaphor extended by way of the father-son 
metaphor to include the larger community, and even the universe. Chinese political 
life, as a consequence of this extension, plays a most significant part in Chinese 
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culture. This cultural strategy gave value to 'age over youth, for the past over the 
present, for established authority over innovation' and in doing so it has 'provided one 
of the great historic answers to the problem of social stability. It has been the most 
successful of all systems of conservatism' (Fairbank 1992, 53). 
Ignoring for the moment Fairbank's charges of anti-innovation and conservatism, he 
does, though, recognize the connection of the psychology of filial piety with the 
overall cultural imperatives and with the political realm. Another eminent historian 
and sinologist, Jacques Gemet (1982, 27), agrees but goes further when he proposes 
that a particular and exceptional quality of Chinese culture is that over its extensive 
history it developed 'complex forms of political organization which were the most 
highly perfected in the history of human societies.' Gemet found it 'astonishing and 
remarkable' that when compared to Europe in size, history, and diversity the Chinese 
were able to maintain a stable and unified society, and a continuous culture. Charles 
Hucker (1973, 552) writes in a similar vein: 
Among the arts in which the Chinese are habitually considered to have eminent 
success, government has always ranked very high. To be sure, China's troubles 
during the past century ... have weakened the awed admiration with which outsiders 
were once accustomed to regard the Chinese state, ... on balance, in the long 
perspective of history, Chinese government has served China's national needs 
remarkably well ... No one would dare to generalize about a European state system or 
even a western state system enduring from pre-Christian times to the present. 
These comparisons with Europe and therefore Western culture are important when we 
consider the success of these cultural strategies such as filial piety, and their 
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relationship with ancestor worship, as they highlight the socio-political focus of 
Chinese culture, and the enduring success of this focus on the social and the political. 
However, although Chinese society is presented here as being historically 'dominated 
by state power. . .it would be an error' Fairbank writes, 'to imagine ancient China as 
an embryonic nation-state' and to apply standards and structures associated with 
modem socio-political structures to the Chinese model. Furthermore, he asserts, 'we 
would do better to apply the idea of culturalism and see ancient China as a complete 
civilization comparable to Western Christendom, within which nation-states like 
France and England became political sub-units that shared their common European 
culture.' Gemet (1982, 28) developed this political dominance theme further by 
highlighting the importance of the political sphere in Chinese culture and its 
supremacy over the other major spheres, the military, religious and economic, which 
so often dominate most other cultures. He sees this as a particularly important cultural 
characteristic. Due the dominance of the political function, 'economic activity could 
not attain in China, any more than religious or military activities, the same degree of 
autonomy or specificity as in other civilizations.' 
However, while it is vitally important to recognize the 'dominance of the political 
function' which Gemet and others put forward, it should not be equated with some 
form of 'banal despotism' as is most often the claim. It is erroneous to see in the 
state's regulations of family inspired morals, 'only a pretext, a sort of alibi for a 
tyrannical regime; it is in fact the expression of a privileged mode of political action 
which has lasted down to our day' (Gemet 1982, 29). It seems most likely that 'most 
emperors and officials seemed to have genuinely shared the popular belief in a 
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transcendental realm whose inhabitants could affect the affairs of mortals' (Eastman 
1988, 58), although it is also most likely that state religious rites 'also served the very 
practical function of helping to maintain peace, order, and obedience among the 
common people.' 
Keeping in mind the cultural, political, and social differences between traditional 
China and modernity as it is juxtaposed with the West, any outdated leap to judgment 
concerning how we might think of this political dominance should avoid modem 
ideas of totalitarianism and despotism. The more efficacious paradigm is perhaps that 
proposed by 'Etienne Balaz (1964), who called it a government by "officialism"' 
(Fairbank 1992, 45). These officials or civil servants were men who were selected by 
examination which 'tested their grasp of classical and historical literature ... The 
longevity and the general conservation of the traditional state system are due 
primarily to its domination by such men' (Rucker 1973, 561-2). The state has always 
been the central power in Chinese society and ethical behavior and ritual have always 
been central to any consideration of good governance in China. In fact, according to 
Gemet (1982, 81), the sovereign did not in practice (with some notable exceptions) 
have this 'arbitrary power of command; rather he embodied the power of setting 
things in order and prompting action'. 
We might better understand this position by going back and having a closer look at 
how filial piety normatively engaged with political power. For a start, 'The duty of a 
man was first to his parents and only second to the state' (Baker 1979, 79). 
He was absolved from responsibility for reporting crimes committed by the father, 
except in the case of treason. As an official, even one holding a lofty position such as 
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prime-minister, he was expected to mourn the death of a parent, and often this meant 
ceasing duties for lengthy periods, often up to a year, or sometimes two or three. This 
statutory time of mourning varied throughout Chinese imperial history both in time 
and in application. 
Until very recently the hierarchical values inherent within the (ideal) Chinese family 
have been transferred to the state en masse - the state being an expanded version of 
the family. Unlike the West and its political values, it was the family and not the 
individual that was the locus of political life in the social realm. 'The filial piety and 
obedience inculcated in family life were the training ground for loyalty to the ruler 
and obedience to the constituted authority in the state' (Fairbank 1992, 18) 
The correlation between the ethical norms of the family and the polity is clear. John 
C. H. Wu (1968, 220) understands this correlation between ethics and governance 
when he writes: 
If you cultivate your virtues so that harmony reigns in your own person, your 
goodness will radiate its influence around the fireside so that harmony will reign in 
the family. If one family is perfectly harmonious, it will gradually but surely 
influence other families. If all families are perfected, the state will enjoy peace and 
harmony. 
The Book of Rites (X: 45) accentuated this connection: 
As the people are taught filial piety and brotherly love at home, with reverence 
toward the elder and diligent care for the aged in the community, they constitute the 
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way of a king; and it is along this line that states as well as families will become 
peaceful. (Hsieh 1968, 182) 
Here the family is considered as the foundation of society. 'In the Analects (2: 21) 
when Confucius was asked why he did not take part in government, he replied by 
repeating a passage from the Book of Documents, "Simply by being a good son and 
friendly to his brothers a man can exert an influence upon government!"' (Tu 1990, 
117). The rationale of this statement is expressed in the Book of Rites: The Principles 
of Sacrifice (Sommer 1995, 35): 'when loyal ministers serve their sovereign and filial 
children serve their parents, they act from the same fundamental basis. Here the 
values of family and kinship, such as harmony and stability, are understood as being 
automatically transferred to the agency of government. The duty of the government, 
as is the duty of the father (and before that, the ancestor), is to provide material and 
security for the people, and as stated at the beginning of this chapter, the purpose of 
filial piety is human success and prosperity. 
This claim of Confucius that filial piety in the family is politically efficacious must be 
seen in the Confucian framework of the concept cheng in regards to politics (Tu 1990, 
116). 'Cheng has the meaning of something's being truly or really the case and is 
contrasted with wei, meaning "false appearance"' (Shun 2003, 37). In the Confucian 
canon, cheng is an ideal state in which one fully embodies Confucian virtues, and 
only when one is or has cheng will one have the transformative and nourishing effect 
on others that provides the ideal basis for government (Shun 2003, 38). The ideal of 
cheng, when practised in the family becomes fully embedded into a person's actions 
and thoughts, and it is then transferred to the wider political realm. It is used in early 
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Confucian texts, including Mengzi, Xunzi, DOJCue, and in the Zhongyong where cheng 
is presented as the basis of social and political order. As Xunzi explains in his 
chapters on political science, economics and ritual, the ruler may bring about order 
and prosperity in the state on the basis of proper moral principles. Xunzi, like many 
scholars throughout Chinese history and especially during his times, often referred 
back to 'the golden ages of the past' and the reigns of the sage rulers Yao, Shun, Yu, 
and the Shang and Zhou kings. However he also advocated the examples of 
more recent rulers of virtue, who lived in the less distant past and whose ways are 
therefore easier to learn about and to practice. He maintained that although political 
and social conditions inevitably change, human nature and basic moral principle did 
not, and therefore the principles that were correct and brought order in the past will 
do so again. (Watson 1964, 5-6) 
Here rulers are supposed to govern by moral leadership and exemplary teaching rather 
than by force. Law and punishment are the minimum requirements for order, but 
social harmony can only be attained by virtue, which is achieved through ritual 
performance. To perform ritual is to take part in a communal act to promote ritual 
understanding. Whether Confucian, or a condition of Chinese culture, as I would 
argue, this way of thinking has a social force which holds the ruler to govern in a 
moral manner as the father may rule or govern the household. One of the fundamental 
Confucian values that ensure the integrity of ritual performance is filial piety. 
Confucius believed that filial piety was the first step toward moral excellence. Filial 
piety does not demand unconditional submissiveness to parental authority; rather it 
demands recognition of and reverence for our source of life. 
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From the very beginning of Chinese history, the social and political structure in China 
may be seen as humanistic, beginning with the family, the basic unit in the socio-
political system. It was the duty of government to take care of the people, this being 
an extended version of the family. Filial piety in the family, extended to the larger 
socio-political system, became the 'mandate of heaven'. This explicit consent to 
rebellion was a fundamental characteristic of the Chinese political realm, emphasizing 
that political authority was dependent on moral conformity to the standards of Ii by 
the observance of both filial piety and ancestor worship. An example of this ideal 
characteristic may be found in the Xunzi - The Regulations of a King: 
One starts with general categories and moves to particular ones; one starts 
with unity and moves to plurality. What begins must end; what ends must begin 
again; and so the cycle repeats itself without interruption. Abandon this principle, and 
the empire will fall into decay. Heaven and earth are the beginning of life, ritual 
practices [of family and ancestors - filial piety and ancestor worship] are the 
beginning of order ... 
The correct relationship between ruler and subject, father and son, elder and younger 
brother, and husband and wife begin and are carried through to the end, end and begin 
again. They share the order of heaven and earth, they last for ten thousand 
generations. They are what is called the great foundation. The rules that govern 
mourning and sacrificial rites and the ceremonies of the court and the armies are 
based upon this single foundation. 
[A true king's] benevolence is the loftiest in the world, his righteousness is the 
loftiest in the world, his authority is the loftiest in the world. Since he is the most 
benevolent, the most righteous and has the most authority, there is no-one to oppose 
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him and he retains the Mandate of Heaven. Should he not be filial and honour and 
worship his parents and ancestors - there is no guarantee! 
(Xunzi, 41, 44-45, quoted in Watson 1964) 
5:6 Conclusion 
The conceptual delineations, or at least the clarity of these delineations between 
government and politics, filial piety, family, kin and ancestors, are now positively 
indistinct and blurred. They are delineations only because they are conceptual -
reality is that they all belong to a unified and organic whole. The reality of Chinese 
culture, as it is to be found in Chinese history, is that by the end of the Neolithic era, 
it was both homogenous and relatively organized. As the socio-political system 
gradually took shape during the Three Dynasties of the Bronze Age, this fundamental 
relationship between the ancestor-descendent, the son-father, and ruled-ruler gained 
wider acceptance. 'It functioned as the capstone of the social structure, the high 
priesthood of the ancestor cult, the arbiter of punishments, and the leader in public 
works, war, and literature' (Fairbank 1992, 44). Up until the Communist Revolution 
this socially oriented and ancestral based political system remained intact, and recent 
studies reveal that 'familism, the core traditional value, has not just been surviving but 
has also been authentically lived by urban and highly educated young Chinese' 
(Chang 2006, 8), and no doubt their rural counterparts. No European state could 
compare with the political accomplishments of China. 'By comparison, European 
dynasties were provincial potentates ... while China had long been a great centralized 
empire governed by a uniform administrative system' (Fairbank 1992, 45). 
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The purpose of this chapter is to reinforce and re-emphasize connections. Filial piety 
confirms the individual as the nexus in the web of significants that is Chinese culture. 
The connections outlined above suggest a unified and dynamic world (view) - a 
worldview not requiring a creator God. Its biological connections allow 
communication across space and time. Analogically, as a cultural connection, it 
connects the biological with the social and the political. 
Filial piety 'involves what is markedly Chinese' (Isay 2005, 441). Filial piety, 'the 
homage of children rendered to their parents, is at the very heart of Chinese culture' 
(Holzman 1998, 199). Therefore, as filial piety is a cultural correlate of ancestor 
worship, each depending on the other for conceptual existence, ancestor worship may 
also be seen as what is 'markedly Chinese' and 'at the very heart of Chinese culture'. 
Both ancestor worship and filial piety are concerned with the orderly and harmonious 
operation of the family and by extension to the ruler and the state. Both imply an 
awareness and knowledge of the ancestors which in tum provide the important values 
to be found within Chinese culture with ancestral/parental worship the strategic 
outcome and family continuity within the harmonious and ordered socio-political 
realm the (achieved) goal. Ancestor worship and filial piety stressed those aspects of 
the family that led to unity, order, continuity and survival of the ancestors and the 
present generation as future ancestors - a continuing and flourishing Chinese society. 
Filial piety does not demand unconditional submissiveness to parental authority; 
rather it demands recognition of and reverence for the source of life - parents and 
their parents and so on: their ancestors. The purpose of filial piety is human success 
and prosperity. The Chinese extend the family metaphor to include the larger 
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community, and even the universe. Chinese political and social life plays a most 
significant part in Chinese culture and is one of the easily recognized strands in the 
webs of significance. 
'The ancient value of filial piety presents a force with its own logical pattern, 
meaningfully linking the context of human life. It is furthermore relevant to 
contemporary discussions of culture' (lsay 2005, 452). Filial piety (and ancestor 
worship) has over the past century or more endured in a situation where there have 
been vast changes to all aspects of Chinese society, yet 'the traditional sociocultural 
traits [have] held on with a remarkable tenacity.' Since the 1930s, the challenge to 
familism [and to those practices and ideals which support it], has grown, but even 
today, after another fifty years of political revolution and economic development, the 
traditional sociocultural traits endure in all areas of Chinese life' (Eastman 1988, 
242). 
Although some Chinese intellectuals during the May Fourth movement condemned 
filial piety as "the source of all evil" - having the effect of turning "China into a big 
factory for the production of obedient subjects" - one of its key figures, Hu Shih, in a 
speech given in Taiwan in 1954, reversed that extreme iconoclastic attitude toward 
Chinese classics, and promoted the study of Xiaojing specifically. (Chan 2004, 2) 
The connections between the social, religious, philosophical, and biological realms 
within Chinese culture are clear. The importance of the social realm in Chinese 
culture is unambiguous, as are the importance of the family in Chinese society, the 
central role of filial piety in the family, and its influence extending to the wider social 
world. 
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In its more extended meanings, [filial piety] provided ideological support for social 
and political inequalities of many sorts, motivating respect for authority of village 
elders, landlords, official, and the emperor. In the now somewhat dated language of 
sociology, filial piety was functional, not dysfunctional. It worked. (Ebrey 2004, 122) 
Filial piety, as that nexus where all those important connections meet, has a prominent 
and irreducible correlation with ancestor worship. 'Whether filial piety is seen as the 
essence of [Chinese] culture or a burden of the past, it remains integral to the Chinese 
heart-mind' (Chan 2004, 2). 
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Chapter6 
Two Concepts of Ritual and Two Understandings of Li 
Ritual has always been one of the descriptors commonly used in relation to Chinese 
culture and to Chinese history. Chinese society, according to Jochim, (1986, 188), 
'brings to mind an image of large-scale ceremony.' However why ritual has been so 
important is not made so clear and unambiguous, and often when an attempt is made 
to explain the importance of ritual, the explanation lacks the depth required for a 
better understanding of Chinese culture. The meaning we seek of culture is deep, 
complex, and important (significant) and according to Xunzi, so is the meaning of 
ritual. 
The meaning of ritual is deep indeed. He who tries to enter it with a kind of 
perception that distinguishes hard and white, same and different, will drown there. 
The meaning of ritual is great indeed. He who tries to enter it with the uncouth and 
inane theories of system makers will perish there. The meaning of ritual is lofty 
indeed. He who tries to with the violent and arrogant ways of those who despise 
common customs and consider themselves to be above other men will meet his 
downfall. (A Discussion of Rites in Watson 1964, 94) 
Through the following analysis of ritual and li, this chapter will not only continue to 
show the significance of the ancestors as a suitable paradigm for understanding 
Chinese culture, it will also be a confluence of a number of vital concepts and ideas. 
Besides showing the links between ritual and Chinese culture, it will also show the 
correlations between ritual and li; ritual as communication and culture as 
communication; and culture understood symbolically as ritual, and ritual 
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communication. Here the links between the practice of Chinese ancestor worship, 
ritual, and Chinese culture are made clear. 
In order to expose the importance of ritual in Chinese culture and to show its co-
relationship with a concern for the ancestors, I will engage the topic in four different, 
but connected, ways. That is: ritual as an aspect of Chinese culture; ritual and its 
Chinese translation as li; li - expanded and connected in its cultural, cosmic and 
metaphysical modes; and ritual as communication - cultural communication. 
6:1 Ritual: As an aspect of Chinese culture 
Joseph P. McDermott in his State and Court Ritual in China (1999) is correct in 
noting that 'ritual has been a central concern of Chinese culture for at least four 
thousand years'. He sees it as a 'self-defining activity of rulers and families alike'; as 
a 'principle of the cosmos'; and 'more than just rites of passage'. However, while he 
rues the lack of scholarly attention to its 'impact on the organized activities of the 
Chinese state' (McDermott 1999, 1), his text exemplifies a continuing discourse, 
which fails to acknowledge fully the impact and the place of ritual in China. This 
discourse emphasises the place of ritual as a political concern and fails to note the 
corresponding impact on the entire culture. More than a political concern however, 
rituals, especially those associated with ancestor worship, have been central to 
'Chinese culture, and many opinions have been expressed on them by Chinese 
thinkers over the centuries' (Yang, C. K. 1967, 44). The importance of ritual to 
culture and social structure can hardly be exaggerated. As James Watson aptly 
remarks, 'If anything is central to the creation and maintenance of a unified Chinese 
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culture, it is the standardization of ritual.' The underlying question of this chapter is 
'why was ritual so important?' 
Ritual has been an important aspect of Chinese culture from ancient times. It plays a 
vital role in Chinese culture as a result of the culture specific relationships between 
the living and the dead, from worldview to human and social values and from these 
values to the means and ways of achieving those values. The meaning of ritual has 
connotations of both historical and cultural continuity and also of lack of change (a 
common charge made towards China), and of an elitist strategy of somehow 
maintaining the status quo. Like all good 'myths', there is a seed of truth in these 
misunderstandings of ritual. However it is in its wider semantic meanings, explored 
below, where it becomes most important for an understanding of Chinese culture. 
The most common exposition of ritual in Chinese history and culture is encompassed 
within the political discourse. It concerns its relationship with politics and its ritualist 
approach to government (lizhi). The lizhi sentiment is exemplified in the remarks 
below by John K. Fairbank (1992, 63): 
Han thought as recorded in classical writings built upon the concept of mankind as 
part of nature and upon the special relationship between the ruler and his ancestors, 
concepts that were already important in Shang thought a millennium earlier ... Han 
rulers' daily regimen of ceremonies and rites required the guidance of learned men at 
court .... The Han retained the Mandate of Heaven by an imperial cult of ritual 
observances, beginning with the Liu family ancestors but especially devoted to 
Heaven. Its attendant cosmology tied together all the phenomena of human 
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experience and set the stage on which Confucianism by degrees came to play a 
central role as an official teaching. 
A second understanding of ritual is that found within the Confucian discourse of 
ritualist ethics, a point so often made by Confucius himself when he declared in the 
Analects (13, 18): 'that a man without virtue had nothing to do with li (ritual)'. He 
could not bear to see the forms of ritual (li) gone through by men without reverence in 
their hearts. 
'These two approaches were closely related in Chinese philosophical discourse 
throughout the long period of Chinese history down to the Qing dynasty era' (Chow 
2003,646), and although they are correct in themselves, their significance to Chinese 
culture is weakened by emphasizing these approaches and thereby neglecting other 
connections, including the overall organic connection with Chinese culture. 
We now know that ritual began with ancestral worship during the Neolithic period: 
According to recent archaeological finds, the ancient Chinese had settled before the 
Neolithic period (around 5000BC) in both north-eastern and north western China, 
centering their tribal community life in ancestral gods (spirits) and natural gods 
(spirits). In this period, known as Yangshao Culture, Dawenko Culture, Liangche 
Culture or Hungshan Culture, sacred objects and sites of worship (temples) and 
burials consistent with the practice of ancestral worship are commonly found. One 
may regard this time as marking the specific era in the prehistory of China which can 
aptly be called the Period of Jade, which lasted at least another two millennia ... In 
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fact part of the word li refers to the offering of patterned jade for sacrificial ritual. 
(Cheng 2001, 496-497) 
Clans and tribal communities based on family lineage had become customary during 
the Period of Jade. The worship of their ancestors provided a worldview imbued with 
the sense of stability, order, and peace. These ancestral rituals later came to mean all 
the ritual used in religious ceremonies. As religion included what we might also now 
refer to as the secular, ritual extended to the court and then to all parts of society. 
Ritual became a social value and a cultural strategy for ordering and restraining 
society. 
Because they were mainly concerned with sacrifices to ancestors, rather than divine 
spirits, 'society became more concerned with the welfare of man than with the 
worship of gods' (Dawson 1978, 93). The fundamental purpose of ancestor rituals 
was the incorporation and continuation of the family and its extension to kin and to 
state - society; it was a strategy for the continuation of Chinese culture. 'Even the 
cultivation of social values such as affection and filial piety, as maintained by the 
classical interpretations, contributed directly to this end' (Yang, C. K. 1967, 48). 
Here, in the Chinese ancestral system, materialized as rituals, there is no need to fear 
death and the unknown 'other', to the extent that was the case for the origins of 
Western culture. Xunzi, in his Discussion of Rites, made it clear that ancestor worship 
was a positive and even joyful practice which understands the harmonious 'ordering 
of birth and death': 
All rites begin in simplicity, and are brought to fulfilment in elegant form, and end in 
joy ... Through rites Heaven and earth join in harmony ... Rites are strictest in their 
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ordering of birth and death. Birth is the beginning of man, death is his end. When 
both beginning and end are good, man's way is complete. Therefore the gentleman 
[regards] both with the same gravity .... To be generous in the treatment of the living 
but skimpy in the treatment of the dead is to show reverence for a being who has 
consciousness and contempt for one who has lost it. (Watson 1964, 94-97) 
For Xunzi, ritual is concerned with all 'aspects of human society. It regulates one's 
daily life and interaction with others, channels emotions properly, distinguishes 
civilised patterns of behaviour, and maintains the political order' (Chow 1994, 56). 
Xunzi's views on ritual rely on two premises: first, humans can only survive socially 
in a well-ordered community with others. If left to survive individually humans would 
succumb to the forces of nature. Second, humans are inherently selfish and, left to 
their needs and desires, without proper order and constraints, their society would self-
destruct. Order means a structure, and the natural order was hierarchical. The 
experience of hierarchy - as higher and lower and as senior and junior - was an 
important factor in the conditions which allowed and propitiated the establishment of 
ritual in ancestral worship is. This natural hierarchy was seen as essential in 
maintaining a holistic totality of order where different places within the hierarchy had 
particular roles and inherent duties. This natural order or hierarchy was to play an 
important part in Chinese culture from these early beginnings to the present and from 
the family to the polity. 
In order to maintain a natural hierarchy and good order, effective allocation of assets 
requires observance of that order and operational rules of conduct: 
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The allotment of each individual is called fen (station), and fen are structured in 
accordance with principles such as kinship, seniority, and socio-political status ... A 
fundamental function of li is to distinguish and structure the fen of members of 
society so that all will receive their appropriate amount of resources to fulfil their 
needs. (Chow 2003, 646) 
Ritual was the means by which an appreciation of these rules and their underlying 
value as virtues was most readily inculcated to society. This included the social values 
discussed in previous chapters, such as filial piety and its extension to the state and 
the polity. 
Although we speak of hierarchy and order, the realm of the ancestors and those 
worshipping the ancestors should not be viewed through a lens which favours a 
philosophy-of presence, as it is still very much a philosophy-of-change. The ritual acts 
were one means to communicate the importance of this ancestral realm and the onto-
cosmological world it so much influenced. In the rituals concerning the ancestors may 
be found a sense of 'totality, mutual placement, mutual support, interdependence, and 
a natural process of transformation and return' (Cheng 2001, 497). Here in this 
ancestral cosmos is the beginning of the cognition of the dao, the inception of yi as 
change, and eventually a philosophy and way of life dominated by reverence and 
piety. 
Up until the modem era, where the significance of ritual is uncertain, ritual, as a social 
custom, as a religious rite or as a familial practice, had an enormous impact on the 
Chinese. However, in philosophical discourse throughout most of this time, the 
significance of ritual waxed and waned. After Xunzi, it was not until the early Song 
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and the rise of the daoxue movement, and the subsequent lixue movement of the later 
Song and Ming, that ritual was once again a fundamental topic of the literati. Leading 
philosophers of these times, 'as an intellectual response to a perceived threat from 
Buddhism', penned copious texts on a comprehensive range of rituals 'pertaining to 
funerals, burials, mourning and ancestor worship' (Chow 2003, 650). 
Philosophical thought in the late Ming period was directed to a large degree towards 
the 'dynamic nature of the mind' (Chow 2003, 652); however, some writers, 
especially from the Dongling Academy, began to question this theoretical focus. They 
began rejecting abstract discussion of human nature, and argued that 'to dwell on the 
essence of mind was nothing but empty talk' (Chow 2003, 652). This ritualist stream 
gained further impetus and gradually moved into mainstream thought during the Qing 
period as a response, not to the threat of Buddhism or Daoism as before, but to the 
conquest of China by the Manchu. 
In attempting to understand China via the Confucian tradition, and focussing 
especially on the neo-Confucian tradition and down to contemporary times with the 
work of Mou Zongsan and Tu Weiming, the cultivation of personal growth 
(sagehood) became the more dominant topic. This has been at the expense of a focus 
on ritual. 
Robert C Neville (2003, 531) offers one explanation for this epistemological oversight 
when he writes: 
The explicit emphasis on ritual dropped back from prominence in neo-Confucian 
discourse ... not because the neo-Confucians did not share the logical point of the 
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ancients about the ritual constitution of civilization ... but because ... the point that 
ritual was important no longer had to be made. 
Continuing this line of analysis, he asserts that a reconstructed study of the signs and 
symbols of Chinese ritual provides 'thick' access to all layers of [culture22]. With this 
assertion I would agree. However, I would argue that the epistemological oversight is 
more an ideological reaction conditioned by Western influence and the West's 'bully 
culture' (Solomon 1993, 13) as argued in Chapter Two. 
6:2 Ritual as li 
The point has been made clear above and elsewhere that rituals have been crucial in 
Chinese history and culture. The rituals of ancestors worship are concerned with 
communicating and understanding important cultural information. However the 
Chinese term li, which is often translated for the English word ritual and makes up 
much of the textual evidence and information used about rituals in China, is difficult 
to translate. 'Ritual', in whatever way it is used in English, does not cover the 
semantic range of li (Chow 2003, 647).This section, along with the following section, 
will endeavour to cover that semantic range, and comprehensively describe its 
meaning, thereby showing connections between the rituals of ancestor worship, li, and 
Chinese culture. 
Li began as a term for sacrifices to ancestors and deities, and, although it never lost its 
important inceptive and deep connection with ancestor worship, its meanings later 
22
_Neville prefers the word 'civilization' here, and while semantic differences are important, I think the 
use of the term culture would not bother him too much. This chapter of his is in fact titled 'Philosophy 
of Culture.' 
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expanded in many ways. 'The etymology and earliest use of the word li is to do with 
religious rites and its connection with sacrifices to spirits' (Cua 2003, 370). According 
to the Shuowen jiezi, an ancient Han dictionary and 'the first real dictionary of the 
Chinese language' (Watson 1962, 194), the graph li means 'practice'- 'religious 
practice' according to Fu (2003, 638). It also means all the various ways of thinking 
and feeling associated with, and necessary to, a ritual performance - a li performance. 
When translated as 'propriety', it refers not just to rituals, but also to proper conduct 
and the ethical reasoning behind this conduct. 'It signifies both the convention and the 
principles which regulate or group life, and particular! y the life of kinship groups' 
(Liu 1959, 68). Later, the use of li was extended to political, social and ethical matters 
and became a basic concept in the Chinese Confucian tradition (Fu 2003, 638). It 
eventually came to mean 'pattern' and 'all patterns of behaviour' and its related 
symbolism. 'The li in each individual thing is part of a larger pattern that runs through 
everything' (Shun 2003, 268). 
Li is not just a matter of ceremony, and its Western meanings range between religious 
ritual, to proper social behaviour, and even etiquette (Schwartz 1985, 22). Li is 'a 
socio-political order in the full sense of the term, involving hierarchies, authority and 
power. The li must themselves support this authority and power' (Schwartz 1985, 68). 
Here Schwartz is articulating li within a secular paradigm. However, for more than 
two millennia, it has also been a concern for traditional Chinese moral life, and in 
broad terms, a Confucian concern with dao (way or Way)- a Chinese religious 
concern (Cua 2003, 370). Both paradigms are linked however with their concern for 
the serious (aspects of life). 
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Depending on the context, and in which discourse it is used, Ii may be translated and 
understood as 'religious rites, ceremony, deportment, decorum, propriety, formality, 
politeness, courtesy, etiquette, good form, good behaviour, [or] good manners ... , 
'rites', rituals, ritual propriety, or ritual rules', especially if we think of 'rites' in the 
broad sense as including any established practice or set of guides to action stressing 
formal procedures for proper behaviour. (Cua 2003, 370) 
One way to elucidate the meaning of li is to examine its conceptual evolution. 
Antonio Cua (2003, 370) urges us to follow Hu Shi (1891-1962), and to see li first as 
a rule. He then proposes that it develops into a 'comprehensive notion embracing all 
social habits and customs acknowledged and accepted as a set of rules to guide action' 
(Cua 2003, 370), and the distinguishing feature that differentiates human beings from 
animals. Later it becomes associated with concepts of right and reason. That is, any 
rule that is considered right and reasonable may be seen as li, an exemplary rule of 
conduct. The li are the actualization (and symbolic articulation) of what is right. 
From the sociological point of view, the li are concerned with the maintenance of 
social structure as a harmonious pattern of roles and statuses. To appreciate the 
significance of li, it is instructive to consider its principle functions by looking at 
Xunzi' s remark on the origin of li: 
What is the origin of Ii? I answer that men are born with desires. If their desires are 
not satisfied, they cannot but seek means for satisfaction. If there are no limits or 
measures to govern their pursuit, contention will inevitably result. From contention 
comes disorder and from disorder comes poverty. The ancient kings hated such 
disorder, and hence they established Ii (rules of proper conduct) and inculcated yi 
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(sense of rightness) in order to make distinctions (fen) and boundaries of 
responsibilities for regulating men's pursuit, to educate and to nourish (yang) men's 
desires, to provide opportunity for their satisfaction (keren zhi qiu). They saw to it 
that desires did not overextend the means of satisfaction, and material means did not 
fall short of what was desired. Thus, both desires and goods mutually support each 
other. This is the origin of li. (Lilun, L417, Watson 1963, 89) 
The etymology of li and its common translation as 'rites' or 'ritual', and its 
connection to sacrifices and to spirits, suggests the early use of li in a religious 
context. The religious point of view, as it is expressed above by Xunzi, and in this 
quote below, is important not for these religious practices per se, and not because they 
worship the spirits of the dead, 'but because of ordinary, human yearning for a long 
life [and] reverence for the dead, especially the beloved dead' (Cua 2003, 381). 
The funeral rites [Xunzi also discusses rites for the living and for military affairs and 
so on] have no other purpose than this: to make clear the principle of life and death, 
to send the dead man away with grief and reverence, and to lay him at last in the 
ground. (A Discussion of Rites: Xunzi. Watson 1964, 104-5) 
This juxtaposition of the dead and living, and the religious with the socio-
philosophical, is also seen in other texts including Confucius' Analects (3.12) and is 
what is meant by his oft quoted 'as if' attitude toward the dead as worthy of sacrifice. 
It is also found in the Li Ji, where it is written that King Wen, when sacrificing, 
served the dead 'as if' he were serving the living. The rites here are used entirely 
symbolically. They are a symbolic means 'of unifying and honouring the beginning 
and the end. In these ritual performances, we consciously engage in pretence without 
215 
self-deception, in order to express our moral emotions of respect and reverence in a 
proper setting' (Cua 2003, 382). 
We know that rites and rituals are symbolically important in a social sense, and they 
also belong in the religious domain either through their importance as a function of 
the serious life or in their spiritual and metaphysical roles. All these significants were 
recognized by the early sages such as Confucius and Xunzi, and they have been 
important in Chinese philosophy and in Chinese culture ever since. Worshipping the 
ancestors is both a function of this world and the other - they need not be separated. 
6:3 Li expanded 
In the Tso Chuan [Zuo Zhuan], 'China's oldest work of narrative history' (Watson 
1989, xi), traditional Confucian concepts such as ren (benevolence), de (virtue), and 
yi (righteousness) are numerous, 'but the key term of the Tso' s doctrine is li (rites, 
ceremonies, sense of propriety)' where it refers to 'specific rules of conduct which 
govern religious and social ceremonies' (Watson 1989, 45). However, as in many 
Chinese philosophical texts, the meaning of the word is extended, and it becomes a 
moral principle, and a principle which even extends to the natural and cosmic worlds. 
Li as rites becomes the exemplar and raison d'etre of li as principle, pattern or reason, 
and it 'developed into perhaps the most important concept in Chinese philosophy 
beginning in the Northern Song period' (Liu 2003, 364). This section is concerned 
with the extension and expanded use of li, and it confronts two questions: first, what 
is the relation between li as rites and li as principle; and second, what is the relation 
between li as rites and Chinese culture? 
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By showing, previously, the connection between ancestor worship and ritual, between 
ritual and li, and here between the li of ritual and the li of principle, the importance of 
ancestor worship is further enhanced through its connections with philosophy and its 
articulation and understanding via philosophy. Chinese philosophy is one particular 
means which enables a clear view of the fundamentals that underpin the culture; it is 
both a constituent of Chinese culture and a means to understand it. It is a 'conscious 
effort to formulate, [and articulate], views and values as expressions of the 
fundamental beliefs of a people' (Cheng 1999, 493). 
All schools of ancient philosophy recognized the value and importance of li, relating 
it initially to human activities. Even the Daoists who are renowned for their dislike of 
ritual made reference (Zhuangzi) to the 'li of heaven or earth, or li of the "myriad 
things" and took li to be something transcendent and metaphysical' (Liu 2003, 365). 
The Mohists mentioned li in correlating names with reality. Both approaches took li 
as something closely related to human activities. It was the Confucianist Xunzi's use 
of li which came to have the most insightful understanding of its normative cultural 
significance. His emphasis on cultural activities such as rites and music profoundly 
influenced Chinese philosophy. 
Xunzi commented that 
You pray for rain and it rains. Why? For no particular reason, I say. It is just as 
though you had not prayed for rain and it rained anyway ... But it is not as though you 
hoped to accomplish anything buy these ceremonies. They are done merely for 
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ornament. Hence the gentleman regards them as ornaments, but the common people 
regard them as supernatural. (Xunzi: A Discussion of Heaven in Watson 1964, 85) 
This should not be equated however, as it often is, as Xunzi understanding li as only 
having a social or political value. In fact he elevated li to a principle of the cosmos. 
Notwithstanding his scepticism towards ii as a superstition, he shared a cultural 
worldview that saw the synthesis of the human, the natural, and the cosmic worlds. 
Li (:El) as principle, the homophone of ii C*L) as ritual, was an important concept in 
ancient Chinese culture and the philosophy which eventually articulated it. Originally 
li was used in reference to patterns on jade, and correspondingly, had religious 
inferences. It not only referred to the carvings on the jade, but also inferred the 
generic idea of culture itself as it emphasised the transformation of a valueless piece 
of rock into a valuable and refined cultural object (Liu 2003, 364). 'Li (principle) 
originally meant 'to "put in order" and can therefore be understood as "pattern" and 
order, but in the long evolution of the concept it came to denote principle, and it has 
been in this sense that most Chinese philosophers have used it' (Chan 1967, 367). 
To understand the connexion between ritual/ii and principle/Ii, it is necessary to first 
understand how ritual was understood in early Chinese philosophy. 'Ritual (ii), 
according to Xunzi, 'is the constant principle of Heaven, the righteousness of Earth, 
and the proper action of mankind ... Ritual determines the relations of high and low; it 
is the warp and woof of Heaven and Earth and that by which the people live' (Watson 
1989, xxiii). Xunzi's understanding of li had a profound influence on the subsequent 
development of Chinese thought. His conception of li has systematic import as it 
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concerns the 'order of things', a concept and meaning closely related to, or used as, 
the meaning of li as principle. 
Xunzi placed special emphasis on cultural activities such as rites and music, 
which formed a comprehensive hierarchical order23• Xunzi's thought 
influenced later Confucian scholars who composed chapters of the Book of 
Rites. For example, the chapter on music took li (rites) to be manifestations of 
li (principle, pattern or reason). (Liu 2003, 365) 
This concern is made clear in their predisposition to associate li (ritual) with its 
homophone li (principle) (Cua 2003, 370). The connection between the concrete 
actions of rituals with the theoretical concept of principle is important as it goes to the 
way the culture is understood philosophically. Xunzi recognized that 'the meaning of 
ritual is great indeed.' And he cautioned that those who try and 'enter it [explain its 
meaning] with the uncouth and inane theories of system-makers will perish there' (A 
Discussion of Rites, Watson 1964, 95). Xunzi says that the li pertaining to funerals 
'have no other purpose than this: to make clear the principle of life and death' (A 
Discussion of Rites, Watson 1964, 105). He also juxtaposes the meanings of li and li 
when he says that 'Music embodies an unchanging harmony, while rites represent 
unalterable reason' (A Discussion of Music in Watson 1964, 117). Where Xunzi is 
finding the 'principle of life and death' in the funeral rites, and 'unalterable reason' in 
rites, he was also finding li in li; principle, reason, pattern, and order of things in 
ritual; he was extending the meaning of ritual, (especially of rituals concerning 
ancestors), through connections with other meanings. 
23 My italics 
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Later Confucians also expressed similar views. In the Neo-Confucian text, On the 
Substance of the Way (Chan 1967, 16), it is written 'that which is inherent in things is 
principle' (1: 15). However, it is also written that 'Humanity is the correct principle 
of the world. When the correct principle is lost, there will be no order and 
consequently no harmony' ( 1: 17). Also, it is clear that 'what exists before physical 
form constitutes the Way. What exists after physical form constitutes concrete things. 
Nevertheless, though we speak in this way, Concrete things are the way and the way 
is concrete things' (1:19) (Chan 1967, 18). In relation to how this might work, and 
how the world might be understood ('Investigation of Things and the Extension of 
Knowledge'), Zhu Xi (1130-1200) provides an example when he says 'that it is not 
enough to know about the li pertaining to a particular instance [for example, filial 
piety]. One has to act on it in order to realize, personally, that this is genuinely li' 
(Shun 2003, 268). 
The li in each individual thing or affair is part of a larger pattern that runs through 
everything, and by repeatedly examining different things and affairs, one uncovers 
this underlying pattern. This process is not induction or empirical generalization but 
more like penetration or insight into what lies behind observable things and affairs. 
(Shun 2003, 268) 
This understanding and appreciation of li as principle, or pattern, or reason became a 
'most important concept in Chinese philosophy'. As Confucianism lost its influence, 
at least at court, and Buddhism became the favoured philosophy of the times, it too 
succumbed to the cultural influence of li, although for the Buddhists it became a 
metaphysical concept. Li (principle) gained its philosophic importance again with the 
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study of li during the era of Song-Ming neo-Confucianism, where it provided the 
name for the period and its style of practice - 'Song-Ming lixue' (Liu 2003, 364). 
Song-Ming neo-Confucian philosophers related li as rites to li as principle, noting the 
extended meaning of ii as rites as 'not just something artificially designed by humans 
to maintain the social and political order; rather rites were based on tianli, the 
heavenly principle inherent in human nature' (Liu 2003, 369). However, this Chinese 
philosophic understanding of principle differs from the Western logocentric 
understanding 'and modes of analysis by virtue of its inherently historical, contextual 
and practical character' (Thompson 2003, 618). Li as pattern was not the same as a 
platonic form or a universal [Western idea of] principle. Rather, li represented the 
inner patterning which structures and relates all phenomena (Thompson 2003, 618). 
'The ancients never spoke of principles detached from particular things' (Zhang 1998, 
6). 
Li, as pattern or principle, is the pattern or order underlying everything and explaining 
why things operate as the do, as well as that to which the operation of things should 
conform. For example, it is li that trees flourish in the spring and fade in the autumn, 
that fire is hot and water cold, or that a boat travels on water and not on land. In the 
human world, li includes all the norms of human conduct; for example, it is li that 
parents are compassionate to children and children filial to parents, or that human 
beings do not cut down trees unnecessarily. (Shun 2003, 268) 
Cheng Yi is credited with emphasising the notion of 'heavenly principle' (tianli), 
which helped the daoxue philosophers offset the Buddhist ontological claims of 
'emptiness' where everything is empty or void of inherent existence. For Cheng Yi, 
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rituals and the social order they gave authority to were part of the cosmic order. 
Cheng Yi commonly refers to ritually indebted social and political institutions of his 
time as being 'grounded in heavenly principles.' He wrote extensively on rituals 
pertaining to the family and lineage, and his views had a great influence on Zhu Xi. 
Zhu Xi' s thoughts on ritual are exposed by his comment that 'ritual is the particular 
manifestation of heavenly principle' and 'since rituals embody heavenly principles the 
phrase simply means "eradicating all selfish desires and returning completely to 
heavenly principles"' (Chow 2003, 651). 
In order to appreciate further the extended meaning of ritual/ii, and also to help 
expose better the relationship between ritual and Chinese culture, it is also important 
to note the relationship between li and culture. In a section above we explored the 
connections between ritual and Chinese culture. Here we explore a more nuanced 
connection-that between li and Chinese culture. Qian Mu (1895-1991) does not 
extend li in the way the Song-Ming lixue scholars did, but he does extend our 
understanding of it when he links li (as the meaning close to the English word ritual) 
to Chinese culture. In his 'Lesson on Chinese Culture' (Dennerline, 1988: 9), he 
notes, as others have, that 'there are no Western language equivalents for the word li' 
and then proceeds to unpack its extended meaning in a unique manner. For Qian Mu, 
especially when comparing Chinese culture to Western culture, li is 'a general 
concept that applies to standards of customary behaviour throughout the Chinese 
world and distinguishes Chinese culture from all others'. The West, according to his 
understanding, does not have this 'customary [pan-Western] understanding of 
culture', and it distinguishes between cultures by comparingfengsu, (local customs). 
This is not appropriate for an understanding of Chinese culture, for local customs vary 
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greatly from place to place. However the li are the same24• 'For a Westerner, culture is 
bound to place, but for a Chinese, culture is universal - so that local customs only 
serves to distinguish place'. 
The universality of Chinese culture, as opposed to the plurality of Western culture, 
has already been made abundantly clear throughout this thesis and especially in the 
chapters on socio-political significance and filial piety. To recap, and in Qian Mu's 
words: 
The li that are the standards for the family - its internal relations, its external 
relations, birth, marriage, death - are equivalent to the li that are standards for the 
workings of government and state ceremonies - internal relations, relations between 
state and society, recruitment, treaties, successions. This is the only way to 
understand Chinese culture. It is different from customary practice. (Dennerline 1988, 
9) 
Here Qian Mu uses the word 'equivalent' where throughout I have used the word 
'connection'. We are both saying something very alike. Qian also sees similar 
connections to ancestor worship (as ritual) and the broader socio-political realm, as 
Chinese culture, when he writes that the family Uia) is the place in Chinese culture 
where li is transmitted. This is both a logical and a normative truth. Li, as the rituals of 
ancestor worship, finds the nearest ancestor within the family- and tautologically the 
ancestor can only be found within the family. When the 'standards of social 
relationships', the li, are extended beyond the family to the wider kin group, and then 
beyond that to both sides of the family and so on, a 'people's descent group', or 
I 24_See Chapters 2 and 3 for discussion concerning the universality of Ii despite local customs. 
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minzu, is made. 'The Chinese are a minzu because the li set the standards in social 
relations for all the people. Where practices vary from the Ii, it is because of local 
custom or economics which are subject to change' (Dennerline 1988, 9). 
Li, as a cultural imperative, finds expression in Chinese philosophy and the classical 
Chinese literature - a place where this thinking is articulated. Although, according to 
Qian Mu, 'the classical literary language gave one access to the metaphorical power 
of the sages and prose masters of the past', a full appreciation of Ii may only come 
about by practice (Dennerline 1988, 15), or by some other sympathetic 
commensurable means which overcomes the inadequacy of the texts. Modem literary 
and herrneneutical study informs us that the texts, including the sacred texts of any 
religion or culture, depend on their meaning within the context of the use and of the 
receptivity of the reader's mind. Ritual/ii was the idea imposed upon the culture by 
the culture and articulated and sometimes analysed by the literati or Ru. 'So long as 
the customary practices of the people could be explained as consistent with li, they 
were tolerated and [cultural] unity was maintained' (Dennerline 1988, 164). And as 
long as political practices were consistent with li, they too would be tolerated. 
In his 'brilliant' and 'intricate' study of li (Cua 2003, 635) as a concept in Chinese 
thought, Tang Junyi (1978) proposes that there are six different [expanded and 
extended] meanings. 'The evolution of Ii refers to its increasing extension' (Cua 2003, 
635). One of those meanings, its initial meaning, is li as wenli - 'principle in cultural 
activities'. With Tang's interpretation of principle in relation to culture, and Qian's 
interpretation of Ii in relation to culture, the correlation between the two homophones 
is complete. 
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6:4 Ritual as communication. 
An understanding of communication as culture, and a ritual view of communication, 
implies that culture defines and maintains itself through ritual. It highlights the 
influence of ideology on and by media, but recognises the forces of culture and 
humanity. Culture is not a top-down process, a process dominated by the social and 
political elite, but a complex process of ritualization leading to collaboration and 
community. Any over-simplified cause-effect or progress model of society and 
cultural communication hides the complex normative way power works within the 
cultural mix. 
An underlying theoretical imperative of this thesis is to show not just what something 
is, that is not just to expose and analyse, but also to try and understand why something 
is what it is? That is, what is the meaning of the ritual or symbol under consideration? 
Here I want to make clear why ancestor worship, as ritual, is central to Chinese 
culture. I have already shown its ubiquity; its relationship to filial piety; its social and 
political significance; and explored the question of what thoughts were behind the 
worship and the rituals concerning the ancestors. It remains the task of this section to 
show why, or at least one way of understanding why, these rituals have had such an 
enormous impact in Chinese culture's development and continuity. 
Ritual, in the generic sense, is a powerful and most effective form of communication. 
From a sociological-religious point of view, i.e. a Durkheimian view, it is an element 
of the serious life. All cultures utilize ritual as a symbolic means of maintenance and 
for adapting to outside influences. Dewey reminds us that 
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Men live in a community in virtue of the things they have in common; and 
communication is the way in which they come to posses things in common. What 
they must have in common ... are aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge - a common 
understanding - likemindedness as sociologists say .... Consensus demands 
communication. (Dewey 1966, 5-6) 
This quote by Dewey is enlightening because not only is it by an influential thinker, 
and one who incidentally taught in China, it reveals his 'emphasis on a ritual view of 
communication' where 'communication is a symbolic process whereby reality is 
produced, maintained, repaired, and transformed' (Carey 1989, 22-23). Furthermore, 
and just as significantly, his views of community are very similar to Clifford Geertz's 
views of culture which underpin the approach used in this thesis. 
A ritual conception of communication is an alternative to the usual way 
communication is viewed. The more common way is to see communication as 
transportation or transmission, where communication emphasizes (new) information 
and the efficient and effective use of transmission across space. The ritual view calls 
attention to the original, socially significant meaning, and to the preservation of 
society in time. Transmission, as an approach to communication, accentuates power 
and control, whereas ritual accentuates social participation and culture (Rothenbuhler, 
1998). 
The hegemony of Western Enlightenment discourse usually considered rituals as 
arational, non-rational, or non-instrumental (Parsons 1954) because they do not meet 
the demands of scientific rationality from the point of view of an objective scientific 
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observer (Parsons, 1968). When rituals are used as if they were instrumental or 
scientific, they are most often labeled as magic, or would be thought of by the 
scientific observers as arational. The nineteenth century anthropologist Frazer defined 
magic as the bastard science because it claims to be able to change the physical state 
of the world by metaphysical means instead of real science, which alters the physical 
world by technical means (Leach 1976, 29). 
Marxist theory focuses on ideology and how it functions within society. Rituals are 
seen to work ideologically as instruments of the central institutions and ideas of 
society, and thus of power. Dominant ideas are reputed to be the ideas of the ruling 
class which, set in most popular cultural forms, support their interests, though it is 
done surreptitiously. Furthermore, it is the bourgeois interests which underpin popular 
culture. Ritual performance is equated with myth, 'which, if not presented as class 
interest, is a form of lying, of intentional confusion, or even magic or witchcraft' 
(Rothenbuhler 1998, 34). 
Although Marxist theory adds to our understanding of ritual, it is far from the whole 
intricate story. The social orders we are trying to understand are complicated; so must 
be our explanations of them, so our understanding of ritual and also of ideology 
require an appreciation of this complexity. If we are to critique ritual, it must be a 
substantive critique, based on the values and beliefs being promulgated and not on a 
formal critique, simply based on the fact that it is a ritual. As Rothenbuhler (1998, 12) 
maintains, ritual works by, and generates its own rationality and logic of signs, 
meanings, and morals; a logic different from that of technical rationality. 
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Another influential discourse concerning ritual emphasizes ritual action as sacred -
that is, it emphasises its religious function. One problem with this discourse 'is that 
the substance of the sacred varies wildly from community to community, culture to 
culture, historical setting to historical setting' (Rothenbuhler 1998 118). However, the 
real problem in relation to the 'epistemological oversight' of the study of ritual is not 
the meaning of the sacred, or even of religion, but that the religious, and therefore 
ritual as sacred, is (now commonly seen as) secondary to secular and scientific 
thinking. This Western oversight of ritual helps explain why the Western 
understanding of Chinese culture either ignores or underestimates the importance of 
ritual in Chinese culture. 
[N]either our understanding of ritual nor of ideology is promoted by facile critiques 
that replace analysis with debunking, questions with presumptions, agnosticism with 
hostility. The social orders we are trying to understand are complicated; so must be 
our explanations of them. (Rothenbuhler 1998, 34) 
Ritual is also used as a synonym for habit and routine, and so in popular usage at 
least, it is often trivialized, although when it does correspond with Durkheim' s 
'serious life', it is not the ritual (meaning) under consideration here. 
Communication, (and this explanation will also be applicable to culture), is both 
clearly and essentially a fusion of thought and matter, of the subject (who thinks) and 
the object (of thought), and of the individual and the collective. Communication is 
internal ideas and experience put in material form by some individual in order to be 
understood by some others within a community. Here, with this synthetic social world 
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view, a study of ritual as communication leads to consideration of important aspects 
of social order which are symbolically constructed. 
Ritual as communication is a cultural strategy that focuses on and encourages social 
participation and the preservation of meaning within that culture. A ritual 
understanding of communication, as opposed to a transmission understanding of 
communication, provides a different view of culture as it focuses on a different range 
of problems and situations. Take for example the simple daily ritual of reading a 
newspaper, as Carey (1990, 22) does. Or, to extend the example further, consider 
imbibing on our daily quota of instant electronic news, or even reading secondary 
articles in journals or books which are themselves dependent on this daily or instant 
type of information. Reading a newspaper, other associated and similar texts, or 
watching a monitor, is for Carey 'less [about] sending or gaining information and 
more [about] attending a mass [or any type of religious meeting], a situation in which 
nothing new is learned but in which a particular view of the world is portrayed and 
confirmed.' 
In relation to China and the project of understanding China's culture, this ritual view 
of communication, brings to bear a suspicion that the means by which information is 
transmitted is perhaps not as objective as we may think it is. News reading, current 
affairs bulletins, journals, and by extension texts written and selected by those who 
are informed by these 'news' facts-of the-world, are a ritual acts. 
What is arrayed before the reader is not pure information but a portrayal of the 
contending forces in the world ... We recognize, as with religious rituals, that news 
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changes little and yet is intrinsically satisfying; it performs few functions yet is 
habitually consumed ... Under a ritual view, then, news is not information but drama. 
It does not describe the world but portrays an arena of dramatic forces and action; it 
exists solely in historical time; and invites our participation on the basis of our 
assuming, often vicariously, social roles within it. (Carey 1989, 21) 
In Western culture the transmission view of communication is the most usual view: 
communication is a process whereby messages are transmitted and distributed in 
space for the control of distance and people. Historically, from the so-called 'Age of 
Expansion' in the West, communication may be seen as 'an attempt to revolutionize 
the conditions under which culture was made and disseminated', to re-create and 
resettle European culture in the far flung reaches of the globe' (Carey 1989, 17). 
When we consider the religious implications of European expansion, we may also 
extrapolate the moral meaning of transportation, to mean the 'extension and 
establishment of God's kingdom on earth'. The moral meaning of communication was 
the same, for it designated a process that was intended to 'spread, transmit, and 
disseminate [religious] knowledge, ideas, and information farther and faster with the 
goal of controlling space and time' (Carey, 1989: 16-17). 
The ritual view of communication, although it pre-dates the transmission view, is still 
uncommon in Western thought. In a ritual definition, communication is linked to 
terms such as sharing, participation, association, alliance, fellowship, membership, 
and 'the possession of a common faith' (Carey 1989, 18). A ritual view of 
communication is the representation of shared beliefs. Xunzi, in the chapter 
'Rectifying Names' in the Xunzi, focuses on language because he wants to reassert 
that ritual (li) is the only standard of correct behaviour. '[He believed that] since 
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reality cannot be a standard of correctness in language, the default standard must be 
convention' (Hansen 2003, 574). 
Western scholarship usually situates ritual as an important concept in religion, 
anthropology, ethnography, sociology and psychology, and it is also often treated in 
the same categories as religion, magic and myth (Chow 2003, 647). Whereas the 
relationship between religion, European expansion, and transmission as 
communication is noted above, the ritual view has the earlier links with religion. 
Before the gospel, the word, and the sermon gained priority, prayer, chant, and 
ceremony were the most vital elements in religion. As Western culture moved through 
the eras of religion as ritual to religion as text and on to the Enlightenment era and its 
values and ideals such as individuality, rationality, and scientific truth, ritual as 
communication, communication as culture, and indeed the idea of culture itself 
became back-grounded. Culture is what other peoples have, and it is only recently that 
culture, as a universal condition, has gained much credence in Western thought, and 
with that acceptance has come a renewed focus on ritual as communication, 
communication as culture, and ritual as an inherent part of culture. It is clear that 
ritual has been central to Chinese culture and that ritual has been an element of the 
Chinese serious life for thousands of years. It is also clear that ritual and 
communication are closely related and that they share many family characteristics 
(Cheal 1992, 363). 
Any critique of ritual must be as complex as the confluence of values and beliefs 
within a culture and 'not a formal critique, based simply on the fact that it is a ritual. 
This section, through its emphasis on ritual as communication, is just one of many 
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ways to assess the value of ritual and rituals within Chinese culture. The specific 
rituals of ancestor worship have their own particular meanings and uses, and that is 
the emphasis of the thesis. However, the reason the Chinese have chosen this 
ritualized culture pathway or strategy is tied to the efficacy of ritual as 
communication. 'The ritual conception of communication calls our attention back to 
the meaning of things' (Rothenbuhler 1998, 123), and it is shared meanings of the 
cultural values within the rituals of ancestor worship that make this critique so 
important. 
6:6 Conclusion 
The underlying question of this chapter asks why was ritual (Ii) has been so important 
in Chinese culture from ancient to modem times. The question is generally answered 
by showing the correlative connections between ancestor worship and ritual. The aim 
of the question has been to further show and explain the significance of the ancestors 
in obtaining a better understanding of Chinese culture. It has also linked the body or 
content of the thesis, which is an exposition of ancestor worship, within the universal 
concept of 'culture' and the particular culture of China. It has achieved this by 
showing the connections between ritual and culture, ritual and Ii, Ii and culture, 
culture as communication, culture understood symbolically as a ritual, and ritual 
communication. Here the connections between the practice of ancestor worship and 
between Chinese culture is made clear. The rationale of connections is: ancestor 
worship- ritual- communication- culture. Put another way, the rituals of ancestor 
worship, understood and extended to mean 'ritual' or Ii, have always been extremely 
important to Chinese culture. When the meaning of Ii is extended to principle, 'it is 
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the warp and woof of Heaven and Earth and that by which the people live' (Tso 
Chuan in Watson 1989, xxiii). It becomes something 'transcendent and metaphysical' 
and cosmological; the Ii of the "myriad things"' (Liu 2003, 365). Having this cultural 
worldview, ritual (Ii) becomes a cultural imperative as a means of continuing the 
(successful) culture. The rituals of ancestor worship, as rites/li were a practice made 
compulsory by the culture for the culture. 
There was good reason why so much emphasis was placed on ritual, and it was not 
just a matter of genteel-manly behaviour or of political expediency, but was a matter 
of cultural transmission - a matter which was obvious even to the ancient Chinese, 
and a matter recently articulated by Western theorists as a concern of communication: 
If the archetypal case of communication under a transmission view is the extension of 
messages across geography for the purpose of control, the archetypal case under a 
ritual view is the sacred ceremony that draws persons together in fellowship and 
commonality. (Carey 1989, 18) 
The rituals of ancestor worship were a sociological emphasis on cultural strategy, on a 
communication strategy, where the community past, present and future join together 
in solidarity, harmony, and strength over time. 
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Chapter7 
Conclusion and Consequences 
John Blair (1993, 29) reminds us that the cross-cultural understanding that we seek 
here concerning Chinese culture is also a matter of comparison with and 
understanding of our own, Western culture: 
It is precisely the function of comparative culture studies to make basic postulates 
explicit in the process of comparing one way of life with another, in particular by 
using the cultural other to bring into conscious definition unspoken presuppositions 
that inform familiar habits of mind. 
One purpose of intercultural studies, according to Arthur F. Wright (1953, 2), 'is to 
ask large and important questions' concerning our world. We must ask these larger 
questions, he adds, or 'abdicate in favour of bolder but less qualified men.' We may 
also contribute further by proposing changes to 'the [current] hypothesis, or in the 
techniques of inquiry, when these seem ill suited to the culture' we are studying. 
These comments, written over half a century ago, form the basis for my concluding 
discussion. They are from the introduction of his book Studies in Chinese Thought, a 
topic which is addressed throughout this thesis, albeit from another direction -
thought underpinning action: practice theory. The book is part of a series called 
Comparative Studies of Cultures and Civilizations and I mention that merely to 
reinforce the idea or goals which Wright mentions. The intention of this thesis is to 
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ask large and important questions about Chinese culture and in doing so to ask large 
and important questions concerning our world. However, before addressing the 
questions concerning importance, I want to address Wright' s other proposal 
concerning changes to techniques which may be 'ill suited' to our type of inquiry. 
The thesis has proposed changes to the conventional and contemporary hypothesis, 
that Confucianism is a metonym for traditional Chinese culture. These changes are 
made because I found that the current master narrative of Confucianism-as-Chinese-
culture was 'ill suited to the culture' I was studying. I was suspicious that the texts 
were a true and reliable representation of the culture as a whole, and wary that the 
Confucian texts, due to the (Western) way Confucianism had been invented. In my 
mind, the West's understanding of China and Chinese culture is problematical due to 
the 'globalization of the Western order' where 'it has become impossible to speak 
with sole reference to traditional texts and without reference to Western notions' (Al-
Azmeh 1991, 468). 
In order to rectify and overcome this epistemological problem, I have proposed a new 
and alternative approach to the understanding of China and Chinese culture, which 
embodies an argument that primarily concerns itself with what people do. Of 
particular interest are those practices which are identified as symbolic and important. 
My approach has been to ask why these practices were and still are practised, what 
were and are the conditions for their existence, and what are the implications of these 
practices for a better understanding of China? I have proposed that a study of ancestor 
worship and its corollaries is much better suited as an epistemological key for 
understanding Chinese culture. In doing so I have relied upon a raft of contemporary 
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theories to underpin a new method or technique of inquiry- more aptly referred to, I 
think, as an approach to understanding. (By calling it an approach I want to suggest 
the freedom of constraint found in the transdisciplinary manner of inquiry). 
My approach is simply to give more emphasis to a specific practice, the practice of 
ancestor worship and its corollaries of filial piety and ritual throughout their long and 
continuous history, and is underpinned by a number of theories which I have 
mentioned in the Introduction and sometimes throughout the thesis. In our 
endeavours at cross-cultural understanding it is 'more helpful to ground our 
understanding in the particularity of a concrete situation than to draw general 
conclusions with claims to absolute truth' (Zhang 1998, 6-7). Ancestor worship has 
been one key symbol that I identified in my research as being important and 
ubiquitous throughout the entire story of Chinese culture. 
In arguing for the importance of ancestor worship as a means for understanding 
China, the influences of those underpinning theories gradually becomes apparent. 
Lyotard (1984) warns us against traditional social theory with its emphasis on 
foundations or universal criteria for truth found within metatheory and grand-
narrative, claiming it has lost its legitimacy. Belief in the so-called rationally 
liberating potential of metatheory 'is to be seduced by the logocentric pretense of the 
Enlightenment' (Ulin 2001, 183). Post-modern theories, especially the 'suspicion of 
grand-narratives' and post-colonial narratives caused me to reject the status quo of the 
Confucianism-as-Chinese-culture narrative. These mostly Western narratives had for 
the first half of the twentieth century and up to the 1960s represented the bulk of 
Western academic work in the area of understanding Chinese culture. 
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Just as Wittgenstein's (2003, §131,133) aim in the Philosophical Investigations was 
to 'achieve a kind of understanding that comes from seeing the particular concrete 
case in the right light', so is mine here. And like his work, mine also is 'not theory or 
a set of positive claims but the understanding which consists in seeing connections 
and not in making theories. My aim has been to argue for a better understanding by 
making a positive case for ancestor worship and showing it 'in the right light'. Most 
importantly, I have followed Wittgenstein's (2003: §133) epistemological dictum that 
'our claims about what we see in the world avoid emptiness only in respect to their 
connections, and so the role of connections has been pivotal in making the case for 
my hypothesis. 
My initial task was to provide a description of ancestor worship, and especially to 
point out that it is a practice that has been ubiquitous throughout Chinese history. 
Here I emphasized the socio-political connections and the cultural connections as we 
explored the seemingly innocuous primitive religious rites and practices of ancestor 
worship. This description-with-connections of Chinese worship provides both the 
meaning of ancestor worship, especially in its broader context, but also and most 
importantly it highlights the universal and comprehensive nature of ancestor worship 
as an important cultural symbol over the entire course of Chinese history and culture. 
The next connection I made is how ancestor worship may also be understood within 
the categories and paradigms of philosophy and religion. It dealt with the importance 
of the ancestors in the minds of the Chinese and in the Chinese mind, and in the 
inception of Chinese culture. Here we begin to see the unique aspects of Chinese 
culture that are necessarily connected to the worship of ancestors. The subject of 
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much of this philosophy is humanity as a social concept. Starting with reverence for 
the ancestors, with the parents as the closest ancestor, it connects, with an emphasis 
on family, to the larger social realm and even to the cosmos. The worldview and 
social strategies which originated in ancestor worship and which profoundly 
influenced Chinese philosophy also had a connection with the socio-political orders. 
Filial piety, as a connection and correlate of ancestor worship, also connects the 
individual to the larger family-kin-ancestor, and eventually to the cosmos. In 
philosophic terms it provides the ontological and cosmological grounds for the unified 
worldview; one that is dynamic and does not require a creator God. Its biological 
connections allow communication across space and time. Analogically, as a cultural 
connection, it connects the biological with the social and the political. 'Filial piety is 
at the very heart of Chinese culture' (Holzman 1998, 199) and as a correlate of 
ancestor worship, each depending on the other for conceptual existence. Ancestor 
worship, thus, may also be seen as what is 'markedly Chinese' and 'at the very heart 
of Chinese culture'. 
The most important connections I made in regards to the thesis proposition are with 
Chinese ancestor worship and ritual. This is important because ritual itself, as it is 
used in Chinese culture, also has a number of connections. The central role of ritual in 
Chinese culture is well known and has not been challenged, but what has not been 
well understood is why ritual has played such a prominent role in the inception and 
maintenance of Chinese culture. In answering this question I make the correlative 
connection between the rituals and rites involved in ancestor worship and the generic 
term 'ritual'. I also make the connection between ritual and the Chinese word li which 
is most often, inadequately though, translated as 'rites' or 'rituals'. The meaning of li 
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is explored to show its more generous denotations and its eventual connections with li 
as 'principle' and therefore a more universal and metaphysical concern. Having 
explored the wide range of meaning attributed to ritual and li, and its wider 
connections, another connection is made. This connection shows that the rituals 
employed in ancestor worship, and also the next level of rituals generally which 
emanated from this worship (ritual/li) were important in that they were a powerful and 
most effective form of cultural communication. 
The message they carried was not only one of temporal connections with ancestors 
and heirs, but a message of important social significance for the present lives of the 
Chinese. Confucius, we are told, developed arguments for Chinese ritual life that also 
reinforce the social efficacy of ancestor worship. In the Book of Rites (Li Chi) he said, 
According to what I have heard, of all things by which people live the rites are the 
greatest... Without them they would have no means of regulating the services paid to 
the spirits of heaven and earth; without them they would have no means of 
distinguishing the positions proper to father and son, to high and low, to old and 
young; without them they would have no means of maintaining the separate character 
of the intimate relations between male and female, father and son, elder brother and 
younger, and conducting intercourse between the contracting families in marriage, 
and the frequency or infrequency (of the reciprocities between friends). These are the 
grounds on which superior men have honoured and reverenced (the rites) as they did. 
(Legge 1975, 261-262) 
In exploring the connections between ancestor worship and ritual, much use has been 
made of the Confucian connection; indeed this has been the case throughout the 
thesis. So the question begs: how is it that the underlying assumption of this thesis is 
that the Confucianism-as-Chinese-culture discourse is inadequate, yet I have 
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consistently had recourse to the Confucian texts as evidence for my arguments for 
ancestor worship as its replacement master narrative? 
The short answer is that Confucianism is important, though it contains much more 
and also much less than what is essential and fundamental for understanding Chinese 
culture. There is not a neat fit between Confucianism and Chinese culture but a kind 
of disjuncture between the Confucian canon as the 'official accounts' of Chinese 
culture, and what people actually do and have done for millennia. 'In other words, 
what is it that produces behaviour, if it is so clearly not the cultural knowledge which 
is revealed in, what Bourdieu refers to as, 'official' public discourse' (Jenkins 1992, 
69)? This thesis has argued that it is an emphasis on ancestor worship, and that the 
focus on Confucianism-as-Chinese-culture is most often irrelevant to a cultural 
understanding, although it is obviously relevant and important in other ways. Besides 
the obvious hermeneutical problems of the Confucian texts referred to previously, 
Confucianism is not a true (or adequately accurate) reflection of Chinese culture. 
Some texts are, of course, more reflective than others (although there is no real 
scholarly consensus on these either), but many, by various degrees, are not. 
But the problems with Confucianism-as-Chinese-culture are even more serious than 
this. The major problems are epistemological and ideological. The problem for the 
West in understanding China is that the West is a 'bully culture' and imposes its 
'transcendental pretense' (Solomon 1993, 13) on all our cross-cultural efforts to know 
and understand China. And it is this problematic which has been the impetus for this 
work. 
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7:1 The Importance of the Thesis 
This cultural difficulty of translation, interpretation and finally understanding brings 
me to a juncture where it is fitting to address the point I opened with concerning the 
importance of a work such as this: why is it important to understand China through 
finding meaning in the practice of ancestor worship? Again the answer is relatively 
simple. First, by understanding China by this means the West will have a better 
appreciation of the cultural differences. Of course, others have offered this assertion 
before. Andrew Nathan (1993, 923, 936) makes it clear that 'to understand the 
distinctiveness of cultures in comparative perspective is a central undertaking of the 
modem humanities and social sciences.' He concludes his essay by asking whether 
Chinese culture is really distinctive, and answers in the affirmative by stating that 
'anyone who studies it must be convinced that it is, [although] we have far to go to 
state clearly how it is distinctive and to prove it empirically.' We cannot, as Nathan 
wishes, prove it empirically as the phenomenon 'culture' is a concept and not 
amenable to scientific study as such. That is, it is not amenable to scientific laws of 
measurement, as we can never manage a suitable and agreed definition of culture to 
enable it to be so. However, what we have done in this thesis is to base our entire 
argument on empirically observable actions: the practices of ancestor worship. This is 
a study of interpretation and it is an interpretive method I offer here as I argue, as if in 
a cultural court of justice, that my interpretation is the better one. 'The process of 
argumentation can and should strive towards achieving a preferred interpretation or 
consensus' (Ulin 2001, 1290). But our efforts at cultural interpretation are not in vain. 
We can still affirm, as Nathan does with conviction, that we are convinced of Chinese 
culture's distinctiveness. 
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Again, this is not new, as others have already stated this, but something is new (and 
important). The means by which we have come to the conclusion of Chinese culture's 
distinctiveness and a description of this distinctiveness are means not chosen before. 
Some have relied on their own and other's interpretation of the Chinese Classics to 
depict a world of thought of the Chinese mind; some have relied on historical and 
archaeological evidence and findings; some have inferred a difference from their 
sociological/anthological studies. This thesis is close to Nathan's hope that we can 
prove the hypothesis empirically, by focussing on a certain practice performed by 
countless Chinese over a number of millennia. So, in effect, we come to the same 
conclusion about Chinese cultural distinctiveness, but I would argue that our 
evidentiary base and our overall argument are sounder. 
But the method, sounder or more rigorous as it is, is not the most significant feature of 
the thesis. The real significance lies in its Chineseness, or more accurately, in its non-
Western-ness. This is not the same Chineseness which as a discourse so concerns 
Chinese intellectuals today. What I mean here is more an 'authentic distinction.' For, 
by eschewing the Corifucianism-as-Chinese-culture discourse, this thesis overcomes 
any negative comparisons between Confucianism and Western religion, philosophy, 
ethics, social ideals and so on. By understanding China as-it-is and as-it-was, and with 
less Western-ethno-centric colouring, it makes it easier to appreciate Chinese culture 
in a more positive light. If there is some agreement that Chinese culture is the most, or 
at least one of the more enduring world cultures, lasting in excess of four millennia, 
then a study of its cultural strategies should be seen as important. And they are 
important both for the Chinese and for the West. For China it means addressing the 
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'China problem'. 'If China is to survive as a nation - united, strong, and independent 
- it must recognize its own heritage' (Dennerline 1988, 115). 
For the West the implications are different. This brings me to the second point I want 
to make regarding how an understanding of China through an understanding of 
ancestor worship is important. As I mention above, it is noticeable over recent times 
in China that there is a strong move to recognize its own heritage - a heritage that has, 
over a considerable time span, proven to be conducive to cultural continuity and 
general cultural wellbeing. However, the concern of this thesis is the Western view of 
China -how can a better understanding of China's culture and its successful cultural 
strategies through a discourse of ancestor worship help us in the West. Firstly and 
somewhat ironically, I will refer to the twentieth century Chinese philosopher, Qian 
Mu and to (his view of) Confucianism. Qian Mu argued that in order to understand 
the spirit of Chinese history, one should study the common people (Dennerline 1988, 
153-156). It was the common people and their culture, that the Confucian this-worldly 
and humanistic ideals distinguish Chinese culture from that of the West (and of India). 
Chinese culture has never been about a struggle between various political, religious or 
ideological institutions. 'The spirit of the culture [may be found in] the belief that the 
spirit of a person lives on in the mind of others' (Dennerline 1988, 153-156), and the 
'key to the construction of Chineseness is the acceptance of the ritual form' (Tu 1992, 
96). 
In this view of Chinese culture, the rituals and ceremonies pertaining to ancestors not 
only link the present with the past and the future, but importantly reinforce core social 
relationships and cultural values. The 'features of the spirit world which enter into 
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such rituals are not simply an arbitrary collection of mythical figures dreamed up by 
generations long dead, but mirror the social world and the concerns of the living' 
(Parish 1978, 249). A full understanding of the import of the connections between 
reverence for the ancestors and the socio-political realm in China and its total 
significance to Chinese culture sets in place a rationale that questions many of the 
standard Western conclusions about contemporary China. This rationale, free from the 
restrictions of the dominant discourse of Confacianism-as-Chinese-culture, and any 
other ideological or culturally biased narratives which prohibit an eyes-wide-opened 
view, allows an analysis of Chinese culture which appreciates its longevity and 
strength over time. 
The secret of the survivability of Chinese culture lies in the intense self-
consciousness of the socialization process ... Therefore, in trying to penetrate the 
uncertainties of China's future, one needs to seek out insights about Chinese cultural 
patterns ... [and] teaching about China will have to deal less with the abstractions of 
ideology and policy and more with actual patterns of behaviour' (Metzger, 1977: x) 
Following from this more positive understanding of Chinese culture, comparisons 
with Western culture and its inherent values and cultural strategies become more 
important and interesting. Colin Mackerras (1987, 61) found that the 'main 
determinant of Western images of China is the West itself' and that while the object 
of his discussion was China, the subject was the West. This is also to a certain extent 
true of this thesis, where my task has been to provide a better and more nuanced 
cultural understanding of China, with the subject of this understanding being the 
West. 
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Adding to these cross-cultural dynamics are a post-modern/post colonial condition 
which is increasingly questioning the Enlightenment meta-narrative of Western 
culture; an increasingly more powerful and influential China; and the more recent 
decline of many of capitalism's most cherished ideals in the wake of what is termed 
the world financial crisis. It is not my intention here to argue for or against one culture 
or the other- merely to suggest that when Chinese culture is better understood 
through the approach suggested by this thesis, some of the ideals and cultural 
strategies of the West, which have for a long time been the standards for the rest of 
the world also, are less certain - its transcendental pretense becomes open to doubt. 
For instance the Western model of democracy and the human rights ideals of the 
West, once beyond question, are now under growing suspicion and question, as is also 
the hitherto unquestioned Western assumption of the individual as autonomous (as 
opposed to the individual connected to community). Western Enlightenment thinking 
is dogmatic in that it is dismissive of any other cultural views - this is its 
'transcendental pretense'. Ancestor worship, as opposed to Confucianism, reveals a 
fundamental cultural difference from Western 'individualism' as opposed to what the 
pundits refer to as 'communalism': 
The excesses of individualism - laissez-faire capitalism, anarchism, lack of respect 
for authority, loss of community, histrionic romanticism- all these must be weighed 
against the fact that, in the Enlightenment and after, individualism was supported by 
the assumption of universal reason and the natural goodness of human nature. 
(Solomon 1993, 14) 
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I have mentioned early, a number of times, why I think this thesis' alternative means 
to understanding China is worthwhile. In doing so I have pointed to the concepts, 
often best encapsulated by Al-Azmeh (1991, 468) of the 'globalization of the Western 
order'; of 'Western economic and political conquest and hegemony'; and of the 
subsequent 'correlative conditions of equally real ideological and cultural hegemony.' 
Many of Al-Azmeh's criticisms are echoed in the debate and discourse surrounding 
'Asian values'. This debate and 'most of the issues and impulses that come under its 
broad umbrella are still alive ... but no one talks about "Asian values" per se' (Barr 
2004, 177). 
The core 'Asian values' argument is cultural relativism, and, with Al-Azmeh, makes 
similar critiques of Western hegemony and that much of the political, social and 
cultural values accepted as universal norms are in fact Western. The 'Asian values' 
argument goes further and adds that these norms are no more legitimate than Asian 
norms. 
At its core the 'Asian values' argument is remarkably consistent. Its proponents 
advocate a hierarchical view of society that emphasizes the interdependence and 
social nature of human beings. The family has a special place as it is 'the prime 
conceptual basis of a relational view of society, and because it is a natural and self-
sustaining mechanism for providing nurture, socialisation and social services to the 
population' (Barr 2004, 7). 
Reference to Asian values has declined, but its core ideals remain alive. The architect 
of the debate, Lee Kuan Yew, now says that he no longer refers to Asian values; 
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however he does refer to 'Confucian values' (Lee Kuan Yew, Asiaweek, 21 May 
1999). And as this thesis has questioned and found these cultural values to be no more 
than another name for Chinese cultural values, we can now begin to read a new 
cultural discourse as 'Chinese cultural values'. Michael Barr (2004, 186) reminds us 
that: 
China will always remain a distinguishing feature of life, economics and politics in 
East and Southeast Asia. No matter what developments take place in the United 
States or Europe, Pacific Asia will always have to live with China as a potentially 
overbearing neighbour - an overwhelming rival and/or a partner in trade and 
investment ... [and] ... The realities of the 'Asian values' discourse are not as 
permanent as the reality of China. 
Although not referring to the Asian values debate, but maybe to some of its 
underlying sentiments, Robert Solomon (1993, 360) also reminds us that this is not 
the end of history but only the end of universal history. He calls on us to realize that 
'our vacuous individualism can no longer be supported by our pretentious 
universalism; that we are but one peculiar culture among many, that we have 
underrated the importance of culture.' As more credence is given to China's history as 
opposed to the West's (generally) blinkered reading of it; its aversion to warfare and 
its urge to conformity; and the dominance of its socio-political realm over the 
military, defence policy strategists in the West can spend less time worrying about 
China and more time on other more belligerent targets. 
The people of China account for about one fifth of the world's population ... even in 
Han/Roman times the Chinese population was vast, probably not less than a fifth of 
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the world's total then. Its cities were, and long remained, the most crowded, and its 
fields the most productive. In science, technology and industry it led the way. (Keay 
2008, 22-23). 
However, the Chinese, unlike their European counterparts, had no global ambitions. 
During the 'middle ages' a predominately Buddhist China, although aware of the 
crisis in its 'Holy Land' of India did not participate in a Holy War. Furthermore, even 
though they also launched transoceanic armadas, just as the European nations were 
doing, they did not launch these in order to amass spices, or gold, or silver, or to 
exploit the labour of others or their lands. Their objective was simply to promote and 
extend harmony throughout 'All under Heaven'. The Chinese empire would remain 
restricted to China and its immediate neighbours. A fifth of the world's population 
would advance no claim to a fifth of the world's cultivable land (Keay, 2008: 22-23). 
China's urge to be there for the next generation and the previous generations far 
outweighs any ideals which others may impose upon them. 
These are some of the important questions and arguments that more readily arise 
when China is understood through the discourse of ancestor worship, piety and 
veneration. The distinctiveness of the culture comes to the foreground: its ontological 
preference for change over substance and presence; its focus on humanity and 
humanism as the individual in the society and not the individual opposed and 
separated from others; its reliance on ancestors and their proximity as opposed to a 
God or heaven; its emphasis on filial piety as opposed to an existential self; and the 
universality of Chinese culture, as opposed to the plurality of Western culture. 
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When the rituals of ancestor worship (as li) are extended to principle (as lil, 'it 
[becomes] the warp and woof of Heaven and Earth and that by which the people live 
(Tso Chuan in Watson 1989, xxiii). With this cultural world-cosmological view in 
mind, the rituals and reverence involved in ancestor worship become the cultural 
imperative of Chinese culture, and the best means available for the West to 
understand China, its people and its culture. 
There is no doubt that the Chinese have placed an enormous emphasis on their 
ancestors and that ancestor worship has played an important and ubiquitous role in 
Chinese history and culture. An understanding of this cultural emphasis or significant, 
gained through a reading of its connections, provides the Western reader with a more 
subtle and reliable understanding of China than has previously been available. 
There is, at this final juncture, a temptation to replace the metonym of Confucianism-
as-Chinese-culture with a more suitable alternative. Perhaps the term 'familism' may 
be considered more appropriate, or even the term 'cornrnunalism', which already has 
wide acceptance in Western discourse and especially in philosophy, may offer a better 
and acceptable alternative. However, although they are perfectly reasonable 
descriptors of Chinese culture, they both lack the full epistemic range to be considered 
as better alternatives to Confucianism. We could always invent a term; and something 
like 'ancestralism' might suffice. However, unless we always link it with the caveat 
that it must be understood (and used) only as a referent to ancestor worship; and that 
as a symbolic action itself it must be understood as a practice; and that it is only 
through its web of connections that it opens the door to a continuing process of 'hardy 
work' (Turner 1995, 2); and that the process is one of continuation which requires the 
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analyst to investigate things in a hermeneutical manner, then the metonym is 
insufficient. This work, if accepted and used as intended, is only a key; 'a key to an 
understanding of the essential constitution of [Chinese culture25] (Wilson 1954, 241).' 
It is no substitute for hardy work. It is in essence a starting and re-starting point, and it 
is also a limiting paradigm. 
As a hermeneutical work, it is necessarily only temporary. In its use as an alternative 
means for a better cross-cultural understanding of China, it will both provide a better 
understanding of Chinese culture, and, in the process, the better understanding of 
Chinese culture, even if it just more nuanced, will change how we think about 
Chinese ancestor worship. 
25 Monica Wilson here was referring to the study of ritual in the generic sense and so rather than 
'Chinese culture' her object was 'human societies'. 
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